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6EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. Several recent papers have highlighted the increasing problems that global fisheries face. Some 28% of 
stocks are overexploited, depleted, or recovering; most of the world’s fishing fleets are overcapitalised; 
approximately 10 million tonnes of fish are discarded; 11–26 million tonnes (worth USD 10–23 billion) are 
lost to IUU fishing. Underperformance due to inefficient operations, overexploited stocks and perverse 
incentives result in an estimated loss of USD 50 billion in economic rent each year.  
2. Commissioned by the International Sustainability Unity, this report investigates a number of innovative 
solutions that have been developed to deal with five key challenges that are impeding progress in achieving 
sustainable fisheries: overcapacity; perverse subsidies; poor governance; lack of data; and by-catch and 
discards. These key challenges are interlinked and affect the sustainability of fisheries both directly as well as 
indirectly by undermining instances of good management.  
3. Through 22 case studies demonstrating good practice, we explore how these challenges have been 
addressed around the world and how these approaches might be scaled up and applied in other fisheries. 
Each case study draws on published material and interviews with key people involved in the fishery. The 
main report draws lessons from these case studies.  
Table 1: List of case studies and the challenge they address 
Case study Challenge addressed Page number 
Alaska: Transferable quotas for Pacific Halibut Overcapacity 20
Iceland: Transferable quotas Overcapacity 22
Canada: Quota pooling for herring roe Overcapacity 24
Vietnam: Ben Tre clam Overcapacity 26
ISSF: Market-demand innovation Overcapacity 28
Chile: Territorial use rights Overcapacity 30
Tackling subsidies through the WTO Perverse subsidies 36
New Zealand: Removal of subsidies  Perverse economics 38
Kiribati: Phoenix Island Protected Area Perverse economics 40
Banking on Cod Perverse economics 40
MSC: Harnessing market power Perverse economics 42
The Philippines: Aquaculture governance in Lake Taal Poor governance  48
South Africa: Certification of the hake fishery Poor governance 50
Mozambique: Co-management  Poor governance 52
Antarctic: Ecosystem-based and precautionary management Lack of data 58
Fiji: Local knowledge and traditional management practices Lack of data 60
Senegal: IUU fishing in small-scale fisheries Lack of data 62
Scotland: Conservation Credits Scheme Lack of data 64
Scotland: Salmon aquaculture Lack of data 66
Australia: Prawn seawater hopper By-catch and discards 72
Norway: Discard ban By-catch and discards 74
International: WWF SmartGear Competition By-catch and discards 76
74. Overcapacity threatens the sustainability of fish stocks if fishing effort is not effectively restricted. 
Traditional “top down” approaches to regulating capacity include decommissioning and limited licensing 
schemes. Several case studies demonstrate that rights-based approaches, particularly those allowing the 
transfers and trade in rights and quota, can be an effective and efficient method to align fishing activity 
with fishing opportunities. For instance, in Alaska the number of licences for fishing Alaskan Pacific halibut 
greatly reduced from 4,830 to 2,855, once a transferable quota system was introduced, and price for 
landed halibut increased from USD 1–2 per lb to USD 3–5 per lb. Total revenue increased from 
approximately USD 50 million in 1992 to USD 245 million in 2008. However, in Iceland the initial limitation 
on transferability limited the benefits. 
5. The implementation of ITQ systems can be appropriate for fleets managed under an objective of 
maximising economic gain, but safeguards may be required to protect less economically-driven fleets. In 
Norway and Alaska, this is achieved by limiting transferability of quota between small and large scale 
fleets. These safeguards are not implemented in Iceland, thus currently Icelandic governments are still 
trying to manage the social repercussions as a result. 
6. Other innovative mechanisms to control capacity and effort are also proving useful. The initiative of ISSF 
is intended to ensure sustainable, legal, tuna fisheries through market control. Local management 
measures, often based on traditional practices, have also proven effective in addressing overcapacity and 
many of these approaches generally have less emphasis on enforcing catch limits. In Fiji the emphasis 
was on using closed areas to control the overall levels of exploitation. 
8. Perverse subsidies to the fisheries sector (such as for vessel construction and fuel tax waivers) reduce 
the real costs of fishing and enable fishing to continue beyond the point at which it would otherwise be 
unprofitable. The countries that provide the most subsidies are Japan (USD 5.1 billion), India 
(USD 4.5 billion), the EU (USD 3.2 billion) and China (USD 2.7 billion); seven countries provide two-thirds 
of all subsidies. The WTO process represents the best opportunity to tackle harmful fisheries subsidies on 
a global level.  
9. Several countries have taken individual initiatives that have shown that, although the removal of subsidies 
can be painful, it often leads to a stronger fishery sector. The removal of fisheries subsidies cost the New 
Zealand government USD 25 million to buy back provisional quota allocations, but subsequently 
approximately USD 20.7 million annually is contributed by a more profitable, robust industry towards 
management and monitoring costs. The removal of subsidies from fisheries is of particular benefit to 
taxpayers, who no longer have to support the industry.  
10. Positive economic incentives and private financing can also have an important role in stimulating 
innovation and by enabling better management. One particularly interesting one is an endowment fund 
that is being established to cover the costs of management of the Phoenix Island Protected Area in 
Kiribati. This fund provides compensation to the government for the opportunity cost of not issuing 
fishing licences. The initial aim for capitalisation of the PIPA endowment fund is USD 25 million. This will 
be used to cover the park management costs as well as an annual payment of USD 1–3 million to the 
government to compensate for lost fishing licence payments. Banking on Cod is another innovative 
financial mechanism that enables investors to contribute to a fund that provides loans to fishing bodies 
implementing stock recovery management plans. Benefits from rebuilding the cod stocks in Atlantic 
Canada, for example, are expected to be worth in the region of USD 800 million per year . 
11. A large number of case studies also involve harnessing ethical purchasing choices through market-based 
mechanisms, including eco-labelling, which can be very effective in generating positive economic 
8incentives for sustainable fishing. The Marine Stewardship Council programme generates a market-based 
incentive, and is currently growing exponentially. Recent estimates suggest MSC certified fishery tonnage 
is >7 million tonnes, an increase of ~4 million tonnes in 2009 and <2 million tonnes in 2006. Large 
financial gains of fisheries certified can also be expected. In the Ben Tre Clam case study, unit price has 
increased from VND 10,121/kg (USD 0.49/kg) in 2007 to VND 36,013/kg (USD 1.77/kg) in 2010. 
12. Poor governance can undermine sustainable management. A common conclusion from the case studies 
was inclusive and accountable processes to address governance challenges can be a vital step in making 
sustainable management possible. This was experienced in Mozambique where prior to implementation of 
the co-management committees, local communities had little control or input in the management of the 
fishery. However, conflict has since reduced amongst neighbouring regions and wider uptake of the 
concept to over 150 nearby villages and increasing representation at the national levels is testament to its 
success. 
13 Similarly in Lake Taal, Philippines, new designated protected areas developed through a participatory 
multi-stakeholder process has led to a Protected Area Management Plan and resulted in the successful 
removal of over 5,000 illegal aquaculture structures. 
14 A lack of data regarding fish stocks and the wider ecosystem confounds attempts to develop effective 
management measures. Critical data about the operation of fisheries, the target species and the 
ecosystem are often insufficient to allow for evidence-based decision-making. This can result in 
inappropriate management measures, appropriate management measures being applied inaccurately, or 
no management at all. 
15. All three situations jeopardise the sustainability of fishery resources. Several case studies show how 
implementing Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management in combination with the Precautionary Approach 
allows for the development of suitable approaches in both data-rich and data-poor situations. Through 
the employment of the 100% observer coverage program, CCAMLR are able to clearly identify problems 
with fishing (e.g. high by-catch, declining catches). Costs for this program are estimated at 3% of the 
USD 293 million annual yield from the fishery. Constant monitoring though has allowed the accurate 
observation of a decrease in bird mortalities from 5,755 in 1997 to zero within 10 years. The Krill Yield 
Model, in conjunction with precautionary measures, has also been employed in CCAMLR. Through this 
and even with the uncertain nature of krill recruitment, managers have been able to maximise the 
likelihood that krill biomass remains at levels which will cause the least impact to other reliant animals. 
16. In the data-poor artisanal fisheries in Senegal, local fishers have collectively developed management 
committees to regulate fishing and enforce fines for non-compliance, and established marketing 
arrangements that benefited local fishers. The use of local knowledge in applying precautionary measures 
can help secure the resource base for a fishery that supports some 57,000 people directly and provides 
an important food source for many more – up to 75% of local population. 
17. By-catch and discards threaten populations of target species as well as other marine organisms that 
may be captured incidentally by fishing operations — other species of fish, seabirds, marine mammals or 
turtles. Solutions include prohibiting discarding, utilising by-catch, and reducing the amount of by-catch 
through gear modifications or implementing time or area closures (including Marine Protected Areas). The 
Norwegian case study has implemented a series of gear modifications, banning of discards and real time 
closures. The benefits experienced from this have included cod stock increases from 121,243 tonnes in 
1987 to 1.1 million tonnes in 2010 (844%). However, the costs involved with the necessary high intensity 
at-sea enforcement were approximately NOK 800 million (USD 137.8 million) in 2006. 
918. The solutions requiring gear modifications are best developed in cooperation with fishers and are most 
successful if they work to the mutual advantage of fishers and the environment. Industry driven designs 
are used in Australia’s Northern Prawn Fishery where research demonstrated that over a four hour period, 
discard survival rates doubled from 8% to 16% through the use of seawater hoppers. This allowed for 
new sorting methods which improved product quality and thus fishing revenue. WWF’s SmartGear 
competition has attracted 70-90 privately funded gear design entries each year. These entries are then 
judged and first prize designs win USD 30,000 and two runner up designs win USD 5,000. Creating 
positive financial incentives for fishers maximises uptake or self-implementation of change. 
19. Our recommendations for specific actions that will promote sustainable fisheries management are:  
a. Fish is the most widely-traded global agricultural commodity harnessing global markets to 
generate change in fisheries management can be one of the most effective way to encourage 
better environmental performance. Actors external to the fishery but with wide market power can 
potentially tackle a wide range of problems. Consolidation within the sector means that individual 
processors and retailers have increasing power to influence the operations of management bodies 
and to make important contributions to increased sustainability. Similar to meeting health guidelines, 
requirements for products to demonstrate sustainable sourcing could represent a formal or 
legislative entry point for change. Raising awareness of sustainability issues within the public arena 
can create pressure for policy reform and on retailers to source more sustainable fish. 
b. Economic inefficiencies in the global system must be addressed by  removing subsidies. 
Furthermore, creating positive economic incentives and mobilising private financing in innovative 
ways can also play an important role in fisheries management and make important contributions to 
enhancing sustainability. The key challenge is to identify sources of funds which can be made 
available to support these innovative schemes. 
c. Fisheries managed with the objective of maximising economic returns should become 
rights-based, preferably with tradable rights and quota (ITQ). If the fishery is properly controlled, 
such systems can generate significant increases in wealth and positive incentives for sustainability. 
However, equity and social issues will also need to be explicitly considered and ITQs may be 
inappropriate where the main objective of the fishery is not economic (e.g. access to fisheries 
resources, maximise food production or employment). Convening policy-makers and engaging with 
civil society representatives to explore the place and potential for ITQs and alternative rights-based 
approaches will be an important starting point to increase uptake of these approaches.
d. Promote the use of scientific observers and other methods of comprehensive data 
acquisition. The benefits that arise from independent scientific observation of a fishery cannot be 
understated. All forms of knowledge have a role in management and information from fishers can 
contribute to understanding stock status and contribute to wider implementation of Ecosystem-
Based Fisheries Management. Where the cost of observers is an issue, increased investment in 
automated data collection is a possibility. Small vessels cannot usually support observers, but here 
the most effective way of acquiring information may be to engage collaboratively or support fishers 
in their own research. In these cases, fishers can assist in identifying both the problem and 
innovative solutions and responses. Increasing investment in data collection, developing new cost 
effective methods and encouraging collaboration between fishers and the fisheries managers are 
crucial steps. 
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e. Increased application of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management. Where there is 
uncertainty about the interactions and interrelationships between fished stocks and the wider 
ecosystem, more precautionary approaches may be more suitable, setting management targets and 
limits in a manner that accounts for interactions and interdependencies. For static habitats (such as 
coral reefs, spawning grounds of fish, sensitive habitat types) MPAs can make an important 
contribution. Additionally. Raising awareness of the importance of considering these interactions and 
ecosystem dimensions, advocating the wider application of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management 
and promoting risk-based approaches represents an important first step. 
f. Promote collaboration and inclusiveness in policy making and management to solve 
governance problems. We recognise that generating collaborative approaches may not be 
straightforward and conflict and confrontation may be part of the process. collaborative processes 
that respect the knowledge, perspectives and positions of different parties can help highlight the 
strengths of stakeholder groups and identify management arrangements that develop their potential 
roles in contributing to sustainability. Working together to achieve sustainability becomes a means 
to further develop trust and respect and we recommend support to initiatives that can bring 
together stakeholders. The most important international governance initiatives currently in existence 
are the UNFSA and Port States Agreement. A key action that will bring about significant benefits is 
to facilitate and assist the ratification of these two instruments by all states.
g. Support innovation as a process rather than single solutions. As initiatives such as 
ecolabelling, industry-led innovations and multi-stakeholder dialogues have demonstrated, it is 
possible to initiate processes that contribute to environmental sustainability. Similarly, the WWF 
SmartGear competition represents an initiative that supports industry (and other actors) to develop 
innovative solutions to by-catch and environmental impacts. With suitable investment (e.g. from 
NGOs, governments and the  private sector), these types of process have a potentially wider 
applicability and can be used to address other challenges. Inclusive processes are more likely to 
identify acceptable solutions and their implementation and uptake is likely to be greater than for 
imposed solutions. As with many of the management challenges, ultimately the process of arriving 
at new solutions is as important as the solutions themselves.
11
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THE STATE OF GLOBAL FISHERIES 
Global fisheries production and the global fishing fleet 
Global fisheries and aquaculture production has increased steadily since the 1950s, reaching 144 million tonnes in 
2006, up from approximately 120 million tonnes a decade earlier (FAO 2009). However, this increasing trend 
masks the stagnation of production of wild capture fisheries from the mid-1980s, with the increase in output 
mainly due to increasing production from aquaculture and questionable statistics from China (Figure 1). The 
estimated first-hand sale value of capture fisheries and aquaculture production was USD 170 billion in 2006. 
This increase in production was largely due to the 
world’s fishing fleet expanding steadily since the 
end of the First World War, when countries 
supported the development of their national fishing 
fleets in the interests of food security and national 
defence. By 2006 there were 2.1 million motorised 
fishing vessels worldwide, mostly small-scale 
vessels and 70% of them in Asia. Of these, 
1.3 million were decked vessels (with enclosed 
areas), and 23,000 were industrial vessels over 
100GT (roughly equivalent to more than 24 metres 
in length).  
Although the number of vessels has fallen slightly 
since the 1990s, the actual fishing power and 
catching capability of the world fleet continues to 
rise. This is due to more powerful engines, 
improvements in technology such as fish-finders, and more efficient fishing gears. These factors mean the global 
fishing fleet can fish further and deeper than ever before. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), 
estimated to catch 11–26 million tonnes of fish worth USD 10–20 billion annually (Agnew et al. 2009), puts 
further pressure on fish resources and undermines management efforts.  
The contribution of aquaculture to global supplies of fish, crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic animals has 
grown dramatically, from 3.9 % of total production by weight in 1970 to 36% in 2006, accounting for 47 % of the 
world’s fish food supply. With an average annual growth rate of 8.7% since the 1970s, aquaculture is the fastest-
growing animal-based food sector. However, there are concerns about the sustainability of the growth of the 
aquaculture sector. In many places expansion has come at the expense of coastal habitats such as mangroves; its 
effluents can cause pollution of surrounding waters; production can depend on wild capture fisheries production, 
either for feed for the culture of carnivorous fish (e.g. salmon), or for the supply of juvenile animals (e.g. shrimp 
and bluefin tuna).  
Decline of fish stocks and damage to the marine environment  
Over half of all fish stocks are fully exploited, producing catches at or close to their maximum sustainable limits 
(Figure 2). Of these, 19% are overexploited, 8% depleted and 1% recovering, yielding less than their potential 
(FAO 2009; Garcia and Rosenberg 2010); and only about 20% are moderately exploited or underexploited with a 
possibility of producing more (FAO 2009). The percentage of overexploited, depleted and recovering stocks has 
tripled since the 1970s. 
Over the last 30 years there has been a pattern of serial depletions of fish stocks with fleets targeting different 
stocks or new, previously unmarketable, species such as deepwater species, estimated now to contribute 4 million 
tonnes (Garcia and Rosenberg 2010). Consumers have, predominantly, remained unaware of the true situation, 
as locally-caught fish has been substituted for imports of the same or similar species from further afield. For 
example, in the UK market, cod from the North Sea has largely been replaced by cod from Iceland, the Barents 
Sea and the Pacific Ocean.  
The situation within European fisheries is illustrative of this situation: 88% of fish stocks in European waters are 
overexploited, the European fleet’s catching capacity far outstrips the potential of fish resources and consumer 
demand for fish in Europe is increasingly met by imports, with 60% of fish consumed in the EU coming from 
imports.
CHAPTER 1
Figure 1: Global capture fisheries and aquaculture 
production, 1950–2008. Source: FAO (2010) 
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In addition to the depletion of fish stocks, fishing can 
cause impacts on the wider marine ecosystem. Fishing 
vessels may catch more fish than they are allowed to 
under their quota allocation, which may be discarded, 
dead, back into the sea. Fish that are not marketable, 
either due to their species, or size (e.g. juvenile fish 
that are too small to sell either because of market 
requirements or fishing regulations) may also be 
discarded. The level of discarding has been estimated 
by Kelleher (2005) as about 9.5 million tonnes, or 10% 
of landings, but discards are rarely recorded and are 
difficult to estimate.
Fishing also catches species other than fish, such as 
birds, marine mammals and turtles, impacting on their 
populations. Some types of fishing gear, such as 
bottom trawls and especially beam trawls, sweep the 
seafloor, damaging ocean floor habitats. This is particularly a concern where these habitats easily damaged, such 
as corals (which can occur in both tropical and cold waters). 
Economic underperformance of fisheries 
As a renewable natural resource, fish stocks can generate a sustainable flow of benefits to society. However, 
fisheries may be operating below their economic optimum even if they are managed effectively at their biological 
maximum production. The 80% of global fish stocks that are fully exploited, overexploited, depleted or recovering  
(Figure 2) are underperforming economically, with an estimated annual loss of USD 50 billion to the global 
economy (World Bank and FAO 2009). 
This loss is the result of two main factors: depleted fish stocks mean that there are fewer fish available to catch 
and the costs of catching are greater than they could be; and the overcapacity in the fishing fleet means that the 
potential benefits are dissipated through excessive fishing effort. The current marine catch could be achieved with 
approximately half the current level of fishing effort. Subsidies to the global fishing fleet, estimated at USD 30–
34 billion per year, represent a further cost to society, which in many cases continue to support unsustainable 
fishing practices and are an important factor in the overexploitation of fish stocks. 
Why does it matter? 
Fisheries provide employment for around 170 million people worldwide, and contribute to food security for many 
more. Fish and fishery products are one of the most widely traded agricultural commodities; exports were worth  
USD 86 billion in 2006 (FAO 2009). Fisheries are particularly important for developing countries, contributing to 
livelihoods of many poor rural and coastal 
communities, as well as providing export 
revenues greater than those of other 
agricultural commodities. 
Poorly performing fisheries put at risk 
these potential benefits, as well as the 
livelihoods of people that depend on 
them. With rising food prices and the 
need to ensure food security for 9 billion 
people by 2050, fisheries’ contribution 
needs to be maintained and increased 
where possible. Effective management is 
required to capture these benefits as well 
as to ensure greater resilience in natural 
ecosystems to withstand potential climate 
change.
INTRODUCTION
Figure 2: The status of global fish stocks, 1974–2006. Data  
source: FAO (2009) 
Figure 3: Major trade flows of fish and fishery products. (Adapted from FAO 
2007).
14
There are a number of factors that have contributed to the current state of global fisheries. Poor management, 
partly as a result of a lack of data on which to base management decisions, and often caused by weak 
governance, results in the application of inappropriate management measures. A lack of control of the activities of 
the fishing fleet allows overexploitation to happen and results in environmental problems such as by-catch, 
discards and habitat damage. It also allows illegal fishing to flourish. Subsidies to the fishing fleet exacerbate 
overcapacity issues and enable vessels to keep fishing when it would otherwise be unprofitable. Coupled with 
this, perverse economic incentives encourage overfishing and allow overexploitation and environmental damage 
to continue, rather than promoting responsible behaviour, sustainable practices and resource conservation. 
The challenge of achieving sustainability in fisheries requires consideration of ecological, social and economic 
components (Figure 4). Whilst the biological sustainability of an individual fish stock underpins the flow of 
benefits from it, the wider ecological sustainability of the marine ecosystem is also necessary to ensure continuing 
productivity. This is also threatened by fishing, marine pollution and climate change (Perry et al. 2005; Cheung et 
al. 2007). The social and economic aspects of sustainability must also be considered. Fisheries provide both 
economic and food benefits to individuals and society and these aspects, if not addressed, may undermine 
attempts to achieve biological and ecological sustainability. Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) that do not address 
these social and economic aspects often end up 
as protected areas in name only, as local 
people’s needs may make compliance with 
biologically-focused regulations difficult. 
Alternatively, a fish stock may be exploited 
sustainably (in biological terms), but the fishing 
fleet that targets it may be unprofitable and 
therefore economically unsustainable. 
Sustainability can be addressed at various levels, 
from local to international. Many fisheries issues 
need to be addressed at the global scale and a 
number of important international frameworks 
for managing fisheries have been developed 
over the last few decades (see Box 1). 
This report identifies five key challenges that are 
impeding progress towards achieving sustainable 
fisheries: overcapacity; perverse subsidies; poor 
governance; lack of data; and by-catch and 
discards. These key challenges are interlinked 
and affect the sustainability of fisheries both 
directly as well as indirectly by undermining 
instances of good management. The case 
studies in this report explore how these challenges have been addressed in innovative ways using examples from 
around the world. 
Overcapacity 
Overcapacity occurs when the fishing fleet is larger than it needs to be to catch the available fish resources. This 
capacity is not necessarily a threat to the sustainability of fish stocks if fishing effort is effectively restricted. 
However, problems arise when effort is not adequately constrained to ensure that catches are suitably limited. 
Under such conditions, overcapacity results in too much fishing effort and therefore too many fish being caught, 
leading to overexploitation of fish stocks.  
Overcapacity is not just related to the number of fishing vessels, but includes also their ability to fish. More 
powerful engines and new technologies contribute to increasing fishing capacity. Furthermore, overcapitalised 
fleets are often unprofitable and this issue of economic overcapacity can increase incentives to overfish. Issues of 
overcapacity are addressed in Chapter 2, with examples of how capacity has been reduced through the use of 
rights-based management approaches, cooperative management, the use of market forces, innovative 
governance structures and improved monitoring and enforcement. 
CHAPTER 1
Key challenges to achieving sustainability 
Figure 4: Key components of overall sustainability. 
15
INTRODUCTION
Box 1: The international framework for fisheries management 
Throughout the course of human history the oceans have been regarded as common property, and fishers 
have in general been free to fish with few restrictions. Forms of tenure have existed, with claims of resource 
‘ownership’ subject to varying levels of formal authority: from customary rights over traditional fishing grounds 
surrounding Pacific islands, to the protectionism of Basque fishers over North Atlantic cod banks. Scotland was 
the first country to claim exclusive national rights over inshore waters in the 15th century, but until the 20th 
century, these territorial seas were restricted in size, generally to three nautical miles from the shore.  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entered into force in 1982 and established in 
international law the right of states to claim sovereignty over waters up to 200 nautical miles from their 
shorelines (the Exclusive Economic Zone, EEZ), and the right to exploit fish stocks in these waters. Many 
distant water fleets were thereby excluded from the waters in which they had been fishing previously, instead 
having to enter into access agreements with coastal states or direct their fishing effort to the High Seas (i.e. 
outside EEZs). UNCLOS requires coastal states to implement conservation and management measures to
maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable 
yield, and to take into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested 
species with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above 
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened (UNCLOS 1982: Article 61).  
Arrangements for the management of fish stocks that are shared between neighbouring coastal states, or 
between coastal states and the high seas (‘straddling and highly migratory stocks’) are further detailed in the 
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA 1995). States must cooperate in management with each other 
and through regional, sub-regional or international organisations (UNFSA 1995: Articles 63 and 64), generally 
referred to as Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs). RFMOs have been established for most 
ocean regions and fish species. The main RFMOs are shown in Figure 5. The RFMOs have become 
increasingly important as more fish is taken from high seas waters; in the 1970s, more than 90% of catches 
were made within 200 nm of coastlines; by the 2000s, about a third of all catches were from straddling or 
migratory stocks (Garibaldi and Limongelli 2003). Unfortunately cooperative management between states and 
through RFMOs is often challenging. There are many continuing disputes over the demarcation of EEZs, as is 
the case with Russia, Japan and South Korea (Kim 2002). Furthermore, not all states have ratified UNCLOS 
and UNFSA, and are therefore not yet bound by them. 
UNCLOS and UNFSA are supported by several non-mandatory texts developed under the auspices of the Food 
and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). Key amongst them is the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
(CCRF), a set of guidelines which most countries have agreed to implement voluntarily. There are also four 
International Plans of Action that recommend voluntary state actions to deal with the problems of seabird by-
catch, conserving sharks, reducing fishing capacity and reducing illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) 
fishing (FAO 2000, 2002a, 2002b). 
Figure 5: Map showing the main regional-based and tuna RFMOs (Source: MRAG). 
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Perverse subsidies 
Subsidies are financial contributions by a government or public body that provide a private benefit. While it is 
recognised that some subsidies can be beneficial (e.g. support to research and management), ‘perverse’ subsidies 
to the fisheries sector (such as for vessel construction, fuel tax waivers) reduce the costs of fishing and enable 
fishing to continue beyond the point at which it would otherwise be unprofitable. This can contribute to the build 
up of excessive fishing capacity and the overexploitation of stocks. As a result, subsidies have emerged as a key 
threat to global fisheries sustainability.  
Chapter 3 addresses subsidies in fisheries. The case studies explore how global negotiations at the WTO could 
result in the restriction of subsidies to the sector and describe instances where subsidies have been removed at 
the national level. In addition, the chapter highlights the use of innovative market-based incentives and private 
financial mechanisms that can redress the incentive structure and promote more conservation-oriented behaviour. 
Poor governance 
Governance is the legal, social, economic and political arrangements and processes through which fisheries are  
managed. Governance is linked with issues such as power and authority over resources and the decisions that are 
made concerning those resources. The key dimensions of ‘good’ governance are related to ensuring greater 
participation, accountability and transparency in, and of, the management and policy-making processes and 
mechanisms. Poor governance can undermine sustainable management. Fishers (and other people) who have not 
been involved in decisions, and do not agree with them, are much less likely to fish responsibly.
Chapter 4 examines a number of governance challenges, highlighting decentralisation in fisheries management as 
a means to increase participation and increase accountability. The case studies highlight examples of governance 
reform that have led to shifts from centralised forms of management in which the state has the authority for 
making and enforcing management measures, towards more inclusive co-management arrangements wherein 
this authority and the responsibility for making and enforcing fisheries regulations are shared with local 
communities and other stakeholders.
Lack of data and stock assessment 
There are considerable difficulties that result from attempting to manage resources that are effectively invisible, 
mobile and have highly variable dynamics. A lack of data about fishing, the fish stocks and the wider ecosystem 
confounds attempts to develop effective management measures. This can result in inappropriate management 
measures being developed, appropriate management measures being applied inaccurately, or no management at 
all. All three situations jeopardise the sustainability of fishery resources. 
Chapter 5 explores the challenge of developing management measures that deliver robust fisheries management 
in the face of a considerable lack of data and uncertainty. The case studies highlight different aspects of data and 
stock assessment. These include accounting for the environmental and ecosystem effects on fisheries in 
management measures as well as ways of working with fishers themselves to deliver additional data on the 
fisheries dynamics and adjust management measures in ‘real-time’.  
By-catch and discards 
In the process of catching the target species, fishing often results the capture of other marine organisms — by-
catch — consisting of either other species of fish, seabirds, marine mammals or turtles. Discarding is the return of 
catch, not including protected species, that has or could have some potential commercial or food value. 
Discarding and by-catch are both wasteful practices that impact on the populations of the animals that are caught 
and may also affect the scientific assessments of the status of these populations.  
Chapter 6 examines the problems of by-catch and discards, presenting a case studies from around the world that 
highlight efforts within fisheries to tackle these problems by prohibiting discarding, utilising by-catch, and 
reducing the amount of by-catch through gear modifications. The chapter also present examples of innovative 
processes that have been developed to stimulate innovation in the development of methods that mitigate by-
catch within other fisheries where there may be particular issues. 
CHAPTER 1
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Identifying pathways to sustainability 
Illustrating positive experiences 
While the outlook for fisheries may appear gloomy at the global level, there are many individuals and groups that 
have been working to innovate and to transform fisheries at an individual, and sometimes regional, level. These 
experiences, across a diverse range of fisheries in both developed and developing countries, offer increased hope 
for more positive outcomes for fisheries and point towards pathways to sustainability that others may wish to 
follow.  
This report draws on case studies that serve to illustrate the kinds of challenges facing fisheries globally and the 
innovative ways that these have been overcome. Twenty-two case studies were selected as being representative 
of the five key challenges identified (Table 1). They encompass a range of fisheries from small-scale to industrial 
in nature, from both developed and developing countries, and include various fishing methods and target species 
that are particularly important in global production and trade. Each case study draws on published material and 
interviews with key people involved in the fishery. They focus on the drivers and entry points for the development 
of innovative solutions as well as on the solutions themselves. This report presents a synthesis of the case 
studies; the full case study reports are available on request (see page 3).
Table 1: List of case studies in the main report and the challenge they address 
INTRODUCTION
Case study Challenge addressed Page number 
Alaska: Transferable quotas for Pacific Halibut Overcapacity 20
Iceland: Transferable quotas Overcapacity 22
Canada: Quota pooling for herring roe Overcapacity 24
Vietnam: Ben Tre clam Overcapacity 26
ISSF: Market-demand innovation Overcapacity 28
Chile: Territorial use rights Overcapacity 30
Tackling subsidies through the WTO Perverse subsidies 36
New Zealand: Removal of subsidies  Perverse economics 38
Kiribati: Phoenix Island Protected Area Perverse economics 40
Banking on Cod Perverse economics 40
MSC: Harnessing market power Perverse economics 42
The Philippines: Aquaculture governance in Lake Taal Poor governance  48
South Africa: Certification of the hake fishery Poor governance 50
Mozambique: Co-management  Poor governance 52
Antarctic: Ecosystem-based and precautionary management Lack of data 58
Fiji: Local knowledge and traditional management practices Lack of data 60
Senegal: IUU fishing in small-scale fisheries Lack of data 62
Scotland: Conservation Credits Scheme Lack of data 64
Scotland: Salmon aquaculture Lack of data 66
Australia: Prawn seawater hopper By-catch and discards 72
Norway: Discard ban By-catch and discards 74
International: WWF SmartGear Competition By-catch and discards 76
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OVERCAPACITY 
Fishing capacity 
Fishing capacity is a combination of the number and size of fishing vessels or gear, and their ability to catch fish. 
Where capacity to fish exceeds the available fish resources, there is overcapacity, and in the absence of suitable 
control or management, overfishing often occurs. To avoid overfishing, part of the capacity must remain idle for 
part of the time if catches are to be constrained within sustainable limits.  
Although discussions on capacity are common, a globally used method of measuring capacity does not exist. The 
most usual measures of capacity 
are the number of people fishing, 
number of vessels in a fleet or the 
gross tonnage of that fleet, but 
this does not adequately measure 
the fishing power, nor does it 
account for that fact that as 
technology increases, so does the 
ability and efficiency to catch fish. 
This increase in technological 
ability is referred to as 
‘technological creep’, and it may 
increase effective fishing power by 
2–5% per year (Fitzpatrick 1996; 
Banks et al. 2002). This means 
that even if the number of vessels 
gross tonnage remain the same, 
vessels can become more efficient 
and catch more fish year on year 
(Marchal et al. 2007). This is 
illustrated in Figure 6 — even 
though global vessel numbers have 
reached a plateau, fishing power 
continues to increase. 
Overcapacity is one of the most 
commonly-cited issues with global 
fisheries, and the need to address 
it is frequently emphasised (e.g. 
World Bank and FAO 2009). It has 
arisen as a result of a range of 
government interventions in the 
1950s which aimed to increase 
fishing capacity in order to boost 
food production, employment and 
the role of fisheries as a driver for 
community development (Robinson 
and Lawson 1986). These actions were very effective. However, from the late 1980s, most commercially-
exploitable stocks had been discovered and world catches had reached their current maximum, but vessels were 
continuing to become more technologically efficient, and consequently capacity exceeded the available 
resources. 
The consequences of overcapacity  
As a result, overcapacity is implicated in negative biological, social and economic consequences (e.g. Bennett 
2005; Neiland et al. 2002; World Bank and FAO 2009). Regardless of the objectives for the fishery, the biological 
sustainability of the stock is fundamental to ensuring the continuation of the fishery. Overcapacity becomes a 
problem when control is insufficient to constrain fishing effort on the stock, resulting in overfishing. In the 
Figure 6: (a) Increases in decked vessels verses the level of decrease in catch per 
vessel. (b) Identical number of decked vessels as (a) with 3.5% annual capacity 
increase accounting for ’technological creep’ (Fitzpatrick, 1996; Banks et al., 
2002). The decreasing slopes indicates an imbalance in capacity to resources 
(Source: graphs calculated based on Fitzpatrick 1996; Banks et al. 2002; World 
Bank and FAO 2009). 
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OVERCAPACITY
absence of adequate control (including explicit and implicit controls as well as cultural norms), capacity and effort may 
increase to the point at which the biological integrity of the stock becomes compromised. A lack of control can also 
lead to a spill-over of effort into other areas and fisheries, increased conflicts, IUU fishing and negative social 
consequences.
Economic incentives can exacerbate these problems. For example, in quota managed fisheries, if all vessels complied 
with management measures and only caught their available quota, theoretically overcapacity would simply lead to 
shorter fishing seasons, as was seen in the Pacific Halibut fishery. However, overcapacity also frequently leads to 
vessels making less profit and becoming economically inefficient. This is exacerbated if stocks and catch per unit of 
effort (CPUE) decline. In such circumstances, the incentive to generate additional income through engaging in over-
quota fishing, high-grading and discarding is increased. This may further deplete stocks, so accelerating the decline.  
Largely as a result of overcapacity the 
fishing industry in some regions has 
been extremely unprofitable in recent 
years. Globally it has been estimated 
that fisheries were operating at a 
USD 5 billion loss in 2004 (World Bank 
and FAO 2009). Simple calculations of 
profit/loss do not take into account 
the lost rents from fisheries. Estimates 
of the global losses of economic rents 
as a result of poor economic policies 
range from approximately 
USD 50 billion to USD 80-90 billion  
(e.g. FAO 1993; Garcia & Newton, 
1997; World Bank & FAO 2009). While 
it should be noted that these calculations can assume a global objective of maximising economic rents from fisheries, 
which is not the case in reality, these analyses do provide an estimation of poor economic performance of fisheries in 
general (Table 2). 
Overcapacity can lead to overexploitation, stock depletion and eventual closure of the fishery. Such a situation 
occurred in the Grand Banks cod fishery, which on its closure, led to the loss of a USD 500 million per year industry in 
the Newfoundland fishing communities. It was estimated that 40,000 jobs were lost, which represented up to 90% of 
regional employment. 
The problems of overcapacity have 
often been exacerbated through the use 
of subsidies, particularly those given for 
new vessel build, but also those 
targeted at vessel improvement, 
subsidising operational costs and the 
withdrawal of capacity. These subsidies 
tend to reduce the real costs of fishing, 
artificially inflating profitability, and 
enabling vessels to stay in the fishery 
rather than be removed (see also 
Chapter 3).
In this chapter, a series of case studies 
are presented that explore the ways in 
which overcapacity has been addressed 
in various fisheries and countries, and 
how the mechanisms to control capacity 
have been strengthened.  
Source: Annual Estimated Loss 
FAO 1993 USD 54 billion (profit/loss calculation) 
Garcia and Newton 1997 USD 46 billion 
Sanchirico and Wilen 2002 USD 90 billion (future projection) 
Wilen 2005 USD 80 billion 
World Bank and FAO 2009 USD 51 billion 
Source: World Bank and FAO 2009. 
Table 2: Varying estimates of global annual economic losses due to 
poor economic policies  
Increasing numbers of vessels and more sophisticated technology increases the fishing 
capacity of the fleet. (Photo: © Wolcott Henry 2005/Marine Photobank).
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The problem and driver: Economic inefficiency and a dangerous race for fish 
During the 1890s, sailing vessels were being replaced by steam powered vessels and by the 1920s the fishery 
expanded from Washington state to Alaska using diesel-powered engines designed specifically to fish using hook 
and line. Through the 1930s and 1940s, multipurpose vessels entered the fishery, targeting Pacific Halibut and other 
species through trawling and other net methods. In the 1960s and 1970s, foreign fleets also began to fish in the 
region. The most notable increase in capacity came in the 1970s and 1980s due to a combination of favourable 
economic and environmental events and an open access fishery. 
Despite the steady increase in capacity, the 
fishery was always considered to be managed 
sustainably from a biological perspective (Clark 
and Hare 2006). To accommodate the increase in 
capacity, the Alaskan fishery season gradually 
reduced from nine months, to two or three days 
by the early 1990s. This ensured total catches 
remained within quotas set by the International 
Pacific Halibut Commission (Figure 7). 
Under open access conditions there was a large 
level of ghost fishing due to abandoned gear. 
This was driven by the short nature of the season 
and the necessity to maximise catches in this 
time, therefore often more gear was set than 
could be hauled. 
The ‘Olympic’ style fishery with thousands of 
vessels fishing for a very short period of time 
exemplified a ‘race for fish’. This resulted in 
conflicts between vessels; ghost fishing; poor fish quality; low product value; and small amounts of fish available for 
the fresh market. The short, intense season was also risky and dangerous for the crews. Furthermore, the fleet was 
extremely overcapitalised and inefficient from an economic perspective resulting in a lack of profits. Based on this 
continuously decreasing season and the risks that were involved, two industry-led associations (the Seattle-based 
Fishing Vessel Owners Association and the Petersburg Vessel Owners Association) requested new management 
measures from the North Pacific Fishery Management Council.
The innovation: Rights-based management and Individual Fishing Quotas 
Rights-based management (RBM) refers to the allocation of rights to fishers, fishing vessels or fishing organisations. 
One of the most well-known is the allocation of a share of the total level of fishing to authorised participants in the 
fishery. It can be a share of the total allowable catch or a share of the total allowable effort, such as days at sea. 
Rights-based systems can come in many forms, but the most economically efficient are those that not only grant 
rights to fishers but allow these rights and the quota shares that they hold to be fully transferrable, or traded, 
between fishers (Hanneson 2009). In the Alaskan Pacific Halibut fishery, a rights-based scheme was introduced, 
based on individual fishing quotas (IFQ) which were transferable. While quotas were freely tradable, as a method of 
reducing social costs in the small-scale sector, all vessels were categorised into vessel size groups and trading could 
only occur within the  groups. 
Costs and benefits  
The number of licences for fishing Alaskan Pacific halibut greatly reduced once the IFQ system was introduced, from 
4,830 to 2,855 (Figure 8a). This occurred because quotas essentially became private property, so quota holders 
were able to sell their quota and exit the fishery (Gilroy et al. 2009). With the decrease in capacity, each vessel 
Alaska: 
Transferable 
quotas for Pacific 
halibut
Species Pacific Halibut 
Fishing Method Longline 
Fishery Tonnage 44, 859 (2009) 
© Google Maps 
Figure 7: Number of days that the halibut season was open (1975 to 
2000). As capacity increased, the season decreased  in length, then 
rapidly increased after the quota share innovation was introduced in 
1994 (IPHC 2011).
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OVERCAPACITY
remaining in the fishery had more quota 
available to it. 
Vessel owners also benefited from a rise in 
prices, from USD 0.45-0.91 per kg to 
USD 1.36-2.2 per kg. This occurred because 
when the fishing season was reduced to 2–3 
days, there was a large glut of halibut caught 
which could not be processed or marketed in 
time to sell it all fresh, therefore much of the 
catch was frozen which fetched lower prices.  
With the longer season and each vessel 
having its own quota, supply to processors is 
steadier. This has meant that the quality of 
product is much higher and there is a much 
greater availability of fresh halibut fetching 
higher prices. The fishery gained MSC 
certification in 2006 which may have also 
contributed to increasing prices. 
Because catch levels have remained stable 
while fish prices have increased, there has 
been a year-on-year increase in the revenue 
from the fishery (Figure 8b). Total revenue 
increased from approximately USD 50 million 
in 1992 to between USD 150 million and 
USD 200 million by 2003, peaking at 
USD 245 million in 2008. 
After moving to an IFQ system, there has 
been a reduced incentive to abandon gear as 
fishers can stagger their effort. As a result, 
commercial wastage has reduced by 53% - 
9.18 to 4.34 million tonnes (Hare 2010). 
Employment opportunities have also changed. 
While overall crew numbers have reduced due 
to the reduction of vessel numbers, the season 
length has increased significantly, allowing a longer period of employment for remaining crew. Furthermore, 
changes in supply to processing factories as a result of the IFQ system have allowed greater employment in 
affiliated land-based industries. 
The Alaskan IFQ system implemented a cost-recovery scheme. In order to ensure that new management of the 
fishery does not incur additional costs to the government, fees are collected from quota owners each year to 
cover any costs which would not exist in the absence of the IFQ scheme. This amount cannot exceed 3% of the 
total value of fished halibut. In 2008, to the total value of landed halibut was USD 245 million and the IFQ 
management costs were USD 3.5 million. The management authorities were able to collect the total IFQ 
management costs, as they amounted to only 1.4% of total landed value. 
Uptake potential: Wider applicability of fishing rights 
Transferable fishing rights led to a successful reduction in capacity in this case. However, the wider uptake of 
transferable fishing rights requires a political commitment to the allocation of fishing rights and a stable free 
market. If markets cannot set the price for quota which is being sold, or if transfers are overly restricted, the 
system will result in poor reductions of capacity and poor compliance in the long term (Hatcher 2005). 
There are often concerns about the equitable allocation of rights and the potential for exclusion of smaller players 
in the fishery with the introduction of transferable rights. However, this case study illustrates how safeguards can 
be put in place to minimise such problems, including setting up a vessel class system and concentration rules. 
Figure 8: (a) The decline in the level of capacity (number of vessels) 
per size category as a result of the IFQ 1991–2008 (IPHC logbook 
data); (b) Ex-vessel revenue generated per crew member in real (1992) 
and nominal dollars and total ex-vessel revenue, 1992–2007 (Data from 
NMFS 2009).
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The problem and driver: Stocks decline due to overcapacity 
By the 2000s, fish and fishery products accounted for 26% of Iceland’s exports (IKR 99 billion, or USD 855.3 million) 
and approximately 8% of GDP. Cod represented 35–40% of this value. 
Despite fluctuating catches for the entire fishing industry, the cod fishery was experiencing a decreasing trend in 
catches (Figure 9a) and declining cod stocks (Figure 9b). Given the importance of cod stocks to the national 
economy, attempts were made to reverse this trend in 1984 by introducing a quota system to align fishing capacity 
with resource opportunities. Total Allowable Catches 
(TACs) were set for different stocks and then split 
amongst vessels as Individual Vessel Quotas (IVQs). 
Unlike the fully-transferable system in the Alaskan 
Pacific Halibut fishery, these quotas were attached to 
vessels. In order to concentrate quota (thus reducing 
fleet capacity), investors had to purchase the entire 
vessel. However, poor profitability and catches 
regularly exceeding TACs (Danielsson 1997) indicated 
that the IVQ system was failing in its objectives to 
ensure the fishery’s profitability and sustainability. In 
fact, net profits were made in only four years between 
1969 and 1991 (Figure 10a). 
Vessels had the possibility of opting out of the IVQ 
system and operating under an effort-restriction regime 
instead. Arnason (2005) shows that the concurrent 
effort and IVQ options meant that the level of overall 
effort applied to the cod fishery actually increased after 
the introduction of IVQs, and only reduced once the 
new management system (Individual Transferable 
Quotas, ITQs) was introduced (Figure 10b). The 
declining catches, despite the continuing increase in 
effort, indicate that the stock was becoming 
overexploited and the fishery was becoming 
increasingly inefficient, leading to poor profitability. 
The driver for the new management system was a 
combination of factors: the negative impacts resulting 
from employing two different capacity-reducing options 
(IVQs and effort restrictions); the lack of improvement 
in stock levels from the IVQ system; loopholes created 
through poor regulation; allowing vessels to fish in 
excess of the TAC; and, lack of legislative authority to 
manage capacity. 
The innovation: Reducing capacity through Rights-Based Management 
In 1990, Iceland passed a new Fisheries Management Act, which abolished the effort option for all vessels (except 
for very small-scale vessels, less than six tonnes GRT) and also made all quotas fully transferable. This meant that 
quotas were no longer attached to vessels, and vessel owners could sell portions of quota if they wished. Following 
the Act, there was a period of public consultation, and in 1991 Iceland implemented the ITQ system across the 
entire fleet. Unlike the Alaskan case study, there were no safeguards put in place for any fleet segments. 
Iceland:
Transferable 
quotas 
Species North East Arctic Cod 
Fishing Method Trawling, Gillnet, Longline 
Fishery Tonnage 181,322 t (2009) 
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Figure 9: (a) Cod catches in Icelandic waters. Despite the 
fluctuations, it is clear that the overall trend is decreasing 
(Source: NWWG 2010); (b)  Icelandic cod stock levels as 
assessed by NWWG (2010). Coinciding with the allocation of 
stricter management and control of landings, stock levels 
started to increase.
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Costs and benefits of Iceland’s reduction in fishing capacity 
The Fisheries Management Act successfully closed loopholes which allowed fishers to catch more fish than set out 
in the TAC. In addition, large increases in fisheries enforcement capacity were made to support this. The budget of 
the Directorate of Fisheries increased from 
ISK 57 million (USD 492,000) in 1990 to 
ISK 322 million (USD 2.7 million) in 2008 - a 
464% increase in the management and 
enforcement budget (adjusted for inflation). The 
budget of the science advisory agency also rose — 
from ISK 470 million (USD 4.06  million) to 
ISK 706 million (USD 6.1 million) - to more 
accurately assess the cod population. 
One social cost to Iceland after the 
implementation of ITQs in 1991 stemmed from 
the lack of safeguards in place for small-scale 
vessels. Quota holders were free to sell their 
quota, and many small-scale holders did so. This 
had some unintended consequences. Communities 
and investment had developed around the fishing 
activities of these small-scale vessels. The loss of 
small-scale vessels meant that linked industries 
suffered. While small-scale vessel owners profited 
from selling quota, other stakeholders were left 
with no livelihood and mortgages on assets which 
then held little to no value (Eythorsson 2000). The 
best estimate available of this employment loss 
across the entire Icelandic fishing industry (not 
just the cod fishery) was 33%, a decrease from 
6,200 jobs in 1991 to 4,200 in 2008 (Statistics 
Iceland 2010). 
By 2007, the 40 companies which existed in the 
early 1990s (and were fishing cod) had reduced 
by 50%. The number of trawlers had decreased 
by 44%. Across the entire cod fishing fleet vessel 
numbers had reduced by 66%. These reductions 
in fishing capacity resulted in a concentration of 
quota, with 82% of the quota being held by the 
top 50 licence holders (up from 60%), which led to the increased profitability of the fleet (Knútsson et al. 2008, 
2009; Statistics Iceland 2010). Since the introduction of ITQs in 1991, profitability has fluctuated, but steady 
increases have been seen since 1996 and the fleet has been profitable for the past eleven years (Figure 10a). 
Since the implementation of ITQs, stock levels of Icelandic cod have stopped declining and are showing signs of 
recovery — ICES estimated the spawning stock biomass at 160,711 tonnes in 1991 and 300,488 tonnes in 2010 
(Figure 9b). However, the increasing stock levels cannot be solely attributed to the implementation of ITQs, but are 
also a result of the stronger mandate awarded to the Directorate of Fisheries through the 1990 Fisheries 
Management Act, and increased enforcement efforts. 
Uptake potential: Further applicability of capacity reduction 
As with other individual quota systems, for effective reductions in capacity, markets must have the ability to set 
prices. This case study highlights the need for quota to be freely transferable in order to result in effective fleet 
capacity reductions. However, it also raises the issue of the wider social costs of individual transferable rights, as 
rights can become concentrated in the hands of a few, large companies. Where there are important economic 
activities based around the small-scale fleet, there may be a need for mechanisms to ensure their continued 
participation in the fishery. 
As the fleet is now profitable, as a direct result of ITQs, it would be possible for the government to offset some of 
the higher management and enforcement costs through cost recovery schemes as in New Zealand and Alaska, 
although this does not occur at the moment. 
OVERCAPACITY
Figure 10: (a) Net profit margin for Iceland’s demersal fishery, 1969–
2008 (Data source: Statistics Iceland 2010 and Arnason, 1995); (b) 
Effort levels in the fishery, 1978–1997. Effort only substantially 
decreased once the fully transferable system was introduced. Source: 
Arnason (2005). 
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The problem and driver: Overcapacity leads to 15-minute fishing seasons 
Canadian fishers have long fished for herring as food and bait, and began to fish herring for roe (fish eggs) in 1971, 
stimulated by demand from Japan (Moloney 1981). Herring roe, or Kazunoko, is a traditional food in Japan and until 
the 1970s, the majority of herring roe was supplied domestically. However, as domestic supplies began to dwindle, 
Japanese authorities relaxed import restrictions in 1971; between 1972 and 1977, Japanese herring roe imports 
were 8,000–14,000 tonnes per year.  
The investment decision was simple: a 
CAD 5,000 (USD 5,060) investment could 
provide access to a share of a 
CAD 9.1 million (USD 9.2 million) fishery. 
Because of the large interest in investing 
in the fishery, a licence fee was 
introduced in 1974, although there was 
initially no limit on the number of licences 
issued. The licence fee was intended to 
limit capacity to ensure three objectives: 
to sustain the health of the herring 
population; to ensure fishing income 
remained above fishing costs; and, to 
collect revenue for the Crown. It became 
clear that the licence fee was not large 
enough to control capacity as there were 
further substantial increases in the 
number of fishers entering the fishery. 
The landing price of herring roe in 
Canada increased by approximately 
1000% over the period 1975–1979, as a result of increased demand from Japan due to supply problems from other 
sources. This further encouraged investment in the fishery. However, the increasing capacity was causing negative 
biological impacts on the herring stock, and catches declined from a peak of 78,000 tonnes in 1976 to 
37,000 tonnes in 1979, and by 1980 catches were 15,000–18,000 tonnes (Figure 11). There was concern not only 
for the viability of the herring population, but also the economic outlook for the fishery. In some areas, fishing was 
so intense, that the fishery was only open for 15 minutes — the time that it would take the fleet to catch the 
available herring. The short fishing seasons not only caused reduced revenues per vessel, but the intense nature of 
the fishing conducted in such a short period time meant that controlling catch levels to keep them within sustainable 
levels was proving to be a difficult task for authorities. This was evident as the fishery regularly overfished the quota 
by 10–15%. 
This reduction in the economic performance of the fleet and tendency for the fleet to overfish quota were the main 
drivers for innovation. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans’ (DFO) management plan required that total catches 
of roe herring did not exceed TACs. Much like the Alaskan case, in order to control roe landings, authorities applied 
shortening of seasons as the management measures. Suggestions were then made through consultations by the 
Herring Industry Advisory Board as to how pooling of licences could alter the open access character of the fishery. 
The innovation: Licence pooling to create economic efficiencies 
By 1981, the industry was considering the idea of ‘pairing up’ to reduce fishing costs. By essentially halving the 
fishing costs, because only one vessel did the actual fishing, profitability would then increase for both parties. In a 
round of public consultation in 1997, the Herring Industry Advisory Board (HIAB) recommended that the DFO 
implement this pooling system as a requirement at the beginning of the season to receive a licence to fish — vessels 
would have to be part of a minimum sized pool of vessels. The entire TAC is divided into regions along the coast 
Canada: 
Quota pooling for 
herring roe 
Species Canadian Herring (for roe) 
Fishing Method Purse seine, Gillnet 
Fishery Tonnage 12,811 t (2009) 
Figure 11: Herring catches for roe in Canada. After the 1998 mandatory licence 
pooling requirement, there was a gradual decline in catches. Despite this 
decline, vessels are meeting costs due to the pooling of licences. (Graph 
created from DFO Herring FMP, 2010).
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and then vessels from within those regions are allocated a catch share. The pooling vessels must hold catch shares 
from the same region to ensure catch allocated to one region is not taken from another. 
Costs and benefits: Reduced fishing costs
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this system was extremely successful and at least for the last 20 years, fishing for 
herring roe has remained profitable despite the reduction in overall revenue (Figure 12). 
The fishery has been subject to a double decrease: the capture landings from the fishery have decreased 
substantially, from 31,442 tonnes in 1997 to 11,529 tonnes in 2008; and poor economic performance in Japan has 
meant that the price per kilogramme has also decreased from CAD 1.56 in 1997 to CAD 1.34 in 2008 (USD 1.58 
and USD 1.36 respectively). This has led 
to a decrease in landings revenue from 
CAD 49 million (USD 49.6 million) in 
1 9 9 7  t o  C A D  1 5 . 5  m i l l i o n 
(USD 15.7 million) in 2008 (Figure 12). 
However, despite this, the fishery has 
remained profitable. 
The licence pooling system has been 
successful in reducing economic 
overcapacity. In order to remain 
profitable, vessels had to reduce costs. 
This has been achieved without the 
permanent decommissioning or removal 
of fishing vessels (which are needed at 
other times of the year in other 
fisheries).  
The fishing season has increased in 
length from 15 minutes to several days 
with fewer conflicts between vessels. 
Fishing is less dangerous and control 
and enforcement in the fishery is easier. 
This season may still seem short, but there is a limited period when herring can be caught for its roe. Furthermore, 
it would not be sustainable to harvest the herring populations to any substantial level when the main purpose is for 
its roe is to spawn herring. In order to collect roe from the herring, it must be caught before it has had the 
opportunity to spawn for that season so any significant harvesting of herring prior to this may negatively affect 
future population sizes. 
Uptake potential: Licence pooling 
Unlike many other cases of reducing fishing capacity in order to increase fleet profitability, the intention of the 
licence pooling system is not to remove fishers and vessels. Fishers remain as participants in the fishery and vessel 
owners within a pool may change which vessel from the licence pool actually conducts the fishing each year. From 
the perspective of each vessel, this is not the method which will result in maximum possible profits. Currently 
fishing costs are reduced because only a small amount of the vessels actually do the fishing, yet profits need to be 
divided amongst other members of the pool. In order for stakeholders to leave the fishery permanently, more 
incentives would need to be in place. 
At the moment, stakeholders do not leave the fishery altogether as they also fish in other areas for other species. 
This means that there are other fisheries, at other times of the year, where their fishing vessel can make profits 
independently. There is no incentive to sell their vessel and leave the herring roe fishery given the potential profits 
in this fishery and others, hence stakeholders want to remain as participants in the fishery as much as possible.  
As a means to reduce fishing capacity and increase profits, vessel pooling will only be useful in scenarios where the 
vessels remaining in the fishery can fish in other areas. Without the option to fish in other regions, the cost of 
maintaining vessels will be wasted as they may potentially only be in action for a limited time during the year. While 
this may not create profits as high as other capacity reduction schemes, the social costs and political pressure is 
substantially less as fishers are not required to permanently leave the fishery. 
Figure 12: Landed values of roe herring between 1980 and 2008. In addition to the 
reduced catch levels, the fishery has experienced a reduction in price/kg as a result 
of poor economic conditions in Japan (DFO, 1998-2009) (Source: graph created 
from DFO data) 
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The problem and driver: Overcapacity in hand-gathered fisheries 
The Ben Tre clam fishery in Vietnam is primarily harvested by hand-gathering. Fishing takes place at low tides 
mainly between April and October, but can occur all year round. During the 1980s and 1990s the fishery was poorly 
managed, which prompted the establishment of a 
cooperative in 1997. 
The cooperative was allocated 900 hectares to 
manage, with the expectation that it would 
address income and food security issues. In 
2000, the harvest of clams was relatively large, 
but given the Ben Tre clam market was only 
domestic, prices were low. The cooperative idea 
continued to be developed and by 2006, 13 
cooperatives were established. However, there 
was a concern that the cooperatives had little 
guidance and that management could be 
improved.
Despite the low price, increasing harvests 
attracted more participants to the fishery. 
Combined with a lack of management measures, 
clam populations began to decline. As in many other cases of overcapacity, this led to the harvesting of seed and 
undersized clams. Prices also continued to decrease due to the oversupply of clams in the market. Additionally, as 
cooperative numbers began to increase without regulations, social issues began to arise between the cooperatives 
and harvesters that did not belong to the cooperatives. Total clam catches remained relatively stable, but average 
catch per hectare decreased rapidly between 2003 and 2005. After management measures were implemented and 
the area under management controls was increased, average harvests stabilised in 2007–2008 (Figure 13). 
The driver for change occurred after identifying the declines in catches, poor quality product and low prices. At this 
point, Ben Tre province began to collaborate with Vietnam’s Department of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(DARD) to implement a series of management measures. This included management of capacity through allocating 
area rights to the cooperatives. By doing so, the cooperatives were then required to report landings to the relevant 
authorities in order to control supply, increase quality and thus improve the reputation of the Ben Tre clam on the 
international market. This improved management of the clams attracted the attention of WWF who provided partial 
funding in order to pay for the full MSC assessment of the fishery. 
The innovation: MSC certification in Ben Tre 
WWF-USA, in collaboration with the Sustainable Fisheries Fund, secured 
funding for the Ben Tre clam fishery to undergo Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC) assessment — an ecolabel that certifies the fishery is 
sustainable and well-managed (see also Chapter 3) — which led to a 
successful full certification in 2009.  
Prior to MSC certification, the fishery’s managers implemented much 
greater levels of regulating and monitoring clam catches. This included: 
banning the harvest of clams below a certain size; banning the use of 
tractors on sand flats to transport catch; allowing only rakes and sieves 
to be used to harvest the clams; introducing closure guidelines if the area 
is considered necessary for environmental development; devolving higher 
levels of authority to cooperatives; and, improving data collection and 
reporting from cooperatives to the fishery’s management. 
Vietnam:
Ben Tre clam 
Species Ben Tre Clam 
Fishing Method Gathering by Hand 
Fishery Tonnage 9,521 t (2009) 
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Figure 13: Management area and average yield in the Ben Tre clam 
fishery, 2000–2009 (based on Department of Fisheries Ben Tre data).
Adjustments in management and MSC 
certification have led to a good intentional 
reputation of Ben Tre clams. (Photo: 
Aquatex).
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Costs and benefits of MSC certification 
In total, the MSC certification cost USD 120,000, which included USD 68,380 to conduct the full assessment. Without 
the financial assistance from WWF and the Sustainable Fisheries Fund, this assessment could not have been 
completed. 
The investment seems worthwhile however, as the stocks benefited from the new management measures leading to 
sustainable clam catches (Figure 13). Through the introduction of those measures, the reduction in yield per hectare 
began to ease in 2005 and has remained constant at 1.2–1.3 tonnes per hectare (total production: 8,503 -
 9,520 tonnes). 
Through sustainable catch levels, the fishery also experienced more sustained economic output. Cooperatives were 
able to manage the catch levels and the amounts supplied to the market. This helped regulate supply to the market 
and thus increased prices — in one area the harvesting of clams decreased by 22%, yet the overall price increased 
by 156%, which increased the overall value of the fishery (Table 3). Applying the 2007 price for clams from the Dong 
Tam cooperative to the entire catch of the fishery in 2007, 9,000 tonnes, this would have been worth VND 91 billion 
(USD 4.7 million). The same catch at the 2010 price would have been worth VND 324 billion (USD 16.6 million). 
Much of this increase in unit price came from the increased willingness of retail markets in the EU (particularly Spain 
and Portugal) to purchase this product as a result of the new management measures and MSC certification. 
Without certification, it is possible 
that prices would not have risen 
so much, thus reducing revenue 
and the incentives for sustainable 
harvesting. Certification itself is 
an expensive process and it was 
only through grants and in-kind 
contributions (research officers) 
from WWF which allowed the 
process to go ahead. However, to 
remain a fishery under the MSC 
label, re-certification is required 
on a semi-regular basis. In order to remain MSC certified, the fishery’s managers must now develop a financial 
strategy to fund the follow up assessments. 
One recognisable social cost is related to access to the fishery resulting from greater levels of control; harvesters 
from outside the province have had their access restricted. Given that these harvesters were seen to be acting 
outside the law, both the provincial and national governments have concluded that there will be no provision of 
substitute sources of income. 
Uptake potential: Controlling capacity through market forces 
This case study has highlighted the potential role of market forces in creating incentives for better management and 
controlling capacity. Within developed country economies, it is possible to allow capacity to reduce independently - 
such was the case in the Icelandic and the Alaskan case studies. However, the income and incentives stemming from 
internationally recognised certification (such as MSC) has helped management understand the importance of 
controlling capacity. 
The success of the Ben Tre province has meant that fishers from other provinces have begun planning to achieve 
MSC certification. However, as with the Ben Tre province prior to intervention from WWF, there is the issue that 
fisheries in Vietnam generally lack suitable levels of enforcement and accurate data. This is one major barrier to 
other provinces achieving MSC certification. 
In this particular case, in order to control capacity, technological development of the fishery has been halted. By 
setting a regulation that harvesting of clams can only occur through gathering with hand rakes and sieves, managers 
have blocked the potential for cooperatives to develop the fishery to a more efficient level, although this does ensure 
higher levels of employment in the fishery. There is concern by the fishery’s managers that if capacity was able to 
experience any form of technological creep, that it wouldn’t be possible to ensure sustainable harvesting. Further 
assistance to develop sustainable methods of harvesting clams would mean that Ben Tre clams can keep their 
environmentally-friendly status yet also encourage social development. 
OVERCAPACITY
Table 3: Total catches and values in Dong Tam cooperative (based on Department of 
Fisheries Ben Tre data)
Year Yield (kg) Value (VND) Unit value VND/kg)
2007 1,761,235 17,825,808,159 10,121
2008 1,206,181 18,273,089,650 15,150
2009 1,341,667 28,168,428,582 20,995
2010 (Jan-Jul) 738,510 26,595,728,920 36,013
Note that once the supply of clams had been controlled, the unit value per kg increased. This 
substantial increase in price in 2010 also coincided with the fishery becoming MSC certified. 
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The problem and driver: IUU and overcapacity 
IUU fishing is both a symptom of overcapacity, and contributes to it. IUU fishing is particularly difficult to control in the 
high seas, because outside the EEZ the only authority able to bring a prosecution of a vessel is its flag state. Specific 
multilateral or bilateral agreements are required even to allow international inspection of vessels in high seas waters. 
The first tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO) came into force in 1949 — the Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) — before the implementation of UNCLOS. The most recent tuna RFMO, the 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), came into force in 2004. Currently, there are five major 
tuna RFMOs covering all tuna, tuna-like species and billfish fisheries (Figure 14).  
The tuna RFMOs, and some non-tuna 
RFMOs, hold substantial databases on 
vessels which are authorised to fish in 
their waters as well as lists of IUU 
vessels that have been sighted or 
otherwise demonstrated to have been 
engaging in fishing in contravention of 
conservation measures. The actions 
taken against these vessels by the states 
that are party to the RFMOs vary, but 
include measures such as refusing port 
access. However, there is not a global list 
across all tuna RFMOs and consequently 
control of IUU vessels that operate 
between various RFMOs is difficult to 
coordinate. Furthermore, once identified 
on an RFMO’s database as an IUU vessel, 
vessel owners are able to easily change some of the characteristics of the vessel, re-name and re-flag it, making it 
difficult to track it. Similarly, there is no global list of authorised vessels across RFMOs, which makes it difficult to 
quantify and manage the global tuna fleet's capacity. 
Recognising that this lack of coordination can compromise compliance with conservation measures, there has been 
widespread agreements that a global database with a global IUU list needs to be created. Representatives from the 
five major RFMOs met in Kobe, Japan in 2007 and agreed that a new unique vessel identifier (UVI) would be a pre-
requisite for such global database and allow to track vessels even through re-registrations (MRAG AP 2010). The 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) offers the most widely-recognised UVI system. 
Unfortunately, the development of an IMO number requires the collation of multiple pieces of information for each 
vessel which are not uniformly collected by any RFMO. Little progress has been made despite the Kobe process. 
The innovation: International Seafood Sustainability Foundation’s  
Resolution 10-01 
The International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF), established in 2009, is a global partnership of leaders in 
fisheries science, the tuna seafood industry and WWF. The main focus of the foundation is to ensure that RFMOs 
implement effective conservation and management measures that are consistent with scientific recommendations. 
In recognition of the importance of achieving global vessel lists to combat IUU fishing and to manage fishing 
capacity, and the lack of progress, ISSF developed its own plan of action. From 31 May 2010, ISSF implemented 
Resolution 10-01, which requires that starting in June 2011 participating companies (processors and traders) not 
purchase tuna from any vessels which do not have an IMO number. This puts the onus on the vessels to apply for a 
UVI. Once the vessels have gained the UVI themselves, they can then report it to the relevant authorities and by 
ISSF:
Market-demand 
innovation 
© Google Maps 
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Figure 14: Global coverage of Tuna RFMOs. All major tuna stocks are managed 
under an RFMO agreement. (Source: MRAG).
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only purchasing tuna from IMO-numbered vessels, ISSF participants assist in achieving two outcomes. Firstly, the 
building block for global databases is in place, meaning that IUU-listed vessels will no longer be able to move from 
one RFMO to another without check, as RFMOs will be able to track individual vessels. Secondly, if the uptake of 
IMO numbers is large enough, it will also give an accurate indication of the total capacity fishing for tuna. However, 
the key aspect is the ISSF’s ability to influence change on practical fisheries management issues.  
Costs and benefits of unique vessel identifiers 
It is expected that ISSF members will hold sufficient influence over the tuna industry as approximately 60% of 
global tuna catches are by processed by ISSF participating companies (V. Restrepo pers comm. 2010). 
Furthermore, ISSF by-laws require that all participating companies abide by its resolutions.  
All ISSF participating companies are required to have a traceability program to track all tuna from capture (vessel/
trip) to the store shelves. Companies also pledged to recall any tuna which was later found to be caught as a result 
of IUU fishing. Also, despite the UN ban on driftnets longer than 2.5 km, many RFMOs had not successfully tackled 
this issue. In light of this, ISSF members agreed not to purchase tuna caught by these large scale driftnets (ISSF 
2010).
ISSF is able to achieve such measures 
through market influence, due the fact 
that there is no affiliation to political 
states. The purpose of ISSF is to 
promote science-based conservation 
measures that ensure sustainable tuna 
supplied as opposed to public policy. 
Without strong private industry support, 
it would also not be possible to influence 
change through such market-dependent 
strategies. The commitment of ISSF 
participants, and the incentives for them 
to do so, are paramount. 
There are no costs involved for a vessel 
to register for an IMO number, the 
number is allocated free of charge from 
the Internet, given that all of the 
necessary information is available for a vessel For individual vessels, certain costs may be incurred to ensure the 
vessel and documentation meet all the requirements. In terms of benefits, advancing the acquisition of UVIs 
through the ISSF resolution will make the global coordination role by RFMOs more efficient and effective. 
A risk to this program identified by ISSF, which is not possible to estimate, is whether the agency that issues IMO 
numbers will always assign them to vessels under 100GRT that request them (currently it is only mandatory to 
register requesting vessels greater than 100GRT). Therefore, ISSF will need to determine if it should require further 
developments to the resolution to deal with this problem if it arises. With UK retailers increasingly committing to 
selling only pole and line-caught tuna (typically much smaller vessels), the importance of these smaller vessels 
should not be underestimated (Sharpe 2011).
Uptake potential of market pressures
This innovation currently has the potential to achieve a global reach for all canned tunas. It is also possible to more 
widely apply this concept to other species or markets if required. Traceability within other markets, such as fresh 
tuna, could be more difficult as they can be much more dynamic. ISSF acknowledge that a system to achieve this, if 
required, could need further development. Nevertheless, a portion of the longline fleets catch tunas for both the 
fresh and shelf-stable markets, and these vessels are expected to obtain IMO numbers. 
The general concept of this innovation though is fundamental. Canning companies that already have traceability 
protocols are now able to extend this to ensuring that the actual supplier vessel holds an IMO number. This can 
contribute to reducing the potential of IUU fish entering the chain. This is a good example of a non-governmental 
organisation harnessing purchasing power to create change. Without the barriers arising from political pressures, 
NGOs and industry partnerships are able to influence policy efficiently and effectively. This demonstrates the 
benefits of multi-level stakeholder involvement in management.  
Tuna being offloaded from a fishing vessel within ICCAT waters. Vessels such as 
these are those which will need to have an IMO number by March in accordance 
with ISSF Resolution 10-01 (Source: MRAG 2010). 
OVERCAPACITY
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The problem and driver: Local management of Chilean loco 
Chilean benthic fisheries are based around molluscs and algae, with the most significant resource being the snail 
locally known as loco. The loco is a valuable mollusc superficially resembling an abalone. Artisanal fishers, caletas,
harvest the snail mainly through commercial diving. In 1976 loco was introduced to the Japanese market and as a 
result landings climbed to around 25,000 tonnes and it was estimated that 15,000 divers from all over Chile were 
involved in fishing (Gelcich et al. 2010). 
At this point the loco fishery was regulated by the Chilean government. Yet, despite legal size restrictions and fixed 
fishing seasons, resources suffered from increasing overfishing. In 1989, recognising the danger signs, the 
government decided to close the fishery entirely, and it remained closed for three and a half years (Castilla and 
Fernandez 1998). 
Throughout the loco moratorium social unrest fuelled political tensions with fishers who strongly opposed the ban 
arguing that stocks were in fact recovering and fishing should resume. The deadlock was broken by Oscar Avilez, 
leader of the regional 
federation of artisanal fishers, 
who interrupted a political 
meeting to deliver the 
message of the loco fishers to 
the Chilean President directly. 
The President, apparently 
persuaded, instructed the 
Undersecretary of Fisheries to 
consider the evidence of a 
stock recovery assembled by 
fishers and the ban was 
subsequently lifted. 
The fisheries authority 
i m p l e m e n t e d  a  n e w 
m a n a g e m e n t  r e g i m e 
consisting of individual non-
transferable quotas. This 
individual quota system was 
intended to ensure the fishery 
did not revert back to the 
open access system which had been considered the source of the problem in the past. However, despite these 
intentions of sustainable fisheries management, within five years catch per unit effort (CPUE) had fallen to pre-
moratorium levels due to a poorly constructed rights based management system, ineffective enforcement and illegal 
trading of rights (Orensanz and Parma 2010). 
This issue, and the original harvest moratorium, led to one of the main drivers to shift the fishery's management 
into a territorial rights-based approach. With the assistance of academic researchers, most notably Juan C. Castilla, 
local fishers have begun successfully experimenting with self-imposed closed areas, which appeared to aid loco 
recovery. These local experiences were the starting point for the development of a new and improved territorial user 
rights system – AMERBs (after the Spanish for ‘areas for the management and exploitation of benthic resources’). 
The innovation: Introduction of territorial use rights in the loco fisheries 
During and before the loco closure, a number of fishers had been successfully experimenting with self-imposed 
closed areas, which appeared to aid loco recovery. These local experiences were the starting point for the 
development of AMERBs. AMERBs were adopted into a new fisheries act passed by Chilean Congress, and 
Chile:
Territorial use 
rights
© Google Maps 
Species Chilean Loco 
Fishing Method Gathering by Hand 
Fishery Tonnage 9,521 t (2009) 
Figure 15: Total landings of Chile Loco, note the harvest moratorium between 1989 and 1992 and 
the initial peak during the quota system (1993-97). Since the AMERBs in 1997, harvest levels have 
remained relatively constant (Source: Gelcich et al. 2010).
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implementation started in 1997. By 2000 loco could be legally harvested only within AMERBs, of which 237 (from a 
total of 732) had locally-designed management plans officially identifying loco as the target species. 
The AMERBs, which are 
g r a n t e d  t o  f i s h e r s ’ 
organisations cover an area of 
seabed and grant members of 
the organisation exclusive 
privileges over the benthic 
resources within. 
Costs and benefits 
The granting of rights led to 
the implementation, by fishers 
themselves, of effective 
monitoring, control and 
surveillance procedures that 
have reduced government 
enforcement costs and 
increased the effectiveness of 
effort regulation. To keep 
these rights the organisation 
must conduct regular science-
based surveys of the loco and, 
after the second assessment, 
pay the government an annual fee for the right to manage and fish the area. These mandatory assessments are 
carried out by third parties reporting directly to the administration. The cost of these studies are high and 
unpopular with the fishers, but until recently have mainly been paid for through subsidies. 
Due to the recovery and good management of the loco stocks the fisheries have been reopened and AMERBs now 
have 14,324 registered fishers. Furthermore, a harvest control rule (HCR) is in place whereby fishers are only able 
to harvest 15–25% of the total stock. With the relatively stable harvest levels of 2,000–4,000 tonnes since 1997 we 
can assume stocks have remained stable at a level at least three times higher than the catches (Figure 15). 
Anecdotal evidence in Gelcich et al. (2010) also suggests that a benefit of the AMERBs is the increased abundance 
of the stock. 
New neoliberal policies following the coup contributed to increasing export earnings from the loco fishery (Gelcich 
et al. 2010). Figure 16 indicates that overall there has been a decreasing trend in export price since implementation 
of AMERBs with prices declining to USD 15,000 in 2008, despite an initial increase in export price to USD 24,000 in 
2002. However, these fluctuations in export price approximately track the same fluctuations in exchange rates 
between the US dollar and the Chilean peso. 
Uptake potential of territorial user rights 
The uptake potential for territorial user rights is high amongst fisheries where the stock is less mobile, and 
especially for coastal fisheries. In this case study, it was demonstrated that prior to the development of external 
stock assessment, the use of local knowledge of fisheries can be key to identifying areas of stock decline risk and 
implementation of self-imposed closures. This concept is further discussed in Chapter 4 when considering lack of 
data and has also been regularly cited in literature (e.g. St. Martin 2004). 
Similarly to the Ben Tre clam case study, locally managed cooperatives in loco fisheries have also demonstrated 
effective monitoring and control regimes to ensure that catches remain up to or below TACs and that stocks remain 
sustainable. Furthermore, the devolution of power to the cooperatives has meant that individual rights were not 
required to control capacity; instead the closer proximity of management and the overall community stake in the 
fishery ensures that monitoring of catches is adequately completed. 
While this innovation began as a more locally-driven and managed system, management authorities have now 
added the requirement for expensive, independent stock assessments. This development has led to a digression 
from the use of valuable local knowledge and the fishery now also requires subsidies in order to comply with these 
new management regulations. Evidence suggests that due to this, local support for the imposed management 
measures has been wavering and that this may be impacting the accuracy of the stock assessments.
OVERCAPACITY
Figure 16: Price per tonne of exported Loco. Gaps in the series indicate the harvest mora-
torium between 1989 and 1992 (Source: Gelcich et al. 2010). 
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Addressing overcapacity 
Capacity control options 
Matching fishing capacity to the available fish resources is a common problem and the case studies highlight a 
variety of measures that have been developed by a range of actors to address this issue. In particular the case 
studies have illustrated the application of rights-based approaches by centralised authorities and the granting of 
increased authority to local management institutions to address the issue. Individual rights-based approaches 
draw on economic analyses of fisheries and are increasingly being used as a mechanism to reduce capacity in 
fisheries. Tradable rights allocated to the industry to fish the quota, that allow market forces to operate, allow 
fishing capacity to be adjusted to fit the available fishing opportunities.  
Traditional forms of fisheries management and local management institutions have begun to receive increased 
attention as an alternative to centralised control of fishing capacity and as the basis for forms of community-
based management and co-management (e.g. Mozambique and Fiji, see Chapters 4 and 5 respectively). In the 
case of the Chilean loco case study, communities, in conjunction with academic researchers, began to 
experiment with territorial use rights which allowed local entities to manage the total quota allowed for the 
particular area and match capacity to the available resources. 
The costs and benefits of individually transferable rights  
Rights-based approaches have emerged as a means to address the problem of the ‘race to fish’. This was a 
particular issue in the Pacific halibut and roe herring fisheries, that led to poor quality of fish, oversupply followed 
by low supply, and high risks faced by crew. Individual transferable quota systems reduced capacity by 66% in 
Iceland and 41% in the Pacific halibut. Due to this reduction in capacity, individual vessels’ profits increased and 
fleets became economically viable again. Supply of fish to the market was stabilised in the Pacific halibut case 
study, resulting in a higher quality product and increased prices. 
Importantly, the use of individual transferable rights achieved capacity reductions without the use of 
decommissioning subsidies, which, in addition to costing tax-payer money, often lead to reinvestment in capacity 
within the fishery, or other 
associated f isher ies. Where 
decommissioning subsidies are 
necessary to ensure a rapid 
reduction in capacity, they should 
follow the OECD guidelines (OECD 
2008). The Icelandic cod case study 
highlighted that individual rights 
need to be freely transferable in 
order achieve effective capacity 
reductions. 
While the reduction in fleet capacity 
can simplify the enforcement task of 
the relevant authorities, the use of 
ITQs requires increased monitoring 
and control, both for monitoring 
catches, and carrying out stock 
assessment to assess the available 
quota. This has cost implications. 
Cost-recovery has greater potential 
where there is a more profitable 
industry, as seen in the Pacific 
halibut fishery case. 
The implementation of ITQ systems can be particularly appropriate where fishing represents an important local 
economic activity pursued for commercial gain. Limiting the transfer of quota for social reasons, for example to 
prevent larger interests  from buying-out the smaller operators for their fishing rights, could lead to the 
introduction of safeguard measures. Safeguarding can be seen in Norway, where vessel quotas cannot be 
This Alaskan fishery is similar to that of the Herring Roe fishery in Vancouver. Large 
groups of purse seine vessels gather in the ‘race to fish’. Without any quota rights or 
capacity controls, vessel owners can be forced into a high risk situation such as this. 
(Photo by: Randy Sponholz). 
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transferred from smaller communities in the north to the more industrialised communities in the south (Hanneson 
2009). Alternative solutions can also be seen in other fisheries: in Estonia, larger vessels are allocated quota of fish 
they can catch whereas the smaller vessels are allocated an amount of effort in which they can fish (MRAG et al. 
2009).
The equitable allocation of these rights initially is also important. In the Alaskan case, quotas were allocated to 
eligible participants based on catch history. These eligible participants were vessel owners which were active in any 
years between 1988–1990 and the catch history was established through any five of the seven years between 1984 
and 1990. Ensuring that rights are allocated to all participants with a recognised stake in the fishery is key to 
establishing a rights-based system that is acceptable to all, with minimised social costs. 
Monitoring and controlling capacity in small-scale fisheries 
As an alternative to individual transferrable quota systems, the Chilean loco and Ben Tre clam case studies 
highlighted how local management measures can support efforts to control capacity in smaller fisheries that are 
managed to generate financial returns from fishing. In both these cases greater authority was given to local groups 
that allowed them to make and enforce some local management actions that included taking steps to address 
capacity within the fishery, both in terms of the number of fishers and the types of gears used.. 
Influencing capacity control through the value chain
Consumer and retailer awareness can create market pressure that can, in turn, influence the behaviour of fishers 
and managers. In addition, market-based incentives have played an important role in capacity control in several 
cases. For example, through the growing consumer demand for sustainably sourced fish, fishery managers in Ben 
Tre were encouraged to limit capacity and improve monitoring as a means to gain MSC certification that, in turn, 
enabled them to gain access to a wider, more lucrative market. Similarly, ISSF have addressed issues related to 
traceability and capacity to highlight the sustainability of tuna supply to retailers. By requiring all of their members 
only purchase supplies from vessels with an UVI, it is expected that 60% of total canned tuna sales will be covered 
under this resolution. 
Identifying candidates for capacity reduction 
This chapter has highlighted a 
number of successful innovations and 
approaches to addressing issues of 
overcapacity. In large-scale fisheries, 
fleets with low or zero profitability 
are likely to be overcapitalised. These 
fleets should be the target of the 
capacity reduction schemes studied 
here, particularly the introduction of 
transferable rights based systems 
with suitable safeguards for small-
scale fishers. These systems should 
be capable of removing capacity 
w i t h o u t  t h e  n e e d  f o r 
decommissioning, to match with 
available fishing opportunities. 
However, it should be recognised 
that these approaches may incur 
additional social costs as there will be 
losers (those excluded from the 
fishery) as well as winners (those 
who gain rights and stand to benefit 
from long term sustainability) and 
these may need to be explicitly 
addressed.
OVERCAPACITY
New management measures encouraged by the potential of new markets in Ben Tre 
clam fishery require landing of clams to occur on vessels such as this moving in and 
out of harvest grounds with the tide. Previously tractors were driven over areas at 
low tide to land catch damaging stocks (Photo: VINAFIS). 
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PERVERSE SUBSIDIES 
Inappropriate subsidies to the fishing industry are contributing to worldwide fisheries depletion, overcapitalisation 
and ecosystem degradation. Nearly 60% of global fisheries subsidies go to unsustainable, capacity-enhancing 
activities, and large developed countries are spending twice the amount of tax-payer money on global fisheries 
subsidies that encourage overfishing than they are on subsidies that protect oceans (Sumaila et al. 2010). 
Removing inappropriate subsidies, reorienting subsidies to contribute towards positive environmental outcomes, 
and creating positive financial incentives for sustainable fisheries will help make global fisheries sustainable and 
will benefit the marine environment. Action can be taken at international and national levels, from governments, 
NGOs and the private sector. 
Fisheries subsidies 
Agricultural subsidies, including those which led to the surpluses of production and the ‘sugar mountains’ and 
‘wine lakes’ of the 1980s in the EU, are well-known. Fisheries subsidies are less well-publicised, but have 
encouraged fishing fleets to search further and deeper for fish than ever before, expanding the problem of 
overfishing.  
Subsidies are financial contributions made by governments or public bodies which provide a private benefit 
(Cox and Schmidt 2002). Sumaila and Pauly (2006) estimate global fisheries subsidies at USD 30–34 billion per 
year (Table 4); more than the GDP of half the countries of the world. The amount spent by governments 
subsidising the fishing industry represents 35–40 % of the first-sale value of total fisheries production.  
A brief history  
Fisheries production declined dramatically during the Second World War. There was a subsequent surge in 
subsidies to marine capture fisheries during the 1950s and 1960s as countries tried to rebuild their commercial 
fishing industries to secure and augment food supplies. In the 1970s and 1980s, as national control over marine 
resources was extended out to the 200 nautical mile EEZ, many countries began subsidising the construction of 
domestic fishing vessels and fishing-related infrastructure in order to take advantage of the fishing opportunities 
created by the displacement of foreign fleets.  
Support to fishing is provided mainly through government expenditure on ports, subsidies for vessel modernisation 
or construction, subsidies or tax waivers on fuel, buy-back (decommissioning) schemes, government-to-
CHAPTER 3
Figure 17: Value of subsidies to the fishery sector as a percentage of the total value of fishery production (Data source: Sumaila and 
Pauly 2006). 
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government payments for access to another country’s EEZ (also called ‘access payments’) that are not fully 
recovered from the fishing vessels, income support for commercial fishers during periods when fishing is banned 
or disrupted, and fish price support mechanisms that maintain prices for fishers artificially high.  
Several hundred million dollars are spent each year on 
decommissioning fishing vessels, buying up surplus 
licences, and helping to retrain fishers for other 
occupations. Decommissioning can sometimes have 
unintended consequences. Fishers are paid to remove 
surplus, loss-making capital, and thus have more 
financial resources with which they buy new vessels 
and gear. 
Experience from a number of countries shows that it is 
extremely difficult to design a decommissioning scheme 
that will stem the continued growth of fishing capacity 
as long as the overall incentive structure in the sector 
continues to encourage because the money provided 
for decommissioning simply supports additional 
investment (Munro 1999). Decommissioning subsidies 
are often anticipated by the industry and unnecessary 
fishing capacity may be accumulated with the 
expectation of future decommissioning payouts. 
The countries that provide the most subsidies are 
Japan (USD 5.1 billion), India (USD 4.5 billion), the EU 
(USD 3.2 billion) and China (USD 2.7 billion); seven 
countries provide two-thirds of all subsidies (Sumaila and Pauly 2006). Developed countries provide the majority 
of fishing subsidies (55 %), and developing countries the remaining 45%. However, on a per country basis, 
developed countries provide more than three times as much in subsidies as developing countries.  
Subsidising fisheries depletion 
By reducing the input costs of fishing, subsidies artificially increase profits for the industry and can enable fishing 
to continue beyond the point where it would normally be unprofitable. This leads to the build-up of excessive 
fishing capacity, resulting in problems with control of the excessive fishing effort and overexploitation of fishery 
resources. Overcapacity, supported by subsidies, means that the net contribution of fisheries to the global 
economy is negative, with total operating costs higher than gross revenue, as discussed in Chapter 2. Often, the 
money used to subsidise the industry could be better invested in other more innovative financial mechanisms to 
promote sustainability and reduce overcapacity. The following case studies showcase some innovative 
approaches to the subsidy issue, showing that it is possible to remove subsidies and also introduce new financial 
mechanisms, with overall benefits to fisheries and the environment .  
PERVERSE SUBSIDIES
Subsidies have been used for construction and modernisation 
of fishing vessels, contributing to overcapacity (Photo source: 
C. Barnes) 
Table 4: Value of global fisheries subsidies by type (USD billion)
Source: Compiled from Sumaila and Pauly 2006
Subsidy type Developing countries Developed countries Global total 
Managementprogrammesandservices,researchand
development(good)
1.1 5.5 6.6
Boatconstruction,renewalandmodernisation,fishingport
constructionandrenovation,marketingsupport,taxexemp
tions,accessagreementsanddevelopmentprojects(bad)
12.3 9.7 22.0
Vesselbuybackschemes,fisherassistanceprogrammes,
communitydevelopmentprogrammes(ambiguous)
0.9 2.5 3.4
Total 14.3 17.7 32.0
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The problem and driver: Subsidies contribute to overexploitation 
As discussed in the previous section, it is well acknowledged that subsidies are a significant driver for 
unsustainable fisheries. Discussions began in the 1990s on the need to reduce harmful subsidies to fisheries. 
Recognition of the harmful effects of subsidies and their widespread use, by international organisations and 
NGOs, led to pressure to address the issue by the international community.  
The innovation: International action on subsidies 
Fisheries subsidies are a global problem which require a global solution. In Doha in 2001, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) undertook to ‘clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into account 
the importance of this sector to developing countries’. Subsequently in the Johannesburg World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, there was a call to ‘eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing and to over-capacity’. 
The WTO deals with the rules of trade between nations at a global level. Because subsidies can have an effect on 
trade, by affecting prices, the WTO plays a role in regulating the use of subsidies that affect trade. Currently, the 
WTO is the only international body with a mandate to regulate and restrict the use of subsidies in fisheries.  
Negotiating positions at the WTO may be made by individual countries or the European Commission for the EU, 
or by groups of countries that associate together due to a common stance on a particular issue. Different 
countries want to restrict subsidies to different extents, from a general prohibition of all subsidies with specific 
exceptions, to all subsidies being allowed apart from specific prohibitions (Box 2). 
Nine years from the start of the Doha Round, the negotiations are ongoing. The negotiations group on Rules 
(which deals with fisheries subsidies) has recently appointed a new chairperson, reinvigorating the discussions 
and contributing to a window of opportunity to conclude the talks in 2011. The successful negotiation of a WTO 
agreement on restricting and controlling subsidies to the fisheries sector would be a major step forwards for 
reducing subsidies’ harmful effects. However, any agreement reached must restrict effectively the use of harmful 
subsidies and avoid providing excessive exemption clauses that reduce its effectiveness for ensuring fisheries 
sustainability. A classification of subsidies is provided in Table 5. 
Challenges: Developing 
countries and small-scale 
fisheries 
Fisheries are important in many 
developing countries as they provide a 
range of benefits in situations where 
there may be few alternatives. 
Developing countries have argued that 
they may need more flexibility in the 
implementation of rules on subsidies as a 
result, but not to the detriment of the 
overall effectiveness of any agreement. 
Countries such as China, India and 
Indonesia have called for exemptions 
from subsidies disciplines for developing 
country small-scale fishers, infrastructure 
and capital and operating costs. Many 
countries have highlighted the need for 
them to encourage development of their 
Tackling subsidies 
through the WTO 
Species All
Fishing Method(s) All
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Table 5: Classification of subsidies in Sumaila et al. (2010) 
Category Types
Beneficial 
(support healthy fish stocks 
through conservation, 
enforcement or improved 
fishing methods) 
Fisheries management 
Fisheries research and development 
Marine Protected Areas 
Capacity-enhancing (enhance 
fishing capacity and 
contribute to overfishing) 
Boat construction, renovation 
Fisheries development projects 
Fishing access 
Fishing port development 
Fuel subsidies 
Marketing and storage infrastructure 
Tax exemption 
Ambiguous
(can either improve fish 
stocks or result in 
overexploitation) 
Fisher assistance 
Rural fishing community development 
Vessel buy-back (decommissioning) 
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domestic fisheries and fish processing infrastructure through the use of subsidies, but this does run the risk of 
fomenting overcapacity in developing countries.  
Some developed countries have also requested exemptions for their small-scale fisheries. However, small-scale 
does not necessarily mean small impact, and effective management measures are also needed for these sectors. 
There is ongoing discussion about the definition of ‘small-scale’ for special treatment in subsidies disciplines, and 
the type of exemption that small-scale fisheries and developing countries should be eligible for.  
Costs and benefits: Reducing harmful subsidies would benefit fisheries 
Restricting harmful fisheries subsidies on a global scale would benefit fish stocks by removing cost-reduction 
mechanisms that allow fishing to continue when it would otherwise be economically unviable, and would 
probably result in a reduction in global fishing capacity. Clearly this issue is closely linked to the need to reduce 
capacity worldwide (Chapter 2) which would allow fish stocks to rebuild and the fishing industry to become more 
profitable. An immediate benefit would be the saving of USD 25 billion per year in subsidies currently paid by 
governments.
However, fishery reform of this type is not easy otherwise it would already have been done. It can cause acute 
economic and social hardship as subsidies that supported fishing costs are removed. A transition phase is usually 
required to support investment in other areas of the economy to develop alternative opportunities, and 
investment in education and infrastructure so that future generations have more options open to them. 
Uptake potential: Influencing the negotiations 
If an effective agreement is reached at the WTO on fisheries subsidies, it  would have significant uptake potential 
as all WTO members will be obliged to abide by the rules. WTO membership covers 153 (out of 195) countries, 
including all major fishing nations except Russia, which is currently in talks about joining. WTO rules on fisheries 
subsidies are likely to include a requirement to report information to the WTO on any subsidies that are provided, 
and the WTO provides a dispute resolution mechanism if any members feel that another member is not abiding 
by the rules.  
The WTO process represents the best opportunity to tackle harmful fisheries subsidies on a global level. The 
right political conditions are needed whereby WTO members are prepared to address subsidies meaningfully. The 
path to achieving such conditions may lie with influencing public opinion prior to negotiation rounds as opposed 
to trying to shape political views during negotiations. 
There are two main negotiating positions 
regarding which subsidies should be allowed and 
which should be prohibited. The ‘top-down 
approach’ argues that all fisheries subsidies 
should be prohibited apart from certain 
exemptions. Members of this group include 
Australia, Chile, Ecuador, New Zealand, Peru, 
Philippines and the US (and previously Iceland). 
In contrast, the ‘bottom-up approach’, argues 
that all subsidies should be allowed, apart from 
those that are specifically prohibited. Members of 
this group include Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the 
EU.
There is general agreement that subsidies that 
support capital costs should be prohibited (e.g. 
the acquisition, modification or construction of 
fishing vessels). However, it is also important to 
restrict subsidies for operating costs such as 
fuel, ice and labour. The position of subsidies 
for infrastructure, income support, price 
support and access agreements is not clear.  
The November 2007 draft text includes 
prohibiting a broad range of capacity- or effort-
enhancing subsidies, as well as subsidies that 
affect fishing on ‘unequivocally overfished 
stocks’, along with exemptions for specific types 
of subsidy from prohibition (e.g. for vessel 
safety or reducing vessel capacity). 
There may be a requirement for permitted 
subsidies to be allowed only where basic 
fisheries management systems are in place, or 
that subsidies should have no adverse effects 
on fish stocks or trade. Prohibited subsidies 
may have to be listed, with an explanation of 
why they contribute to overcapacity and 
overfishing, although for a specific subsidy not 
to be prohibited, there may have to be an 
explanation of why it does not contribute to 
overcapacity and overfishing. 
Box 2: Proposals for restricting fisheries subsidies at the WTO 
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The problem and driver: Recognition of declining fish stocks  
In New Zealand in the early 1980s, subsidies aimed to develop deepwater resulted in overcapacity in both inshore 
and deepwater fleets. A lack of catch limits also resulted in ’boom and bust’ fisheries, which had a disruptive 
influence on local communities. Fisheries management included non-restrictive permits, lack of catch limits, and 
availability of various subsidies such as for building fishing vessels and promoting seafood exports. This 
combination of measures is typical of those used by many countries to encourage fisheries development. 
The declining state of the inshore fisheries in the early 1980s was impacting on both commercial and amateur 
fisheries and on the marine environment. There was recognition by the public, industry and amateur fishers that 
something needed to be done to avoid severe overfishing and the collapse of the industry in the near-future. The 
successful trial of an innovative management system in deepwater fisheries, strong support from a few industry 
leaders, and concurrent reforms to the wider economy all acted as drivers for the reform of the fisheries sector. 
Additionally, the relatively short history of commercial fishing and weak industry organisations facilitated the 
implementation of change in New Zealand, enabling it to take a different approach from most other countries.  
The innovation: Fisheries reform and removal of subsidies  
Subsidy removal in New Zealand’s fisheries was part of a wholesale reform of the fisheries and agriculture sector 
involving the removal of open access and input controls and the introduction of output controls and individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs). Instead of fishing to catch as much as possible, with no overall limits on catches, 
fishers were given long-term ‘shares’ in various fish stocks, known as ITQs. This gave fishers the entitlement to 
catch a certain amount of those stocks over the year, depending on the expected productivity of the stocks. 
The reform was a process that took place over several years and began with 19 inshore and seven deepwater 
species. It involved the allocation of quota to fishers without charge. This system was considered least 
economically disruptive method and allowed vessels in the short-term to operate as per usual. To then reduce 
exploitation rates, the government bought back NZD 42 million (USD 25 million) of provisional catching rights. 
However, since then it has recovered substantially more in resource rents, sales of quota and levies. 
As part of the reform, subsidies were removed and the industry 
pay a levy which contributes to the costs of fisheries 
management services — initially, quota owners paid a resource 
rental based on the value of their quota shares; from 1994, this 
was replaced with a levy to contribute to the government’s costs 
associated with management of the commercial fisheries, 
including services such as research and compliance. The cost to 
industry is approximately NZD 35 million (USD 20 million) per 
year. In recent years the only government assistance provided to 
the industry has been co-financing of industry training and 
environmental certification, and one-off assistance to the 
industry to cope with the costs of moving to a new greenhouse 
gas emissions trading system. 
The New Zealand industry had previously received subsidies 
such as the financing of an organisation for promoting industry 
development, various tax breaks, low interest loans and import 
and export subsidies. The industry did not receive ongoing 
support to fishing costs, such as fuel subsidies or minimum price 
support, which may have meant the removal of subsidies was 
less problematic. 
New Zealand:  
Removal of subsidies 
Species 130 different demersal and 
pelagic species 
Fishing Methods  Trawls, longlines, dredges 
and pots 
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The New Zealand fishing industry pays a levy to 
government which covers fisheries management 
costs (Photo: J Peacey). 
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Costs and benefits: Reducing management costs, increasing profitability  
The reforms have made New Zealand’s commercial fisheries self-financing; even the costs of management services 
are recovered from the industry. There is at least some evidence of good resource conservation, increased prices 
for fish, increased profits, generation of resource rent, greater economic stability, and an improved investment 
climate. New Zealand was rated as one of the best-performing countries in its progress in implementing ecosystem
-based management of fisheries (Pitcher et al 2009).  
The Ministry of Fisheries reports that 72% of total catch is taken from assessed stocks. Of the 117 assessed stocks 
67% are at or near target levels (MoF 2010). There are rebuilding plans in place for most of the 38 fish stocks that 
are below target levels, including reductions in catch limits and closure of some areas to fishing.
The removal of fisheries subsidies cost the New Zealand government NZD 42 million (USD 25 million) to buy back 
provisional quota allocations. Approximately NZD 35 million (USD 20.7 million) annually is contributed by industry 
towards management and monitoring costs. The removal of subsidies from fisheries is of particular benefit to 
taxpayers, who no longer have to support the 
industry.
It is difficult to assess the total value of the fishery in 
terms of landed value as the extent to which 
companies are vertically integrated through all 
sectors makes it difficult to obtain this figure. 
However, as a proxy to the value of fishing, the 
change in overall asset value based on the trading 
price of quota shares and annual catch entitlements) 
is positive and has been increasing since 1998 
(Figure 18). It has increased from NZD 2.65 billion in 
1996 to NZD 4 billion in 2009 (USD 1.57 billion to 
USD 2.3 billion). This indicates that quota owners 
are confident of the sustainability of New Zealand 
fisheries and future income from them. 
The fisheries industry is profitable without the need 
for subsidies. Instead of relying on catching more fish to increase income, fishers had to adjust to a new system of 
adjusting their inputs to match the amount of catch entitlement they have. This has led to more efficient fisheries, 
indicated by an ongoing reduction in the number of fishing vessels. Alongside this, there is an incentive for fishers 
to obtain the best value possible from the fish they catch — either by catching when market prices are highest or 
by ensuring maximum value-added returns through quality or product diversification. 
It should be noted that there were some losers in the process as well; some 1,500 part-time fishers were excluded 
from the fishery and did not receive quota allocation, and crew members received no compensation if the vessel on 
which they worked was removed from the fishery by its owner. 
Uptake potential 
The removal of subsidies is difficult, but New Zealand demonstrates that fishery management in which the industry 
is not only profitable without the use of subsidies, but also covers the costs of research and enforcement, is 
possible. It should be noted that the benefits in this case cannot be attributed solely to the removal of subsidies, 
but rather to the package of innovations that were implemented in the 1980s and refined since then.  
Whilst there are international moves through the WTO to restrict subsidies to the fisheries sector, countries do not 
have to wait for the conclusion of the WTO talks to rules to remove subsidies to their fisheries sector. New Zealand 
unilaterally removed subsidies as part of a wider sector reform policy in the 1980s and now recoups the costs of its 
fisheries management services from the industry. 
The relatively short history of commercial fishing and the previous absence of certain types of subsidy to support 
ongoing costs (e.g. fuel, minimum price support) may have facilitated the changes that were introduced. As a 
result, attempting to introduce similar changes in other countries may encounter more resistance. The way in 
which such changes are introduced must be tailored to the specific circumstances of each fishery, as different 
political, social, economic, biological and infrastructure factors are at play in different fisheries. 
Figure 18: The asset value (nominal) of New Zealand’s fish stocks 
is positive and rising since the introduction of ITQs and removal of 
subsidies to the sector (Source: Statistics New Zealand 2010). 
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Investing in conservation 
CHAPTER 3
The problem and driver: Lack of financial incentives for conservation  
The transformation from an overexploited fishery to a sustainable fishery often involves short-term social and 
economic costs related to this transition phase (or longer-term in the case of conservation actions such as closed 
areas). Innovative ways of financing change can provide financial resources that can mitigate the short-term costs 
and allow conservation-oriented actions which will yield greater returns in the future. Two examples of promising 
innovative financing mechanisms, which are in the early stages of development, are explored here: the Kiribati 
Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA) and Banking on Cod. 
Kiribati: Phoenix Island Protected Area 
Kiribati is located in the western central Pacific and the country is made up of three separate groups of islands — the 
Gilbert group in the west, the Phoenix group in the centre, and the Line Islands in the east — each surrounded by its 
own discrete portion of the EEZ. Stimulated by research conducted by the New England Aquarium, which highlighted 
the richness of reef biodiversity and abundance of top predators otherwise missing from many other Pacific island 
marine ecosystems, the Kiribati government recognised the potential biodiversity and conservation importance of the 
marine environments around the Phoenix Island group. The idea of formally protecting the Phoenix Islands and their 
near-shore ecosystems was championed by the President of Kiribati, partly motivated by concerns of the potential 
impact of climate change on low-lying nations such as Kiribati, thus lending high-level political support to the process. 
However, over one third of government revenue comes from the sale of fishing licences to foreign vessels to fish in 
the Kiribati EEZ, and closing a large area to fishing would imply a reduction in revenue from fishing licences. There 
was therefore a need to develop an alternative financing mechanism to support the costs of implementing and 
enforcing a closed area, and to compensate the country for lost fishing licence revenue. 
Banking on Cod 
All but two of the twelve cod stocks in the Northwest Atlantic severely depleted, and the Grand Banks cod fishery 
— which was once the world’s most productive and valuable fishery — was so severely depleted that in July 1992, 
the cod fishery was closed. This heralded the end of a USD 500 million industry which employed up to 40,000 
Canadians and represented up to 90% of regional employment. Initial signs of recovery in the stock forced a 
premature reopening of the fishery. This rapidly depleted any increases in the cod population and resulted in a 
further closure of the fishery that has yet to be lifted. There is a need to meet the short-term social costs and 
provide industry with income during the closure period and, at the same time, enable the fishery to shift towards 
long-term profitability and environmental sustainability. 
The innovation: Alternative financing mechanisms  
Kiribati — Phoenix Island Protected Area 
An endowment fund is being established to cover the costs of management of PIPA in Kiribati and provide an extra 
payment to the government to compensate for the opportunity cost of not issuing fishing licences. The endowment 
fund will be capitalised through public and private investment, and administered by the Phoenix Island Protected 
Area Conservation Trust, established by the Kiribati Government in partnership with Conservation International and 
the New England Aquarium. PIPA will be managed by the Kiribati Government under an agreement with the PIPA 
Trust in the form of a five-year recurring conservation contract (currently being formalised). The contract defines the 
management obligations, and the Kiribati Government will receive annual payments from the endowment fund (as 
compensation for the loss of fishing licence revenue) in return for satisfactory performance.  
The implementation appears to be progressing well, although it is still in its initial phases. The structures have 
been established and a Trust Executive Director is being recruited to focus on fundraising to capitalise the 
endowment fund. While PIPA is not directly aimed at management or conservation of the tuna stock, providing a 
compensation payment to the government for lost fishing licences enabled the protected area to be established 
and the inshore ecosystems protected, which will benefit the wider marine ecosystem.  
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Banking on Cod 
As a means to finance the industry during the closure, WWF have proposed an alternative financing mechanism, 
Banking on Cod. The basis of Banking on Cod is that future benefits can be expected from more productive stocks 
and increased catches. The proposed mechanism would allow investors  with an interest in environmental 
stewardship (‘interested investors’), and subsequently others looking for a return on their investment 
(‘disinterested investors’), to contribute to a fund that would provide loans to fisheries bodies on the basis of long-
term business and management plans (Figure 19). These plans demonstrate how long-term sustainability and 
profitability will be achieved. 
P lans should therefore 
demons t r a t e  l ong - t e rm 
profitability based on long-term 
sustainability, through a 
management system that 
confers stewardship incentives 
and accountability on to 
fishers.
The expectation is that both 
stocks and the broader 
ecosystem wil l recover, 
creating a mutually reinforcing 
positive feedback loop in which 
fishing becomes profitable. 
Portions of this profit are then 
used to benefit the original 
investors and remaining 
portions could be recycled 
back in to the financial 
institution for further loans. 
Costs and benefits 
Both of these initiatives provide innovative financing mechanisms to overcome the costs associated with actions 
that require a reduction or cessation of fishing effort. They allow payments for not fishing and reward 
environmental stewardship. 
The initial aim for capitalisation of the PIPA endowment fund is USD 25 million. This will be used to cover the park 
management costs as well as an annual payment of USD 1–3 million to the government to compensate for lost 
fishing licence payments. There will have been costs associated with the initial scientific research to establish the 
need for the protected area, but data on this was not available. The primary benefit will be environmental in the 
form of ensuring that the reef systems remain pristine. 
Banking on Cod has not been implemented. There are no estimates available on the size of the fund required or 
the size/number of loans yet. However, the potential returns are substantial. Atlantic Canada is estimated to be 
losing CAD 820 million (USD 800 million) per year of potential earnings that would accrue from a sustainable 
demersal fishery, of which cod would be an important contributor (MacGarvin 2001). In the Atlantic US the total 
value of the north-east groundfish fishery landings are projected to quadruple to around USD 425 million if the 
fishery was completely rebuilt (NEFMC 2001), with cod again playing an important role. However, as with any 
investment, there is risk involved.  
Uptake potential: Mechanisms could be used more widely 
The PIPA example provides a financing mechanism that enables conservation actions in nations that are otherwise 
heavily dependent on income derived from the exploitation of marine resources. It follows a model of ‘payments 
for ecosystem services’ (Wunder 2005) which is often used in terrestrial conservation but is relatively new to 
marine conservation. Establishment of PIPA was facilitated by the islands having almost no resident population. 
Establishing a similar protected area in another part of the world would require full consultation and participation 
of local communities. 
While the Banking on Cod mechanism is still theoretical there would be potential for wider application. However, it 
requires investors to have confidence in future fish prices, the potential for stock recovery and good management. 
Similar approaches are already used in futures markets for other natural resources such as oil and wheat. 
Figure 19: Proposed Banking on Cod financing model. This conceptual model of the funding 
system shows the Financial Institution at its core, which must have political endorsement to 
provide investors with the confidence to invest (Source: Rangeley, R. pers. comm. 2010)
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The problem and driver: Lack of reward for sustainable practices 
There are many incentives for overexploitation of fisheries and often there is a lack of reward for sustainable 
practices. Fisheries that are responsibly managed and sustainable need a way of communicating this to consumers 
so that consumer choice and market demand can reward these practices.  
Fisheries sustainability concerns are becoming more widely known, particularly in key developed country markets 
for fish such as the US and Europe. Consumers that wish to make purchasing decisions based on environmental 
factors such as sustainability need a way of differentiating between sustainably-fished and less sustainable 
products. The processing and retail sectors also recognised the need for a sustainable supply of fish to ensure 
business sustainability in the future and to demonstrate their own commitment to sustainability. 
Ecolabels provide a different entry point for driving sustainability in fisheries, focusing on the market power of 
consumers and retailers, in addition to regulation at the fishery level.  
The innovation: Ecolabels reward industry for sustainability 
Ecolabels provide a visible endorsement of the sustainability of a product that consumers can use to decide what 
products to purchase. Organic labels for agricultural products have a long history, and dolphin-safe tuna was one 
of the first such types of ecolabels in fisheries. The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) provides a fisheries ecolabel 
and certification scheme that assures consumers that the fish was caught in an environmentally responsible 
manner from fish stocks that are sustainable and effectively managed. The demand for this type of assurance is 
increasing rapidly (Figure 20). 
The MSC sets a standard against which individual fisheries are assessed by third-party certifiers, providing an 
independent assessment of a fishery and its practices, the sustainability of the stock, environmental impacts and 
management system. Fisheries that comply with the criteria can use the scheme’s label on their products.  
Both large-scale and small-scale fisheries are 
eligible. Examples are the South African Hake fishery 
(Chapter 4), the Cornish mackerel handline fishery in 
the UK and the Ben Tre clam fishery in Vietnam 
(Chapter 2). 
The Cornish mackerel handline fishery operates 
mainly within six nautical miles of the UK coast in 
Cornwall. It is based on a traditional, relatively low 
intensity handline technique, selectively targeting 
mackerel and takes almost no by-catch. The Ben Tre 
clam fishery is managed by cooperatives together 
with local and regional government. Live clams are 
handpicked on coastal sand flat areas. A number of 
management improvements, such as setting clear 
management objectives, strengthening the 
management capacity of the cooperatives, setting 
harvest limits and stricter control on clam exploitation contributed to the fishery achieving MSC certification.  
Costs and benefits: environmental improvements and market access 
Fisheries certification promotes environmental benefits because a fishery must comply with sustainability and 
environmental criteria to achieve certification, and have management systems are in place to ensure future 
sustainability. In most certified fisheries, conditions must be met to maintain certification which often serve to 
MSC: Harnessing 
market power 
Species:  multiple 
Fishing Method: mutiple 
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Figure 20: Tonnage of MSC-certified fisheries (Source: D Agnew, 
based on MSC data) 
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reduce environmental impact such as by-catch and habitat impacts. In the case of the South African Hake fishery, 
conditions ensured that stocks started to recover, bird by-catch was significantly reduced and the impact of the 
fishery on benthic habitats was minimised. For Ben Tre clam, we have shown in Chapter 2 that its certification was 
conditional on capacity management.  
Certified fish are increasingly in demand from retailers, especially in developed countries, because of sustainability 
commitments and the demand from consumers. Achieving MSC certification has increased the market access of the 
Ben Tre clam fishery, which has increased its exports to markets such as the EU, Japan, China, Taiwan and the 
USA. The certification process for Ben Tre clam in Viet Nam cost approximately USD 120,000. Yields have become 
increasingly stable and cooperatives’ profits have increased. Clam price has increased, and the increase was 
particularly marked for the year that MSC certification was achieved.  
Prices per tonne paid to one cooperative rose from USD 615 in 2007 to USD 1,874 in 2010, including a 71% 
increase between 2009 and the first half of 2010, subsequent to MSC certification. The increases in unit price and 
profits to cooperatives that have been observed the result of achieving MSC certification and the willingness of 
buyers in developed markets to pay premium prices. A number of other factors have also contributed: improved 
value chains and traceability; establishment of a brand name; 
meeting stricter trade requirements of processors and exporters; 
better size selectivity; and more market-demand-driven harvesting. 
Similarly, the entry of South African hake into northern European 
markets was coincident with acquisition of MSC certification. 
Challenges: externalities affect fisheries 
The MSC-certified Cornish mackerel fishery operates within the 
EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, catching fish within the quota 
allocated to the UK. At the time of certification, the mackerel stock 
was considered to be sustainably fished; the number of fish caught 
and the overall biomass of the fish stock and mature fish were 
within precautionary sustainable limits. However, recent shifts in 
the geographical distribution of the mackerel stock as resulted in 
new claims from Iceland and the Faroe Islands for a greater share 
of the total allowable catch and they have unilaterally increased 
their quota. These moves potentially threaten the sustainability of 
the stock, and there may be an impact on the Cornish mackerel 
handline fishery as a result. 
This illustrates that although individual fisheries may be well-managed and responsible, they can be subject to 
external forces beyond their control that may affect stock sustainability. Furthermore, this certification may address 
only part of the problem. It may reward environmentally sustainable practices without addressing either the 
cumulative effect of the fisheries exploitation or where there is a particular issue, e.g. overcapacity, within a fishery 
or region. 
However, MSC is being increasingly criticised for its policy of encouraging change in what some environmental 
organisations consider to be uncertifiable fisheries, such as those using bottom trawls (Jacquet et al. 2010). As we 
have seen above, it is precisely the engagement in these types of fisheries which gives MSC leverage to create 
change.
Uptake potential: Increasing importance of Ecolabels 
Ecolabels are increasing in importance worldwide, especially in developed countries where consumers are 
increasingly aware of sustainability issues. Industry is becoming more pro-active in seeking certification due to the 
demand from retailers and consumers.  
Most certified fisheries to date are in developed countries. It is more difficult for developing country and small-
scale fisheries to obtain certification due to the cost involved, the need for effective management and stock 
assessment requirements. However, a number of developing country fisheries have been, and are being assessed, 
and certification schemes are developing risk-assessment methods for ‘data-poor’ fisheries that lack traditional 
stock assessment data so that they are not unnecessarily excluded from certification. 
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MSC certification of the Ben Tre clam fishery has 
contributed to increasing market access and 
improved prices for the harvesters (Photo: T. 
Chuong Ngo). 
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Addressing perverse subsidies 
Economic incentives need to be reoriented  
Many economic incentives contribute to the overexploitation of fish stocks, and act as barriers to achieving 
sustainability. Incentives such as subsidies may prevent industry from responding to signs of overexploitation and 
continue to fish beyond the point at which it would otherwise be unprofitable. However, there are a range of 
emerging positive financial mechanisms that can be used to encourage and reward sustainability and which do not 
bring the perverse incentives of subsidies.  
Subsidies are a key challenge for fisheries sustainability 
The WTO process represents an opportunity to tackle harmful fisheries subsidies on a global level and lead to real 
sustainability gains. However, for such benefits to be realised, any agreement reached must effectively ban the 
use of the most harmful subsidies such as those that enhance capacity or effort, as well as subsidies that affect 
fishing on overfished stocks. While there is a need for special and differential treatment for developing countries 
and small-scale fisheries, this should not be to the detriment of the overall effectiveness of the agreement, and 
such countries and fisheries must also act responsibly and work towards sustainability and good governance. 
Removal of subsidies at national level is difficult but possible. The New Zealand case study demonstrates that 
fisheries can not only be profitable without subsidies, but can also contribute financially to management and 
assessments costs. However, achieving the removal of subsidies is likely to encounter significant resistance from 
the industry, and is likely to result in social and economic changes as adjustments are made. In most cases a 
transition phase will be beneficial to support retraining of fishers, investment in other areas of the economy and 
investment in education.  
Alternative financing mechanisms can be applied to fisheries 
There are a range of alternative financing mechanisms that could be more widely used in fisheries. The case 
studies have shown the potential for alternatives such as endowment funds to finance conservation (PIPA) and 
private finance mechanisms to provide loans to fishers and fisheries organisations to limit fishing and allow stocks 
to rebuild, based on expected future returns (Banking on Cod). These mechanisms are still in development, 
however. Banking on Cod is still in the early stages, and will depend on the willingness of investors. Although the 
PIPA endowment fund has been established, the protected area is new and as such there is little evidence yet that 
it has generated significant environmental gains, and the phase of capitalising the fund with the required 
USD25 million is yet to be completed. 
The use of alternative financing mechanisms in fisheries faces a number of difficulties, including raising sufficient 
capital for the funds, and the uncertainties related to conservation and sustainability outcomes. However, these 
are not insurmountable; similar financing mechanisms have been used for terrestrial conservation and for other 
natural resource commodities. They offer potential for promoting actions oriented to conserving and sustainably 
exploiting fish stocks and marine resources rather than overexploiting them. 
Ecolabelling and market-based incentives 
Increasing consumer awareness about the state of fisheries, and more ethical purchasing choices, holds promise 
for the future of ecolabelling and market-based mechanisms to promote sustainable fisheries. Consumers, and 
more importantly retailers, increasingly wish to know the provenance of their food and ensure its sustainability. 
Many retailers have established their own sustainability criteria and are accountable against them. This has proved 
to be a powerful way in which markets have been able to influence both policy and practice. For consumers, the 
award of an ecolabel to fishery products demonstrates that an external body has judged that the fishery is 
conducted in a sustainable manner, with minimal environmental impacts. Benefits of certification are often in the 
form of access to additional markets and enhanced prices (MSC 2009). The philosophy of creating incentives, 
demonstrated in a number of MSC fisheries now (such as the serial application for certification by toothfish 
fisheries) is being shown to improve performance in fisheries across management systems.  
However, the cost of obtaining certification can be relatively high for some smaller fisheries and those in 
developing countries, which can act as a barrier to its implementation. Despite this, a number of small-scale and 
developing country fisheries have already been certified and in the Ben Tre clam fishery, the certification process 
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was financed by external NGOs. Ecolabel organisations such as the MSC are also piloting certification processes 
that are appropriate for such fisheries.  
Uptake potential 
Across the case studies, there is potential for intervention at all levels in fisheries related to the removal of 
subsidies and the implementation of economic incentives that are better aligned with sustainability outcomes — 
from the level of individual fisheries undergoing ecolabel certification, through national schemes for removing 
subsidies or financing conservation actions, to international action through the WTO aimed at limiting or 
removing subsidies to the fisheries sector.  
However, there is a risk with all financing mechanisms and economic incentives that they may have unintended 
consequences. For example, subsidies were not designed to overexploit fish stocks, but have often had this 
effect; options and futures markets can cause market price fluctuations which impact on producers. While the 
increased sourcing of certified seafood represents the greater influence of such schemes, there is a potential 
issue if the diversity of fisheries types and seafood species that come to market is further reduced to only those 
fisheries where certification is financially viable and/or low risk. 
The WTO negotiations on subsidies have good uptake potential as a result of the wide applicability they would 
have, but their impact is dependent on the outcome of the negotiations and what special treatment is agreed for 
developing countries and small-scale fisheries. Removing subsidies at a national level can be difficult, and the 
approach will be dependent on the situation in individual countries. In New Zealand, this was facilitated by a 
relatively young fishing industry, which was weakly organised, and fisheries reform went hand-in-hand with 
wider political and governance reforms in the country. Elsewhere, removing subsidies may encounter 
substantially more resistance from industry. 
At the level of individual fisheries, ecolabelling provides a good opportunity to reward good practice and 
sustainability. Increasing consumer awareness, increasing demand for certified product from retailers, suppliers 
and processors, and as a result increasing numbers of fisheries entering certification processes, all point towards 
this being a growing sector in the years to come. 
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Certified sustainable seafood has potential to encourage sustainable practices by industry through harnessing market incentives
(Source: MRAG). 
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POOR GOVERNANCE 
Governance is the process of decision-making and the legal frameworks, structures and processes by which 
decision are implemented (or not implemented) (UNESCAP, no date). Governance is therefore largely about the 
politics of natural resource management  (e.g. Béné and Neiland 2006) and how policy and management decisions 
are made and implemented. It relates to how people are involved in decision-making and how this affects their 
abilities to empower themselves and others and derive benefits from the process. Power, and the way that power 
is distributed between different stakeholders, are key aspects of governance. Stakeholders include those directly 
involved in fisheries (the fishers, processers and fisheries departments) as well as those with a broader stake or 
interest in the outcomes of fisheries management — including NGOs, policy makers and wider civil society. Poor 
governance is variously characterised by corruption and a lack of transparency, lack of participation by key 
stakeholders, a lack of accountability and lack of the rule of law. This chapter explores some of the issues related 
to poor governance in fisheries and case studies highlight some of the approaches to governance reform that can 
provide important insights to addressing these issues. 
Governance as a political challenge 
Meeting present and future food needs, ensuring environmental integrity and providing income and employment in 
the fishery sector is a balancing act given the finite productive capacity of resources and, as Chapter 5 highlights, 
a complex challenge given the uncertainty over this productivity. Establishing the objectives for a fishery is a 
political process and is therefore a matter of 
governance. Without addressing these 
important governance aspects, the potential 
positive contributions of technical and 
management innovations may be 
undermined. As an example, Figure 21 shows 
how high levels of illegal, unregulated and 
unreported (IUU) fishing are correlated with 
poor governance. Poor governance has 
ramifications throughout the fishery 
management system.  
However, addressing these issues is what 
makes governance possibly the most complex 
of the challenges. There are potentially many 
stakeholders who may wish to gain access to, 
or control over fisheries resources or 
influence management decisions. These 
individuals and groups may have very 
differing views of what sustainability is, based 
on their world views and attitudes to risk, and 
therefore what sorts of priorities, decisions 
and outcomes would be appropriate for a 
fishery.
In any fishery there are a variety of benefits (based on food and income) that can be derived sustainably and, 
associated with these, different costs and risks. As Figure 22 shows, catch increases with increasing fishing effort 
up to a maximum (referred to as the Maximum Sustainable Yield, MSY) where there will be maximum food 
provision. As fishing effort increases beyond this, catches decrease as there are fewer individuals to maintain the 
stock size and the risk of stock collapse increases. An advantage of fishing beyond MSY is that large numbers of 
people can subsist and/or be employed in the fishery. However, individual returns are lower and social conflicts 
may increase as users compete for fish. On the other hand, maximum profits can be expected towards the left of 
the figure, at lower levels of effort and less risk to the stock. This highlights two important points. Firstly, there are 
alternative sustainable outcomes as all points on the curve represent logical, but differing, objectives for a fishery 
that, at least on face value, have equal validity. Secondly, selecting between these alternatives (and their 
associated benefits and risks) is a matter of societal choice.  
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Figure 21: Relationship  between governance score (based on three global 
governance indicators) and the percentage of IUU fishing.  
(Source: Agnew et al. 2009). 
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Decentralisation: a key governance reform 
At the same time as there has been growing attention on the need for transparent, accountable processes, there 
has been a recognition that many centralised management arrangements have failed to deliver sustainable 
fisheries. Both of these have led to increased interest in the potential of decentralised decision-making, including 
community-based management and co-management. Central to decentralised approaches are notions of sharing 
responsibility and authority between resource users and other stakeholders. Interest in these forms of 
governance reform has largely taken two forms. More instrumental approaches take participation by those who 
are subject to regulation as a means to improve management, for example to strengthen compliance to 
regulations. In this way, reform and greater participation can reduce the costs of data collection, monitoring and 
enforcement and assist with conflict 
resolution. Alternatively, these approaches 
have emerged as a people-centered response 
to Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’, 
highlighting the knowledge, skills and rights 
of local resource users in of managing their 
own natural resources (e.g. Ostrom et al., 
1999) and an interest in the empowerment of 
local people. In practice, decentralisation can 
be pursued for a number of reasons and the 
roles and level of authority that is shared can 
vary considerably.  
The case studies illustrate how more inclusive 
forms of governance and management have 
been applied. They highlight in particular how 
different groups have been able to work 
together, negotiate fisheries objectives and 
develop mechanisms to achieve these.  
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Figure 22: The relationship between fishing effort and yield based on a surplus production model and highlighting the different costs and 
benefits associated with management. (Figure adapted from Beddington et al. 2007). 
Debates on sustainability of fisheries systems can often involve broader 
debates that encompass impacts and choices outside the fisheries 
sector. Fisheries is one part of this negotiation of the multiple uses of 
water resources. (Photo source: A. Halls) 
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The problem and drivers: Addressing environmental degradation 
Lake Taal is situated approximately 65 km south of the Philippines’ capital, Manila. At 28.3 km2, it is the third-
largest lake in the Philippines and is surrounded by six different local municipalities. The lake has an endemic 
sardine (tawilis) that forms the basis of a wild capture fishery and the lake is also used for aquaculture using 
floating cages (mainly to produce the non-native Nile Tilapia). Aquaculture developed in the 1970s, expanded 
rapidly in the 1980s and production peaked in the 1990s. Over this time, aquaculture gained importance with 
respect to the level of fish production from Lake Taal (Figure 23). Overall, Lake Taal represents an important local 
source of food and income and it also provides an additional source of income through tourism. 
The large increase in aquaculture 
development has contributed to 
increasing negative environmental 
impacts. Between 1997 and 2006, 
there were large quantities of fish 
dying in Lake Taal (both wild and 
farmed), mainly as a result of the 
effects sulphide and ammonia 
releases from the lake floor and 
‘overturns’. 
Overturns are a particular feature of 
volcanic lakes resulting from deep 
water with a low oxygen content 
being brought to the surface (due to 
currents, winds and cooling of 
surface waters following rains). The 
oxygen needs of the dense caged 
fish populations and the plankton 
and fish around them (denser than 
in open waters) cannot be met and 
fish die as a result.  
Additional effects on the lake environment arise from the provision of artificial feeds to the fish cages that adds 
large amounts of nitrogen and phosphorus to the lake. The lake’s increasing eutrophication can cause additional 
problems of low oxygen levels. However, amongst some local people, this process has been welcomed as an 
‘enrichment’ of the lake that they expect will contribute to increases in fisheries production. 
Conflict and increasing competition between users have been a feature of the use of Lake Taal. Fishers (targeting 
tawilis), leaving aside their own illegal practices, blame fish farmers for the decline in the lake’s fisheries. They 
argue that the fish cages obstruct fishing, occupy the fish sanctuary in the lake and impede the flow of the 
Pansipit River into the lake. Furthermore, uneaten feed escaping from the cages attracts the wild fish but when 
fishers follow the fish, they are chased away by cage farmers who fear poaching and sabotage. Furthermore, 
tourist operators have objected to the spread of cage culture that they view as unsightly while NGOs and 
researchers have increasingly warned of the environmental and social costs of unchecked development. 
The innovation: The Taal Volcano Protected Landscape Management Plan 
Lake Taal is a designated protected area that is managed by a Protected Area Management Board (PAMB). This is 
the only body that has the right to give permits for fish cages in the lake. It is outside the jurisdiction of the 
municipal councils around the lake. Following the difficulties to develop and enforce earlier plans, the PAMB 
undertook a consultative process to develop a Taal Volcano Protected Landscape Management Plan  involving 
negotiation among a wide range of users and interest groups. The resulting plan includes commitments to 
The Philippines: 
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Figure 23: Openwater (red) and fishcage (blue) production from Lake Taal (Source: 
based on Mutia (1999) and BAS (2004) for relevant production figures). 
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maintain water quality, zoning for forests, 
aquaculture, fish sanctuary and agro-
tourism, better law enforcement and 
maintaining current population levels, 
disaster preparedness and solid waste 
management.  
Under the plan, the number of fish cages is 
to be limited to 8,000; in line with the 
estimated carrying capacity for the lake. 
While there were groups (including NGOs 
and tourist operators) who would have 
preferred no cage culture, the final target 
was arrived at by consensus and 
compromise. Licensing requirements have 
been strengthened with regard to farming 
equipment and production. Cages are 
required to be manufactured from certain 
materials and located at least 100m from 
the shore. Stocking densities within the 
cages are to be limited to reduce the 
incidence of disease, because infestation by the parasitic isopod, Alitropus typus (known as timud) was cited by 
cage farmers as a major impediment and risk to fish farming. Demonstrating the degree of commitment to the 
plan, and as a means of ensuring accountability, a copy of the final plan was buried under a tree by the Governor 
of Batangas to be unearthed after ten years to see how it has fared. 
Despite broad support and this high level commitment, the plan faces a number of obstacles, not least from 
influential groups who are benefiting from aquaculture and who are resisting changes in the way Taal Lake is 
managed. These groups have resisted the process to regulate cage culture and, as it appeared inevitable, 
requested extensions to maintain current levels of production for as long as possible. 
Costs and benefits 
Despite determined opposition, over 5,000 illegal aquaculture structures were removed by the end of 2009 and 
an inventory of the fish cages within the legal fish cage zones has begun. It is expected that removal of these 
cages will facilitate the flow of water and assist in increasing water quality. Costs of funding the activities under 
the plan will be met through the licensing and there are also plans to set up a Taal Lake Conservation Foundation 
that can provide opportunities to mobilise private sector financing to support the activities. 
Because of the vested interests and the influential groups involved there will be difficulties to implement the plan. 
While many illegal structures have been removed, the cages are relatively cheap and new cages are being put up. 
Levels of aquaculture production have not yet fallen and this may be because removal of cages has taken out 
unproductive and inactive cages, stocking densities have not yet been controlled and because of the building of 
new cages. As an example of the contested and political nature of the process, the process of dismantling illegal 
cages has been put on hold during elections. Maintaining continued support for the plan, vigilance and 
enforcement are likely to remain challenging. 
Uptake potential 
While it is too early to determine how successful the regulations have been at reducing the environmental 
damage caused by aquaculture practices, many people have been involved in the process and have a stake in its 
success. This includes local government planning, environment and agriculture personnel who set up the public 
consultations, local people who engaged in these, facilitators and experts from the national agencies and 
Universities as well as volunteer experts and NGOs who helped draft the plan, and the political figures, including 
the governor, who have endorsed it. The planning process was a long (over two years) but the achievement has 
been considerable in moving from a situation of no regulation, conflict and environmental degradation, to the 
development of a plan in which there is general consensus. 
This case study illustrates that with consensus on a problem, if not on the solution, and a commitment to full 
participation, it is possible to mobilise a process that can result in a plan that has broad agreement, includes 
aspects of environmental stewardship, economic development and social equity, and achieves political support. 
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Tilapia farms in Lake Taal. (Photo source: Charlotte Cawthorne). 
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The offshore hake (Merluccius paradoxus) fishery in South Africa (Figure 24) employs around 7,000 people and 
contributes over 50% of the total value of all fisheries in South Africa with the main markets being Europe and the 
domestic market. The industry has annual sales of ZAR 4.15 billion (USD 600 million), generating ZAR 2.65 billion 
(USD 400 million) of foreign exchange and 
ZAR 0.95 billion  (USD 140 million) revenue 
for government.
The problem and driver 
From the start of the century the fishery 
developed and grew rapidly after World War 
II. In the 1960s a large number of foreign 
fleets started to operate along the western 
African coastline, and entered the South 
African hake fishery (Spanish, followed by 
Japanese, Soviet and Polish vessels). The
fishery developed rapidly in the 1960s, 
reaching peak catches of almost 
300,000 tonnes in 1972, less than half of 
which was accounted for by the domestic 
fleet.
The governance challenge within the hake 
fishery has concerned rights to fish and who 
benefits from the fishery. The first change 
was the introduction of a 200 nm fishing zone in 1977 and the exclusion of foreign vessels. The South African 
trawler association was formed in 1973, and received almost the entire quota that was re-distributed in 1978. 
From 1984, government policy included some redistribution of quota to new fishery entrants, and the pioneer
companies’ share of the quota fell to 68%. Under the 1998 Act the number of rights holders stabilised, and 
allocation policy included consideration of the applicant’s historical catch, performance (jobs, training, investment) 
and transformation (management, ownership and shareholding) and specifically aimed to foster Black Economic 
Empowerment.  
The fishery is sustainably managed, and has a good governance structure involving decision-making and 
consultation between industry, government, independent scientists and environmental organisations. Governance 
is strengthened by the presence of a cohesive industry body, comprising a limited number of cooperating sectors, 
supported by the continued policy of rights allocation, and involvement of the large industrial operators — 
including the original beneficiaries, now the South African Deep-sea Trawling Industry Association (SADSTIA) —  
whilst also allowing some redistribution and empowerment. However, an equally important part of the system is 
strong, nationally- and internationally-respected science. 
A particular concern of industry, in 1998, was the maintenance of strong sustainable management under the 1998 
Act, and it was concern about the continuation of these policies that stimulated the industry to apply for MSC 
certification. 
The innovation: MSC certification  
The fishery is currently assessed as meeting the MSC’s criteria for sustainability, being first certified in 2004. 
Decision rules are chosen by managers in collaboration with the industry so as to achieve outcomes that are 
acceptable to both, and supported by robust scientific testing. An observer programme is in operation with 
coverage targets of 10% for trawl and 15% for longline, which is financed by an industry levy. In the past, 
South Africa:
Certification of the 
hake fishery 
Species Deepwater and shallow 
water hake 
Fishing Methods handline, longline, 
offshore and inshore 
trawling 
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Figure 24: South African hake fishing areas for the two target hake species 
Merluccius paradoxus and M. Capensis (Source: Powers et al. 2010).  
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industry has argued strongly for reductions in catch and effort, both to maintain stock status and to avoid 
unacceptable management interventions. Industry has cooperated with NGOs to develop mitigation measures for 
bird by-catch and is responding to pressure to create marine protected areas. 
All parties perceive the MSC certification as providing them with additional leverage. Industry argues that it provides 
added value to South Africa, and that sustainability must be ensured. Government use the MSC requirements to 
improve management, particularly of by-catch species, and increase observer coverage. Environmental 
organisations use the MSC requirements to stimulate better environmental performance in the fishery, in particular 
reduction in bird by-catch.  
Costs and benefits 
The costs of MSC certification are placed at ZAR 600,000 (USD 86,000), with surveillance costs about 10% of this 
annually. The larger cost borne by the industry has been in making changes to comply with the conditions, 
estimated at ZAR 12 million (USD 1.7 million). However, industry has been able to access new markets in northern 
Europe, which were previously inaccessible to them without MSC certification. This has partially compensated for 
the currently very difficult international market in whitefish. Current assessments put the M. paradoxus stock as 
likely to be below BMSY but increasing under the influence of the current operational management procedure. Catch 
rates are increasing, bringing profitability up with them. Levies on industry (permit fees and levies on landings) 
have generated ZAR 24 million (USD 3.4 million) in 2009 to support management costs. There have been significant 
environmental gains, including reductions in by-catch of birds and non-target fish. The social cost in this case study 
is that limiting access rights limits who can benefit from a sustainably managed and certified fishery. 
Uptake potential 
South African hake provides an example of a fishery in which limiting the rights to the fishery has led to 
sustainability benefits, including the recent MSC certification and stock recovery. Industry works with management 
authorities to ensure that management measures provide positive environmental benefits, without creating 
significant impacts on employment and maintaining relative stability in catch levels between years and acceptable 
increases in catches.  
However, the case study also highlights the contested nature of resources and the way that actors respond to 
change. The state is intervening in fisheries, as a result of major changes in government priorities arising from 
significant political changes within South Africa, to achieve wider societal goals. Part of the industry’s motivation for 
certification, in addition to securing markets and increasing environmental sustainability, included defending against 
further erosion of the management system, and changes in industry composition, by government policy. 
POOR GOVERNANCE
Figure 25: Development of the South African hake fishery over time (Source: Powers et al. 2010).
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The problem and drivers: Overexploitation and conflict 
As a result of the civil war in Mozambique (1975–1992), people increasingly moved to the coastal areas from the 
interior as a means to escape the conflict. For local people, fishing is an important source of income, food and 
employment. Many took up fishing and as the 
population of costal areas increased, the 
pressure on fish resources increased 
substantially. The resulting coastal fisheries are 
multi-species, and the beach seine net is one of 
the main fishing gears used. Beach seines — a 
net approximately 500m long, deployed using a 
small boat to encircle fish and crustaceans — 
provided a relatively easy entry into the 
fisheries. People moving to the coast lacked 
financial resources and the skills to operate 
more advanced fishing gear or larger boats. 
Boats were also lacking as a result of the 
devastation of the civil war. 
The increasing pressure on coastal resources 
increasingly led to conflicts between fishers. 
These conflicts occasionally spilled over into 
physical violence and the destruction and theft 
of fishing gear. From the point of view of 
sustainability the regulation of effort and 
overexploitation became key problems, with 
access and rights to fish an important consideration. By the time of the peace accords in 1994, these problems 
reached such proportions that the government had to intervene and try to reduce conflict and introduce better 
regulation, yet recognising that these were problems that the government would not be able to control directly.  
The innovation: Establishment of local co-management committees 
The Institute for the Development of Small-Scale Fisheries (IDPPE) was created at this time and sent a team of 
local experts together with foreign technical assistance to coastal villages to facilitate the establishment of co-
management committees (Comités de Co-gestão de Pesca, CCPs). Pilot studies were conducted, one in 
Kwirikwidge and another in Inhassoro, where the CCPs provided an opportunity for local people to discuss the 
problems related to the fishery and fishing activities. Through these discussions it became clear that there was a 
strong local sense of the need for preservation and rational use of marine resources and to establish some rights 
over access to the resource. The latter was addressed by licences issued by the CCPs to beach seine operators in 
order to control the number of people who could fish within their delimited areas of influence. The CCP was also 
responsible for collecting revenues and passing these to the Fisheries Administration. Other issues that were 
raised as concerns by local people were the lack of knowledge to diversify into other forms of fishing (to provide 
new opportunities and reduce the pressure on coastal resources) and access to markets. As a result, IDPPE 
worked with the CCPs to introduce other gears, such as gillnets and trammel nets. 
Costs and benefits 
The initiative proved promising as it was able to reduce conflict through the licensing and the support that was 
provided through IDPPE to local regulations. The initiative was extended to other nearby coastal villages and this 
provided an opportunity to extend the scheme and create a network of CCPs that could share information 
between themselves and also discuss common issues with the government. Throughout this period, IDPPE 
continued to guide the locally-elected CCP leaders through the process of promoting regular meetings, issuing the 
fishing licences, preparing meeting notes and helping them to prepare the agenda for the discussion of relevant 
Mozambique:  
Co-management 
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Beach seine operation in Kwirikwige village in Mozambique. (Photo 
source: F. Leotte). 
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issues at a provincial level. However, the nature of 
these fisheries means that it is not possible to 
provide quantitative estimates of changes within the 
fisheries and the coastal villages or to establish the 
extent to which this process has had beneficial 
impacts on fish stocks.  
The networking of the communities enabled them to 
collectively address another issue affecting them — 
the fishing operations of larger shrimp trawlers 
fishing that caught fish as by-catch and often fished 
very close to shore and their interactions with the 
coastal fishery. Again, the coastal communities were 
able to use the mechanism of the CCPs to put 
forward their perspective on the issue and to assert 
rights over the coastal resources. As a result, 
agreement was reached between these 
communities and the semi-industrial trawler fleet in 
that the latter stopped operating within the area up to three miles from the coast. This was an important 
agreement that is claimed to have virtually eliminated problems relating to the damage of fishing nets by shrimp 
trawlers.  
Challenges: The changing nature of the problem 
In terms of governance this co-management initiative has proven to be a successful mechanism to bring together 
stakeholders to discuss the issues facing the users of coastal resources. The CCPs have also provided an effective 
mechanism to establish claims on the resources. However, while effective in addressing this concern, the CCPs were 
less successful at providing the villages with increased authority over resources and new problems began to emerge. 
Even with the licensing of beach seines, and attempts to introduce new gears, there was increasing use of fine-
meshed nets (such as mosquito nets) and the catching of juvenile fish. Catches continue to fall and, given the 
short-term need for food and income, there is a reluctance to enforce the ban on these gears.  
There have also been concerns raised within the villages about the operation of the CCPs. In some cases there 
have been complaints that the CCPs have become a mechanism by which the government passes on its 
responsibilities to local communities. Because the CCP issue licences and collect the revenues on behalf of the 
state, they believe they should be paid for what 
they see as work for the government. 
Uptake potential 
The establishment of co-management 
committees to involve local resource users in 
management and decision-making has been 
widely seen as a positive move. The 
implementation and extension of the CCP has 
been so successful that today there are over 
150 CCPs spread along the whole coast. It is 
believed that almost all fishing communities in 
the country are now represented by a CCP, and 
the CCPs are represented at national level on 
the Fisheries Advisory Committee. 
Co-management, and the sharing of authority 
and responsibility, has potential in many 
contexts. While it may be established to 
address one particular set of issues, it may 
begin a process that can respond to further 
challenges. A stronger local voice can provide a 
different perspective and highlight further challenges to sustainability that may not be apparent to external 
actors. However, as this case highlights, stakeholders have their own interests and will also act in ways that 
promote these. 
POOR GOVERNANCE
An outstanding issue, small fish fry caught by fine-mesh nets in coastal 
beach seine fishing, threatening the long-term sustainability of these 
resources (Photo source: F. Leotte). 
Asserting community rights over the local resources in Kwirikwige 
village in Mozambique (Photo source: F. Leotte). 
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Many of the issues of management are, at heart, issues of governance. This section draws on the governance 
case studies as well as highlighting the governance aspects related to overcapacity (Chapter 2) and lack of data 
(Chapter 5). Overall, the case studies emphasise the dynamic nature of fisheries the governance challenges within 
fisheries as different actors, interests and issues emerge over time.  
Governance is a complex problem 
Governance is the most complex of the challenges because it is a human and a political challenge. Within any 
given fishery there are a range of interests at play and these interests may be variously supported and challenged 
by efforts to transform fisheries. As other chapters in this report also illustrate, many of the key challenges also 
raise aspects of rights of access and entitlement, which are governance issues. As the South African hake and 
Lake Taal case studies showed, efforts to restrict or redistribute rights can be resisted by actors within the fishery 
and sustainability initiatives and the rhetoric of sustainability can even be deployed in support of these interests.  
What this highlights is that there is unlikely to 
be a single solution to governance challenges. 
As the case studies in this Chapter show, the 
introduction of more inclusive decision-making 
processes have been able to start the process of 
transforming a number of fisheries. These 
processes have had different starting points, 
recognise different objectives and bring together 
stakeholders, creating debate, compromise and 
negotiation, creating the space in which positive 
transformations become possible and within 
which, as Figure 22 illustrates, more than one 
sustainable outcome is possible.  
Pathways and processes of 
transformation 
Creating transformative processes requires 
careful facilitation and it also requires us to 
accept that different values and world views are 
equally valid and must be actively represented. 
In doing so we must consider our own position. Underpinning many approaches to sustainability has been an 
emphasis on the application of science and rational planning to sustainability challenges. Applied to governance 
challenges this can lead to a focus on solutions and models of success that can downplay the political (and 
historically situated) dimensions of what are fundamental challenges of rights and power (e.g. Arthur et al. in 
press). As Pitcher and Lam (2010) in a recent review concluded, there are no simple solutions to complex fisheries 
problems but management measures that are context specific. Identifying which measures are appropriate is part 
of the process. 
These case studies illustrate that transformation not always straightforward. Changes in the nature of the fishery, 
in those seeking access to the resources, and changes in the capabilities across the stakeholder groups involved 
over time, will mean that the process will be ongoing and can be expected to change over time. There is no ‘one 
size fits all’ set of guidelines or prescriptive arrangements for governance reform. Local, national and regional level 
processes have all been instrumental in bringing about or initiating positive changes in which context-specific 
management plans have been identified. The ISSF case study (Chapter 2) shows that even on a regional basis it 
has been possible for actors to pursue sustainability goals.  
It is the multi-stakeholder nature of the process that has been important. Different types of knowledge, world 
views and values can be represented in identifying and framing the issues and assumptions about the nature of 
the problem can be assessed and challenged. Within these processes, local fishers and those dependent on the 
fisheries represent critical stakeholders. As Chapter 2 points out, they have important local knowledge and 
capabilities, often overlooked. Even in the absence of government regulation, effective local management is 
possible, with these groups often choosing solutions that are consistent with biological sustainability. Indeed, 
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Addressing poor governance  
Co-management committees, such as this CCP in Mozambique, can form 
part of the governance arrangements for fishery management at a local 
level. (Photo source: S.F. Walmsley). 
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where there are issues of poor governance, corruption and ineffective institutions, it may be necessary to engage, 
in the first instance, with wider civil society organisations.  
Barriers to transformation 
The case studies repeatedly reinforced the contested nature of decision-making and the way in which different 
groups sought to advance their interests and the way in which sustainability arguments can be deployed to support 
these interests. Furthermore, as the nature of the challenge changed, protagonists of change could become 
antagonists as their interests were challenged by the proposed changes. In Mozambique, while local communities 
were supportive of co-management plans that reinforced their rights over the resources, they were less supportive 
of efforts to introduce gear bans. 
Within governance processes narratives and discourse play an important role in shaping arguments by presenting 
straightforward assessments, creating simple story lines of how a ‘problem’ has arisen, how it will unfold, and 
therefore what the necessary course of action should be (e.g. Roe 1995). Within capture fisheries, the dominant 
discourse of the individual economic behaviour of fishers within the context of open access resources leading to 
overfishing has proved powerful in shaping approaches to sustainability that emphasise external top-down control, 
constraining debates on the options for fisheries management. It is important such discourses, and the courses of 
action they support, can be placed under scrutiny.  
Across the case studies, changes in management and governance were sometimes used as as a means to further 
influence and control — variously by fishers, by NGOs and by the state. As such, initiatives to improve sustainability 
have been translated, implemented and resisted by actors within the process, with the eventual outcomes being 
either supportive, undermining or neutral to the initial aims. Individuals involved have the ability to affect the 
process and outcomes and the extent to which they can do so is often also dependent on their power and 
influence. As a result, as the Lake Taal case study showed, there may be actors involved whose interests may be 
best met by resisting change or by adopting the rhetoric of sustainability while continuing to pursue ‘business as 
usual’. The South African hake case study also highlights this point through the role of the state in the governance 
of fisheries resources—the state can intervene as an interested party, whose objectives may not be limited to 
environmental sustainability and whose actions may even compromise sustainability. 
A way forward 
Because of the complex nature of the challenge and the diversity of fisheries contexts, it is almost inevitable that 
addressing poor governance will require different approaches from fishery to fishery. It is also important to accept 
that both the nature of the process, who drives it and where it starts from can differ. However, a number of key 
principles can be identified. The most suitable approach to deliver accountable management is to develop an 
inclusive and participatory process that is fishery-specific and takes into account the local context, history and all 
interests in order. This will not always be straightforward, and reaching consensus on issues where there may be 
winners and losers is not always possible. 
POOR GOVERNANCE
Governance indicators are negatively correlated with the level of IUU fishing. Good governance supports effective fisheries patrols and 
enforcement. (Photo source: R. Gater). 
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LACK OF DATA AND STOCK ASSESSMENT 
Much of the blame for the decline in fish stocks across the world has been pinned on failures in fisheries 
management. While the failure of management systems has often resulted from poorly defined objectives and the 
way that decisions about fisheries are made (see Chapter 4), there is often a lack of data on which to base 
management decisions. Additional problems arise through the inappropriate selection and application of 
management measures. Many of these problems are related to the way that information for management is 
generated and used and the way in which responsibility for enforcing decisions is shared.  
In this chapter we draw attention to how these problems can arise and examine, through four very different 
management situations, some of the innovative ways in which groups are beginning to try to address these issues 
and where these problems have been overcome: management of common resources on the high seas, the 
application of ecosystem-based management in the CCAMLR region; management at the local level in Fiji and 
Senegal; and management of a Northeast Atlantic cod fishery. 
Information, data and management 
As Charles (2001) uncomfortably highlights, what we do not know about fisheries systems far exceeds what we 
do know. This is a problem of data collection as well as the inherent uncertainty associated with fisheries 
systems. Fish (and many other components of the ecosystem) are effectively invisible; what we know about stock 
dynamics is inferred from fishing and research sampling. Fish stocks are affected not only by fishing but also by 
other environmental factors such that the relationship between stock variability and fishing is not always clear. 
Given this situation, it is important to identify the information that is critical to managing fisheries, whether this 
information exists and (if it does) how it can be incorporated into decision-making, and (if it does not) how the 
resulting uncertainty can be addressed, which may include taking more precautionary approaches or identifying 
what data are required to generate the information. 
Critical elements to consider are information about the biology, ecology and productivity of the fish stocks and 
their interactions with the environment and other species. It is important to distinguish the difference between 
data and information in that information is data that has been processed or analysed to provide information. In 
this respect local knowledge can be considered information while observer records, which require analysis to be 
informative, represent data. 
Information from within the fishery is vital for identifying and applying management targets and limits for species 
and ecosystems. These, in turn, are important for determining at what stage fishing controls (e.g. deployment of 
effort, closed areas and/or total catch) may be needed in order to ensure the objectives are being met. Without 
targets and limits and a process for assessing how well the fishery is doing against them, agreement over 
whether the harvest controls should be altered will rarely occur.  
Targets and limits for the fishery can be derived from both the stated objectives and the level of risk that society 
is prepared to accept to derive benefits from the fishery. This is an issue of governance (see Chapter 4), but it is 
important that these targets and limits are clearly identified. Because there may be different opinions about the 
objectives for the fishery and appropriate level of risk, uncertainty about fish and fish stocks can lead to 
disagreement about how well the fishery is doing and thus what action needs to be taken as a result. It is also 
therefore important that methods for assessing stocks and performance are also agreed in advance. 
In addition to information about the stocks and their dynamics, it is important to consider the human dimensions 
of fishing, for example the extent of fishing operations and how they affect fish stocks, other species and the 
wider environment. Particularly where overcapacity is a concern, information is also needed about what is driving 
capacity development (see Chapter 2 and also the Senegal case study in this chapter) and how the benefits from 
fisheries are derived and shared. This information can come from a number of sources and the experiences from 
the case studies demonstrate that many actors (governments, NGOs, local people and industry) can play a role 
and have provided information that has contributed to identifying issues within the fisheries. These stakeholders 
have also assumed roles in developing and applying the innovations that have addressed the challenge (see also 
Chapter 4).
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Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management and the Precautionary Approach 
Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management (EBFM) arose from the recognition that individual fish stocks need to be 
managed as part of dynamic ecosystems that consist of directly and indirectly interacting species (fish and non-
fish) and it is viewed as a means to incorporate these wider effects into decision-making (Figure 26). EBFM is 
now commonly expanded in meaning beyond the UNCLOS (1982) text (effects on species associated with or 
dependent upon harvested species:
UNCLOS, Article 61) to include the 
concept that fisheries should be 
managed without jeopardising the 
options for future generations to 
benefit from a full range of goods 
and services provided by marine 
ecosystems (FAO 2003).  
Given the uncertainty associated with 
fisheries, and the lack of precision in 
stock assessments, a more risk-
averse attitude has emerged and 
been promoted as part of a 
Precautionary Approach to fisheries 
management.  
Under this approach, which is at the 
core of the UN ’Fish Stocks 
Agreement’ and the FAO Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 
the burden of proof is shifted. The 
Fish Stocks Agreement introduces the concept of the precautionary approach in Article 6: States shall be more 
cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures.
Controlling exploitation and IUU fishing 
Responding to change in the perceived state of the fishery is an important aspect of management. A crucial 
aspect of the capacity to respond is the ability to control the level of exploitation and maintain stocks within safe 
biological limits. While there are a range of ways that control can be exerted (from self regulation through to 
external control), capability to implement, enforce and assess effectiveness are crucial in selecting the approach 
and the appropriate measures. 
The ability of the state to control fisheries through centralised management systems has been questioned, 
particularly in countries where governance is an issue and where resources may be limited. At the same time 
there are also questions about the ability of industry to self-regulate. Under such conditions Illegal, Unregulated 
and Unreported (IUU) fishing can undermine fisheries sustainability. 
Not only are there direct effects on the fisheries (including the use of destructive gears), but IUU fishing also 
introduces further uncertainties into decision-making and makes additional demands on the control and 
enforcement measures. Unreported catch creates gaps in data which can affect the accuracy of stock 
assessments. This unreported catch can occur legally within the framework of current legislation where quota is 
related to landings rather than total catches. Illegally caught and landed fish exacerbates these problems. 
IUU fishing is recognised to be a global problem and one of the main impediments to the achievement of 
sustainable world fisheries, worth between USD 10 billion and USD 23.5 billion per year. Controlling capacity is a 
critical element of addressing IUU fishing but, as the case study from Senegal illustrates, it can also be important 
to understand the drivers of IUU fishing as IUU fishing may be a symptom of problems that exist outside the 
fishery.
Figure 26: CCAMLR foodweb highlighting the direct relationship between fished 
stocks and species in trophic levels higher and lower (Source: modified from Kock 
et al. 2000, original S. Cowell) 
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The problem and drivers: decreasing seabird populations and increasing 
krill catches 
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) Convention Area 
consists of the whole Southern Ocean, bounded to the 
south by continental Antarctica and to the north by the 
Antarctic Convergence (Figure 27).  
CCAMLR was negotiated within the framework of the 
Antarctic Treaty (1961) which suspends  territorial 
claims over Antarctica and sets the region aside for 
science. Conservation rather than economic 
optimisation was therefore very much in the minds of 
the negotiators and a key driver for the adoption of a 
management approach that considered all ecosystem 
interactions.  
Although highly productive in some areas, Southern 
Ocean ecosystems are also sensitive to exploitation. 
Within Article II of the Convention, EBFM includes 
conservation defined to include rational use (i.e. 
fishing) and aims to a) prevent the decrease of 
harvested populations below levels which ensure stable 
recruitment, and maintain populations at a level equivalent to maximum sustainable yield; b) maintain ecological 
relationships between harvested, dependent and related populations, and restore depleted populations; and c) 
minimise the risk of changes to the ecosystem that are not reversible over two or three decades. The wider 
interactions of fisheries and the exploited species with the ecosystem have been of central concern in Antarctic 
fisheries.
In the 1970s, the krill fishery was developing rapidly. This was the basis for concern as it was recognised that krill 
was a key component of the ecosystem with a vital role. Scientists were unsure of the level of krill which could be 
harvested before there would be risks to the recruitment and growth of krill which would then have implications 
for populations of other species which are dependent on krill. In response, CCAMLR took a precautionary 
approach to modelling of krill stock dynamics and the setting of catch limits, the Krill Yield Model (Constable et al. 
2000). The development of ecosystem-based management of the krill fishery has been implemented by the 
scientific community within CCAMLR. 
In contrast to krill, concern arising from the toothfish has been the incidental mortality of seabirds as a result of 
the fishing method. Toothfish are primarily caught with bottom longlines and birds are attracted to the bait on the 
hooks, get caught, and are dragged under the water to drown. Since the longline fishery developed in the late 
1980s, many thousands of birds were suspected to be killed each year. A large proportion of these were 
endangered albatross species (particularly wandering and black browed albatross) whose populations at South 
Georgia, and other areas of the southern ocean, had been declining. In 1989, CCAMLR urged fishing countries to 
investigate methods of mitigating bird by-catch in CCAMLR waters. 
The innovation: Application of EBFM and the Precautionary Approach 
The Krill Yield Model, developed by CCAMLR in 1994, combines the known information – estimates of krill 
biomass—with uncertain information, such as the variability in krill recruitment rates and natural mortality and the 
impact of the krill fishery on dependent and related populations. The decision rules apply both EBFM and the 
precautionary approach to state that a) the krill stock should not be reduced to below 75 % of its level in the 
Antarctic: Ecosystem- 
based and precautionary 
management 
Species toothfish, icefish, krill 
Fishing Methods trawling, longline 
Figure 27: The CCAMLR Convention Area, showing fishing 
areas and the Polar Front (Antarctic Convergence – dashed 
blue line). With colours showing the distribution the krill, 
toothfish and icefish fisheries (Source: Agnew 2004). 
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absence of exploitation and b) there should be only a low probability of the stock being at levels which might 
impair recruitment (Constable et al. 2000). Catch limits are set in a precautionary fashion and are only increased 
as more data becomes available. CCAMLR has also defined small areas where shore-based predators forage for 
krill, and has put a cap on catches for these areas. 
For toothfish a Conservation Measure was agreed in 1991/92 under which vessels are required to use weighted 
longlines, avoid fishing in particular seasons, set lines only at night, retain hooks and offal and use streamer lines 
to scare birds away from hooks (Figure 28). The effectiveness of these measures has been significantly enhanced 
by the 100 % scientific observer coverage requirement on toothfish vessels and scientists were very active in 
collaborating with industry to develop mitigation measures. 
Costs and benefits of ecosystem-based management 
The overall catch of krill has been very low in comparison to estimated abundance and productivity, CCAMLR's 
efforts to develop management approaches for the krill fishery that are both precautionary and ecosystem-based 
have exceeded approaches taken by other RFMOs. This has been the basis for certification of the fishery and to 
date one krill fishing company (Aker Biomarine) has achieved MSC certification. These steps should allow sound 
development of the fishery as new krill-based products are developed in the future. 
Seabird mortality in the toothfish fishery was reduced to negligible levels as a result of observer programmes and 
by-catch mitigation measures. For example, in Subarea 48.3 catches dropped from 5,755 in 1997 to zero ten 
years later. However, observer programmes come at considerable cost. Details of observer costs for CCAMLR are 
not available as the costs are managed by the member states, but they are probably in the region of 3% of the 
value of the catches. In this case, these costs are in relation to the estimated annual yield of approximately 
USD 293 million. The value of a comprehensive scientific observer scheme cannot be underestimated. 
Information regarding the scale of the problem of seabird by-catch, and effectiveness of solutions, only became 
available once scientific observers became mandatory on longline vessels. There are also benefits for the industry 
and as a result, the South Georgia toothfish fishery has been certified by the MSC since 2004, and three more 
fisheries are undergoing assessment. 
Uptake potential 
A feature of the CCAMLR system which has been very important in generating effective solutions is the 
conservation-focused objectives for CCAMLR. CCAMLR has shown the potential for RFMOs to adopt and apply 
precautionary and EBFM approaches and the benefits of observer programmes. The experiences within CCAMLR 
provide evidence of the effectiveness of these measures that can be considered by other RFMOs and 
management bodies for national waters where the scale and value of the fishery is sufficient to cover the costs. 
The challenge for many other bodies, regional and national, comes in balancing the need for conservation against 
the other management objectives for the fishery. 
Figure 28: Brightly coloured streamer lines suspended from the back of the fishing vessels create a deterrent to seabirds such as black 
browed and grey headed albatross, preventing them from taking baited hooks at they are set. In CCAMLR, streamer lines are one of 
several technical measures used to reduce seabird by-catch, which was considered a major issue in the 1990s. Since the introduction 
of such measures, for which compliance is very high due to the presence of onboard scientific observers, seabird mortality caused
through interactions with fishing gear has been reduced to virtually zero. (Photos source: D. Agnew). 
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The problem and driver: Developing community-based ecosystem 
management
A key characteristic of successful management is the incorporation of different types of knowledge into the 
decision-making process. This can not only improve the knowledge base upon which management decisions are 
made, but can also result in greater acceptance of management decisions by all. When management decisions 
are being made or enforced in a centralised fashion, it can give rise to a disconnect between the way that the 
fishery is considered by the management body and the way it is perceived by fishers and other stakeholders. 
Pacific island communities have long practised traditional methods of preserving their valuable marine resources. 
In many areas these community-based methods of management have been maintained. Where government 
resources are limited, communities have often taken the initiative to reinforce customary village management 
systems which are based firmly on traditional knowledge. This allows them to assert control over their natural 
resources, health and way of life. 
Whilst the Fiji Department of Fisheries retains primary responsibility for licensing and enforcement of all 
commercial and artisanal fishing activities in Fiji, coastal resources are largely governed by customary marine 
tenure and customary management. Fiji’s system of local marine tenure consists of traditional fishing grounds, or 
qoliqolis, that are under the control of the communities adjacent to them. Qoliqolis have legal recognition as 
customary fishing rights areas. 
Traditionally the management of qoliqolis 
has included temporary area closures, 
restrictions on the number of fishers, 
control over the use of certain fishing 
practices, and the imposition of a tabu,
or prohibition, on fishing for certain 
species. 
In Kubulau District, on the island of 
Vanua Levu, sustainability concerns 
amongst local people emerged as larger 
commercial fishing vessels started 
operating within locally- managed areas. 
This occurred as a result of the lack of 
government capacity to monitor and 
enforce commercial coastal fishing 
activities.
Villagers felt that this was undermining 
their attempts to sustainably manage 
their resources and conserve village food security and local culture. Local grievances were taken up by the press 
and NGOs who put pressure on the government to better enforce the commercial fisheries. They also leveraged 
financial resources and expertise to enable villages in the area to visit places where local management was 
successful. The objective of these visits were to learn from successes and to include additional, scientific, 
information in their decision-making and management. 
The innovation: Linking science and local knowledge 
With assistance from NGOs, scientific research programmes have been established that complement Fijian 
traditional knowledge and provide additional information for local decision-making. Working with local and 
international scientists, villagers started to map fishing pressures, collect data on species abundance and size to 
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Species Mixed pelagic (e.g. trevally 
and mackerel) and demersal 
reef (e.g. Snapper and grou-
per)
Fishing Methods Handline, trap, gillnet, spear 
Throughout Fiji, marine scientists have worked alongside villagers to apply 
scientific monitoring and survey techniques to tabu areas. (Photo source: 
MRAG Asia-Pacific). 
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identify management objectives and develop management 
strategies for the fishing grounds. This resulted in a protected 
area network being established in 2005. This network has since 
expanded to 17 small, traditional closed (tabu) areas within 
estuarine and reef areas; and three large, district-wide no-take 
fisheries areas, all with defined boundaries and management 
rules.
Using information from the surveys, village chiefs have 
increasingly been applying tabu to protect spawning areas and 
overexploited species. The location and size of the tabu area is 
considered by members of the village, depending on how much 
they feel they can close and still meet their needs. External 
experts may advise a community on what they consider to be 
the optimal placement of the tabu area for conservation 
benefits, but ultimately the community has the final say about 
location. 
The combination of scientific and traditional knowledge helped 
highlight the links between the local terrestrial, freshwater and 
marine habitats and these findings encouraged village chiefs to 
take a more ecosystem-based approach to the management of 
their natural resources and the impacts of their villages.  
Costs and benefits of community-based ecosystem management in Fiji 
Overall, the benefits in Kubulau have included renewed awareness and respect for traditional village hierarchies, 
resulting in better management of the qoliqoli. The use of destructive fishing methods such as dynamite and 
poison fishing are now thought to have been eliminated. Additionally, community members perceive benefits in 
terms of increased fish and invertebrate size and abundance and coral cover since the innovation and scientific 
assessments support this, demonstrating significant increases in reef fish biomass in a number of closed areas 
compared to open (Jupiter and Egli in press). However, there have been conflicts between villages over the 
management decisions, with the one village that takes the majority of fish for sale feeling that they are being 
disadvantaged by the changes. This is subject to ongoing negotiation.  
In contrast to many sites in Fiji , a comprehensive research and assessment program was launched to inform the 
development of Kubulau’s ecosystem-based management plan and a similar plan (still under development) in the 
nearby Macuata Province on the north coast of Vanua Levu. While a study in 2009 by Fiji’s Community 
Conservation Investment Forum into local management areas in Fiji estimated the cost per site to be 
approximately FD 1,300 per year (USD 707), two rounds of funding by US foundations provided contributions 
totalling approximately USD 3 million over four years (2005-2009) to the NGO partner organisations working in 
Kubulau and Macuata, largely to fund an additional comprehensive research and assessment program.  
Uptake potential 
This case study provides evidence of how science can provide additional information and bring a new perspective 
to a situation that complements local knowledge. However this can also be challenging. Scientists and local 
people often have different ways of representing, interpreting and talking about the fishery and may have 
different objectives. The power and access to resources (financial and other) may also be very different.  
While traditional management systems may not have originally been established on the basis of environmental 
concerns, but rather to address social issues, the case study also demonstrates how traditional management 
arrangements, with support, can provide a means to move to greater sustainability. This is something that 
potentially has global applicability yet the case study also highlights that this is not straightforward and there may 
be conflict between different local users, local fishers and other users of the marine environment (e.g. tourists 
and divers).  
However, there is much that can be learned from this example as meaningful engagement between actors, based 
on mutual respect, could have much wider application and open up new opportunities and alternative forms of 
assessment and enforcement. 
Figure 29: Map outlining the Vatu-i-ra land/
seascape (Source: WCS 2009) 
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The problem and drivers: Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing  
A central problem with all fisheries management systems is ensuring compliance with regulations and avoiding 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. IUU fishing is defined in the FAO International Plan of Action 
(IPOA) to consist of: 
 Illegal fishing: fishing in contravention of the laws of that state; or fishing by a flag state in high seas 
waters in contravention of the conservation measures adopted by an RFMO to which the flag state is a 
party;
 Unreported fishing: fishing that is not reported, where this is in contravention of national laws or RFMO 
reporting obligations; 
 Unregulated fishing: fishing in the area of application of an RFMO, in a manner inconsistent with the 
conservation measures of that RFMO, by vessels without nationality or states that are not party to the 
RFMO, and on high seas waters with no RFMO authority if this is in contravention of state responsibilities.
One of the major issues associated with IUU fishing has been in the effective control of fishing effort (see Chapter 
2 - ISSF). Developing countries are not immune from these problems and increases in the number of fishers and 
fishing capacity have been observed across many small-scale fisheries. Senegal provides an example of one such 
fishery and of the challenges presented by IUU fishing and control of fishing.  
Senegal has a very important and productive fisheries sector. Senegal has a long history dating back to the 1960s 
of fishing access agreements with other countries, including Asian nations and the EU. Over this period there was 
increasing conflict between the industrial vessels fishing under access agreements and the artisanal fishers, with 
accusations of IUU fishing and resource overexploitation. Over the last 20 years, there has been a large increase 
in artisanal fishing capacity (see Figure 30). While Figure 30 indicates reductions in foreign industrial fleets, total 
industrial fishing capacity may not be decreasing because since the EU-Senegal agreement ended in 2005, most 
foreign industrial vessels are now Senegalese-flagged. Conflict between the industrial and artisanal fleets remains 
(MRAG 2010).
The total annual landings of the artisanal 
sector are estimated at 488,100 tonnes, 
some 85–90% coming from the marine 
artisanal fleet, of which approximately 
66% is for local consumption. Fish 
provides 75% of local protein needs and 
fishing plays an important role in the 
national economy (Brown 2005). Women 
have a significant role in these fisheries in 
processing the local catches.  
The importance of the coastal fisheries 
extends beyond the coastal areas. 
Senegal’s rural population is dependent on 
agriculture and highly susceptible to 
droughts and other disruptions in 
agricultural production. During droughts or 
periods of low agricultural production, 
farmers migrate to the coast to take up fishing. In this way, coastal resources have an important function as a 
safety net. A role that is dependent on the low barriers of entry to the artisanal fisheries, but this has contributed 
to increasing capacity in the artisanal sector and putting additional strain on marine resources. 
Senegal: IUU fishing in 
small-scale fisheries 
Species Coastal pelagic and demersal species 
including sardinella, anchovy, mackerels, 
octopus 
Fishing 
Methods 
Ringnets, gillnets, hook and line 
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Figure 30:  Number of artisanal and foreign industrial vessels fishing in 
Senegalese waters, 1975–2007 (Source: Data from MRAG, 2010). 
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The effect of this increase in capacity has been that while catches from within the artisanal sector are believed 
to have remained fairly constant (Blueyou and ENDA / REPAO, 2007), the catch per fisher has been falling to 
the extent that fishers are having to fish harder in Senegalese waters, go further afield and place themselves in 
danger, and resort to using illegal gears. According to a World Bank study, about 30% of the artisanal demersal 
fish catch is caught outside of Senegalese waters with around 2,000 vessels fishing in the waters of 
neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, The Gambia and Mauritania.  
This IUU fishing represents losses of about USD 100 million annually to those neighbouring countries (MRAG 
2010). Some of the fish is exported to Europe, and some of it to other west African countries. The situation is 
exacerbated by the low level of control exerted over artisanal vessels in Senegal by the central government, 
without effective enforcement of limits on licensing or gears (MRAG 2010) and increases in the fishing power 
(technology) of Senegalese artisanal boats. 
The innovation: Emergent local management regimes 
With the state lacking the capability to enforce management measures in the artisanal fisheries, local fisher 
initiatives have emerged. Alioune and Catanzano (2005) have described the example of Kayar village, where local 
fishers have collectively developed local management committees to regulate fishing and enforce fines for non-
compliance, and established marketing arrangements that benefited local fishers. These systems are dependent 
on local information about the fisheries and the prices of fish.  
While local management systems may operate very 
effectively they depend on social cohesion that enables 
collective action and can be undermined by external 
agents against whom regulations can be difficult to 
enforce, and where sanctions that are effective locally 
cannot be applied. However, in the case of Senegal the 
situation is complicated by the movement of rural people 
into the fishery and conflict between the artisanal and 
industrial fleets. To simply increase the emphasis on 
control of artisanal fishing alone, the effect of preventing 
or limiting their entry into the fishery could either cause 
further hardship for these people or increase the 
likelihood of illegal fishing activity.  
Clearly it is important to understand the role of fisheries in livelihoods in order to develop appropriate 
management and control measures. Many of the issues lie outside the fishery in the relationship between 
agriculture and fisheries and the role of fisheries in times of hardship. Although the situation is currently 
exacerbated by the legacy of earlier fishing agreements, the solution requires better control of industrial fishing, 
support to local fisheries management and, critically, addressing the driver of movement into the fishery by 
enhancing livelihood options for rural farmers and considering the management and institutions related to both 
land and sea. 
Costs and benefits of local management regimes 
Better control and management of the fisheries of Senegal can help secure the resource base for a fishery that 
supports some 57,000 people directly and provides an important food source for many more, especially in the 
coastal communities. It is not possible to directly quantify these benefits as local management objectives and 
arrangements can differ (Alioune and Catanzano 2005) but generally there have been benefits in terms of better 
control of artisanal fishing and more advantageous marketing arrangements. Similar benefits will flow to the 
neighbouring countries in which Senegalese artisanal fishers are currently having to fish. These benefits have 
come at little or no cost to the state (although NGOs have supported the process and will have incurred costs as 
a result). 
Uptake potential 
As this case demonstrates, control is an important element of addressing IUU fishing, which must be addressed in 
both artisanal and industrial fisheries. However, IUU fishing can also be more than simply an issue of control. 
Artisanal fisheries in developing countries can have an important safety net function and increasing the barriers to 
entry can undermine this. Rather, the issue is to examine the drivers of IUU fishing in more detail to identify why 
IUU is occurring. As the case study demonstrates, this can be because of factors external to the fishery that lead 
people to have to enter the fishery. It can also be as a result of policies, such as foreign fishing agreements, that 
appear inequitable and that can act to undermine local management initiatives.  
LACK OF DATA
Artisanal pirogues in Senegal. (Photo source: C. Tindall). 
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The problem and driver: The need for increased conservation measures 
The management of a fish stock explicitly for its recovery often requires large reductions in allowable catch or 
effort. Such measures can then impact upon the economic welfare of fishers. Where these measures are 
externally decided, such measures may be met with social and political objection.  
Where unpopular management decisions are made, levels of non-compliance (effectively IUU fishing) may 
increase and experience has shown that simply increasing the level of inspections and penalties does not always 
solve the problem. Furthermore, mismatches between management approaches - such as requiring very low catch 
levels of a species under recovery but allowing high catches of other species in the same multispecies fishery - can 
lead to perverse results, such as increased discarding. This case study looks at the potential for collaborative 
approaches between management and the fishing industry to solve problems with achieving compliance in 
recovery programmes. 
Scottish demersal fisheries for cod, haddock and whiting operate in coastal shelf waters throughout the northern 
and central North Sea, as well as to the west of Scotland. As with many demersal fish species, cod are often 
caught as part of a mixed demersal fishery, and within Scottish waters. Vessels predominately fish using towed 
gears such as trawls and Scottish seine. Over the last few decades, cod stocks have declined dramatically 
throughout European waters. In the North Sea, annual landings of cod declined from an average of 250,000 
tonnes during the period 1965-85 to just 95,000 tonnes by 2000 (Figure 30). Stock size has declined over the 
same period from more than 264,000 tonnes in 1971 to less than 50,000 tonnes by 2000.  
The scientific body ICES estimates catches to be much higher than reported because of vessels catching in excess 
of their quota (particularly prevalent in the early 2000s) and discarding of cod by vessels targeting other species. 
Management, compounded by issues of overcapacity, has proven unable to address the problem. Rebuilding of 
cod stocks was being compromised and fishers were frustrated at being forced to throw away perfectly 
marketable fish that were unlikely to survive anyway. Cod stocks continued to decline, and catches were not 
restrained to the limits set by the 
EU’s cod recovery plans. 
Recognising this as a problem, 
government, industry and NGOs 
came together to develop an 
innovative solution to this problem. 
The challenge was how to reduce 
the fishing mortality of cod within 
the mixed-species whitefish fleet, in 
line with the targets outlined in the 
recovery plan, whilst maximising the 
number of fishing days available to 
the fleet in the face of ongoing 
effort reductions required by the 
EU.
The aggregating behaviour of cod 
was used as a basis for developing 
temporary closures of areas for 
fishing that would be compensated 
for by allowing vessels additional 
opportunities to fish in other, open areas, where they would be less likely to encounter cod. Fishers have an important 
role providing information about catch rates that are needed to trigger the real time closure of the areas (Box 3). 
Scotland: Conservation 
Credits Scheme 
Species Mixed demersal  
(cod, haddock, whiting) 
Fishing Method  Trawl, Scottish seine 
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Figure 30: Cod SSB and landings in North Sea - 1963-2009. Note that catches were 
regularly above the SSB which is likely to be the cause of the declining stock (Source: 
graph produced from data in ICES 2010). 
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The innovation: Scottish Conservation Credit Scheme 
As part of the amended cod recovery plan, the EU granted Member States the flexibility to run their own effort 
limitation schemes based on days-at sea. The Scottish Government took up this opportunity and on 1st February 
2008 the Scottish Conservation Credits Scheme (CCS) was launched. The CCS takes the form of a mechanism that 
allows the Scottish whitefish fleet to reduce impacts on the cod stocks (enabling the stocks to recover) but also 
ensures that the whitefish fleet is able to fish and land other species. The CCS sets out to do this in a two tiered 
approach: through cod avoidance (e.g. RTCs); and by an EU-mandated reduction in effort. The centrepiece of the 
CCS is that by adopting the cod avoidance measures specified within the scheme, vessels increase their effort 
allocation, being allowed to ‘buy-back’ days at sea and fish for other species. The buy-back system acts as a buffer 
shielding Scottish fishers from the full impact of the EU-wide cuts in fishing effort.
Costs and benefits 
Although the CCS is still in its infancy, it is possible to identify some positive impacts. Discards of juveniles have 
decreased in all of the demersal fleet segments as a result of improved gear selectivity and avoidance. An 
economic benefit to fishers has been that the allocation of further effort days has In 2009 the fleet was able to fish 
for the full year, although the total number of fishing days were too few to catch the available cod allocation, 
which remains a problem. ICES has not yet been able to evaluate the consequences of the CCS on North Sea cod, 
but have suggested that vessels have been compliant with CCS real-time closures. Although the cod stock is 
gradually increased to 68,000 tonnes in 2009 (from the record low of 34,000 tonnes in 2006) however, this is still 
below what ICES estimates as sustainable limit - 70,000 tonnes. In addition the landings of 91,000 tonnes in 2009 
was higher than regulation allowed, suggesting that the CCS has not yet achieved the complete desired effect.  
The costs of implementing the CCS are difficult to isolate given that management and logistical tasks are built into 
the wider effort management regime i.e. vessel monitoring system cross check with logbook data as part 
of monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) activities. The Scottish Government administrative arrangements of 
fisheries management measures are already in place. In fact, arguably it is this ease of integration which has aided 
the adoption of the CCS. There are a few elements of the Scheme however which increase the work burden and 
have a cost, such as translating MCS findings into RTCs and ‘Amber Areas’, and running the observer programme. 
This is paid for by the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) under Axis 3 funding (S. Baxter, Marine Scotland, pers. 
comm.).
Uptake potential 
The Scottish Conservation Credits Scheme is a conceptually simple solution to a relatively widespread problem. 
However, the practicalities are regionally specific, and given the narrow applicability the most obvious targets to 
create a similar scheme are those EU Member States which share the North Sea cod resource. To this end, the UK 
Government (Westminster) is currently undertaking preliminary discussions with industry in mind of establishing 
their own version of the Conservation Credits Scheme. 
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Box 3: Real Time Closures 
Real Time Closures (RTCs) have been introduced across the North 
Sea under the CCS, although currently not within the 12 mile zone. 
These RTCs are not permanent, but are instead established in real 
time in response to a predetermined trigger based of the cod catch 
rate reaching 40 cod per hour. This trigger rate was established at the 
start of 2009.  
The RTCs are set for a period of 21 days, which is considered to allow 
sufficient time for cod aggregations to disperse, after which the areas 
automatically reopen. As of 2010 each RTC covers a maximum of 15 
nautical miles by 15 nautical miles, and there cannot be more than 
three RTCs in any given Commercial Impact Zone.  
There should be a maximum of 9 RTCs in place at any given time, 
and these are monitored through a combination of ongoing 
inspections and analysis of Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) data and 
associated landings. Vessels are notified of new and existing closures 
through communications with fishing associations, email, radio and 
online. 
Real Time Closures in place on the 16th March 2009. The 
yellow squares indicate RTCs, green circles show Commercial 
Impact Zones and the red areas are seasonal/permanent area 
closures. (Source: Marine Scotland).
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The problem and driver: Increasing environmental impacts 
Salmon farming was established in Scotland during the 1970s, with development along the west coast and in the 
Northern and Western Isles. Salmon farms are generally cage-based and located in sheltered sea lochs in systems 
that mimic the natural life cycle of the salmon. From hatching, the salmon goes through four stages in freshwater  
(egg, alevin, fry, parr). The salmon are transferred to sea water at the smolt stage, when wild fish would be 
migrating to the sea at one to two years old. The fish are grown on in cages and fed pelleted feeds with 
harvesting usually starting from when they are at least two kilograms.  
The increase in salmon aquaculture has been important for the Scottish economy and for rural areas of Scotland 
in particular. However, there have been a number of criticisms of salmon farming practices and of the impacts of 
salmon farms on the environment. These arise from the discharge of nutrients and solid waste from feeds and 
faeces, pharmaceuticals and antifoulants (used to keep the cages clean). Solid wastes from fish farms can collect 
on the seabed under fish cages, particularly where the currents are low, smothering the seabed and animals and 
plants. The organic nature of the material can also cause harm by altering the chemistry of the sea bed. Nutrients 
released into the waters surrounding the cages can increase the amount of algae in the water and the growth of 
seaweeds and may be connected with poisonous algal blooms  
Additional impacts through interaction with wild salmon and sea trout stocks, which are themselves part of 
economically important recreational fisheries in Scotland, have also raised concerns. Fish can escape from 
hatcheries into rivers and from the cages into the sea. Perhaps the most common cause is predators (especially 
seals) damaging the nets of fish farm cages. Escaped fish can have a number of impacts. Diseases such as 
infectious salmon anaemia (ISA) can be transferred from escaped fish to wild fish stocks and farmed fish may 
also compete for food with the wild stocks. Perhaps though of greatest concern is the potential for interbreeding 
between escaped fish and wild populations, 
resulting in losses of genetic variability, 
including evolved adaptations. 
A final area of concern is the sustainability of 
the fisheries supplying wild-caught fish meal 
and oil as feed to salmon. These are low 
trophic level species-anchovy, sardine, 
sandeel, krill-and many of the stocks are 
already fully exploited. Any expansion of 
aquaculture without changes in the feed 
composition could place additional pressure 
on these stocks.  
The problem with salmon farming is, in fact, a 
number of problems. These have emerged 
and been recognised  as information has 
become available about the implications of 
aquaculture activities and practices, 
particularly as the scale and intensity of 
farming operations has increased. The response to these issues and the sources of information have come from 
the industry itself (as Scottish salmon is a premium product), NGOs and from the regulatory bodies. 
The innovation: Multi-stakeholder inputs to reduce aquaculture impact 
Efforts have been made by a number of stakeholders from farmers to government and NGOs to reduce the 
impacts of aquaculture. Within Scotland, the Scottish Executive and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
(SEPA) have taken steps to approve applications for the leases and discharge consents to develop a salmon farm. 
Additionally, the size of farms is regulated to reduce the impacts on the local marine environment. Long-term 
Scotland: Salmon 
aquaculture 
CHAPTER 5
Species Atlantic salmon 
Fishing Methods Cage culture 
Sea pens such as these are usually situated in protected inlets 
for protection. (Photo source: STV, 2009).  
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monitoring by Marine Scotland is part of an effort to investigate the impact of aquaculture on wild fish. 
The Scottish Salmon Producers Organisation has established a Code of Good Practice for Scottish Finfish 
Aquaculture that addresses procedures for escaped fish, nutrient discharge and for the management protocols for 
sea cages. Reducing fish farm escapes is being addressed by cage manufacturers who have developed new cage 
designs that are more resistant to both predator damage and storm damage. Research by industry in partnership 
with academics and the Sea Mammal Research Unit (SMRU) has focused on developing non-lethal methods to 
reduce net damage from marine mammals that can also reduce the reliance on acoustic deterrents, which have 
been criticised for affecting the hearing of marine mammals.  
The aquaculture industry has made efforts to reduce the amount of wild fish in feeds, by increasing the use of 
processing by-products and using vegetable oils (nearly 25% of fish meal comes from by-products). However, 
use of vegetable oils also raises sustainability questions, as there is the issue of whether these should be 
consumed directly by humans. Alternatives for the use of fish meal and fish oils in feeds remain an important 
focus for investigation. 
Despite all the progress to date, a significant challenge that remains is the issue of sea lice (Figure 31). These are 
a natural parasite of salmon but in aquaculture systems they can become abundant, causing injury, reduced 
growth rates and mortality. These lice may also spread other microbial and bacterial disease that can further 
affect the fish. The chemicals that are used to treat sea lice can cause pollution. Wild salmon and sea trout are at 
risk from sea lice infection, especially during the juvenile period. They are most at risk in cases where they have 
to move through lochs and pass several farms during their migration. At present there are efforts by farmers to 
take coordinated action on sea lice through a 
national strategy that aims to reduce sea lice 
numbers in the spring when wild smolts are 
migrating to the sea. Furthermore, finding a new 
way to deal with the issue of sea lice would 
represent a significant advance that would have 
benefits for both the salmon farming industry and 
for wild salmon and sea trout. 
Costs and benefits 
Scotland is now the second largest salmon 
producer in the world (after Norway) with a value 
in the region of £ 350 million (USD 557 million). 
The industry provides important employment opportunities in rural areas. Considering the upstream and 
downstream added-value processing it is estimated that salmon farming contributes £ 700 million 
(USD 1.14 billion) to the Scottish economy. Addressing the environmental issues of salmon farming has created a 
stronger regulatory framework for developing and undertaking salmon farming. Many of the costs of addressing 
the challenges are difficult to assess because of commercial confidentiality. However, costs of compliance and 
economies of scale are such that they represent a significant barrier to entry and, as a result, the industry has 
become highly integrated throughout the value chain and global in nature. 
Uptake potential 
The global nature of the industry and the consolidation that has taken place produces both opportunities and 
obstacles for increasing sustainability. The intensification of the industry has brought to the fore a number of 
challenges and is likely to continue to do so in the future. However, problems faced in Scotland are similar to 
elsewhere so the opportunities for solutions to be identified are also greater. The consolidation within salmon 
farming has created a few large players and has also increased the strength of the retailers (and consumers), 
making sustainability a more high profile issue but also making it likely that these players will respond and that 
proven solutions will be widely adopted.  
The economies of scale in the industry mean that the feed manufacturers and other suppliers can afford to 
innovate. This has provided additional opportunities to bring together producers, NGOs, researchers, retailers and 
governments to develop standards and to address the outstanding areas where further innovation is required: the 
reduction of escapees; developing alternatives for fish meal and oils and; the issue of sea lice. Examples of the 
kids of platforms that have been created to achieve this collaboration include the WWF Salmon dialogue initiated 
in 2004 and global Aquaculture Stewardship Council. 
LACK OF DATA
Figure 31 Sea lice which has the potential to become more abundant 
during farming activities (Photo source: anon, commons; Marine 
Scotland). 
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Addressing information gaps 
Limited information and/or a disconnect between scientists, management authorities and fishers can act as a key 
obstacle to transforming fisheries to achieve sustainability. The case studies in this chapter suggest some steps 
that fisheries have taken to identify and address these and some of the different roles and responsibilities that 
stakeholders have assumed in providing data and information that have contributed to improving sustainability. 
Bringing together the existing knowledge of different stakeholders and their capacity to contribute to both data 
collection and analysis can improve the information on which management decisions are made as well as the 
responsiveness of this decision-making. 
Observer programmes 
Some of the information gaps have 
been related to the biological elements 
of the fisheries and how data on the 
amount of catch, species caught and 
by-catch can be improved. The most 
significant impact that fisheries have on 
ecosystems is through their extractive 
activities, and it makes sense to 
monitor these as closely as possible. As 
the case study from CCAMLR indicated, 
observers on board vessels can be 
highly-effective in this respect. In large
- scale or high value fisheries, the 
acquisition of additional information 
through the use of scientific observers, 
has generally been proven to be cost-
effective. Management systems with a 
good record of success—such as 
CCAMLR, the USA, Australia and New 
Zealand—make extensive and effective 
use of scientific observers. 
Management systems with poor 
records—for instance the EU—often have inadequate or non-existent observer systems. However, the cost of 
observer programmes can be quite high and observers often cannot be placed on very small vessels. For these 
fisheries other sources of information can be used, including from fishers themselves. 
Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management 
The case studies also provided different examples (CCAMLR and Fiji) where EBFM has been applied to capture 
fisheries and helped to account for the wider interactions between fishers, fish stocks and other elements of the 
ecosystem. As these two case studies demonstrate, consideration of the ecosystem within a fisheries management 
context does not always require significant levels of investment; it can also be brought about simply by increasing 
awareness of the types of interaction that occur. The concept of EBFM can be applied to virtually any fishery. 
However, the intricacy of the management applied depends largely on the capacity of the management authority 
to collect, analyse and draw conclusions from large volumes of data. In the absence of such data, and in the 
presence of uncertainty, the Precautionary Approach should be applied. 
Roles and responsibilities in information generation 
The sections below highlight again the fact that capabilities define what is possible and practicable within the 
specific fisheries context. In some cases, where there is political will and available resources, it is possible to have 
a highly centralised management system (e.g. CCAMLR and Scotland), while in others the particular nature of the 
fishery requires much greater involvement of local people in decision-making, information generation and 
enforcement (Fiji and Senegal). Within both of these systems, the case studies have shown that fishers can make 
an important contribution to management through the information that they can provide. Indeed, managing 
without local information may be counter-productive. In the example of the Scottish conservation credits scheme, 
previous management approaches did not reward conservation-oriented behaviours and were causing fishers to 
fish in excess of their quota. 
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Scientific observers on fishing vessels can collect valuable data about target and 
by-catch species and are particularly effective for large-scale fisheries. (Photo 
source: MRAG). 
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Fishing in excess of quota creates its own problems. Once quota of a species has been exhausted, in fisheries 
where quota is managed based on landings, fishers are required to then discard any over-quota catches. This 
occurs as despite having exhausted their quota in one species, fishers may continue to fish whilst targeting 
another species. The perverse incentives and requirements to discard will be dealt with further in Chapter 6. 
However, it is important to note the differences in data availability which can be achieved using catch quotas as 
opposed to landings quotas. Managing using landings quotas retains a degree of uncertainty about the level of 
discarding that is occurring while, with good compliance, there is a better estimation of the total fish caught, and 
hence of total fishing mortality. Due to this greater understanding of total fishing mortality, the accuracy of 
scientific stock assessments are increased greatly.  
Fishers are interacting with the fish and the wider environment on a daily basis. In addition to providing data on 
total catches, they often have a wealth of time and place knowledge and can provide important insights into 
changes in stocks (e.g. changes in cod catch rates in the Scottish example) and into changes that may be driven 
by environmental change (including climate change). Fishers often have an interest in conserving stocks and 
reducing environmental impacts and have demonstrated that they will cooperate with each other and with 
management bodies to achieve this (e.g. Fiji, Senegal and Scotland).  
Science represents an important information source and scientists can and do play an important role in 
contributing to information. However, the way that scientists and fishers perceive the system may differ and the 
assumptions of fisheries science and about the contributions fisher knowledge could make can limit what can be 
said about fisheries and the options available to management. This is particularly critical for the design of Marine 
Protected Areas and Real Time Closures if they are to be effective. In these instances the spatial/temporal 
knowledge of fishers can be vital in providing real-time feedback. 
Some of the best results are being achieved where fishers, scientists and other groups are able to work together 
to address sustainability issues. This has been the case in Scotland and in Fiji. In both cases there was also an 
important role for consumers, NGOs and wider civil society in highlighting and maintaining a focus on 
sustainability. This pressure has helped to drive innovation and has had benefits, for example, in providing a 
price premium for Scottish salmon. However, fishers should not be seen as a cheap or free alternative to funded 
data collection programmes. 
Controlling fisheries 
Fisheries managers, whether in centralised government agencies, communities or some collaborative body, face 
the challenge of creating rules that can, and will, be complied with by fishers and that can be enforced. Where 
fishers have a strong role in deciding management they often prefer to do it by area-based and cooperative 
forms of management, for instance in the tabu systems in Fiji and the cooperative management methods in 
Senegal. These approaches can be beneficial in collaborative forms of management between stakeholders. For 
example, the Scottish CCS scheme is an example of fishers, government and other stakeholders, working to 
create a system that rewards fishers for avoiding catching large quantities of by-catch. Although it has not yet 
been credited with generating a recovery of the cod stock, it does have wide buy-in and compliance from 
fishers. The implementation of restrictive quotas did not have such buy-in nor did it result in a cod recovery. 
Similarly, the WWF aquaculture dialogues have been an attempt to bring together different players to identify 
the critical areas that need to be addressed and targets that should be achieved to improve sustainability and to 
get broad agreement and commitment to achieving these. 
Information and governance 
The case studies in Fiji and Senegal highlighted an additional factor related to information and fisheries 
sustainability — while many of the environmental sustainability issues can be addressed through direct sampling 
and working with fishers, there are aspects related to the human dimensions that require information and 
initiatives that target areas that lie outside the fishery. In the case of conflict (Fiji) and IUU fishing (Senegal), 
what may, at first glance, appear to be management issue and a failure of control can, on closer inspection, be 
identified as a governance challenge. Within these contexts, applying management (control) responses to 
governance challenges may simply exacerbate the problem. 
LACK OF DATA
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BY-CATCH AND DISCARDS 
Direct interactions with the environment as a result of fishing operations are numerous: the destruction of seabed 
habitats, by-catch of non-target fish; and the incidental mortality of birds, mammals and reptiles. An aspect of by-
catch that is particularly wasteful, and has complex impacts on the ecosystem, is the discard of unwanted fish 
and other organisms.  
It is important to distinguish between by-catch and discards. By-catch is all species caught which were not the 
intended (or target) species. It also refers to the catch of juveniles or undersize fish of the species targeted. By-
catch can still hold economic value and may be kept on board to sell. Discards is a term specifically used for catch 
which is not kept and thrown back, often dead, in to the sea. This may be either unwanted by-catch or target 
fish. Discarding may occur for a number of reasons, including the lack of value of fish compared to others (high 
grading), or because landing or retention is prohibited by regulation. Globally, discarding is estimated to be 8% 
(6.8 million t) of the total volume of fish caught annually (Kelleher 2005). 
Of the all the discarding occurring in fisheries, 27% is caused by tropical shrimp trawling alone. By-catch in 
tropical shrimp fisheries is estimated to be 15-20 million tonnes (Kelleher 2005). The reason for such high levels 
of by-catch in these fisheries is clear; in order to catch small species, such as shrimp, nets with very small mesh 
size must be used. In some cases the total weight of by-catch can be 20 times the total weight of shrimp caught 
(Eayrs 2007) (Figure 32). Most of this by-catch is valuable enough to sell, but nearly 13% is simply discarded 
back in to the sea. 
Measures to reduce by-catch 
A range of measures have been implemented in the past to reduce this high level of by-catch. Most commonly 
used throughout trawling fisheries are by-catch reduction devices (BRDs), also known as sorting grids. This 
system allows for an initial sorting of larger and smaller species from the trawl net.  
Turtle exclusion devices (TEDs) are based on a similar concept where turtles are separated from the remainder of 
the catch and allowed to escape the trawl net. For some fisheries  it may be possible to switch to other fishing 
methods, such as hook and line fishing, which have lower by-catch levels. Although this is possible if the target 
fish can be caught by other methods, in many cases (such as shrimps) there is no alternative method other than 
trawling.
Furthermore, it must be recognised that negative interactions can occur through the use of any fishing method, 
including hook and line. For instance, in pelagic hook and line fisheries, it is estimated that over 250,000 sea 
turtles were caught in one year (Lewison et al. 2004), and BirdLife International have estimated that in the EU 
alone, 2 million seabirds have been killed over the last ten years by methods of fishing other than trawling. 
Mitigation measures such as bird scaring devices, weighted line and setting fishing gear only at night have been 
Figure 32: Levels of by-catch attributable to shrimp trawling (Source: graphs created from figures in Kellher 2005 and Eayrs  2007). 
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used as ways to reduce bird mortalities in hook and line fisheries. Additionally, varying shapes of hooks and types 
of bait have been known to reduce capture and mortalities of sea-turtles (e.g. Read 2007; MRAG et al. 2008) and 
banning the use of wire trace in longlines has been implemented to reduce shark by-catch in some tuna fisheries. 
For example wire trace has been banned in the British Indian Ocean Territories offshore fisheries since 2007 (The 
Fisheries Conservation and Management Ordinance 2007), following the prior ban of wire trace in the inshore 
fisheries and IOTC resolution 05/05 recommends that wire trace should not be used in fishing gear for vessels 
operating in the IOTC tuna fisheries. 
Impacts of by-catch and discards 
By-catch and discards may affect ecosystem structure, for instance by removing parts of marine populations. 
Discarding may encourage the population growth of scavenging animals, and attract seabirds and marine 
mammals. Furthermore, the level of uncertainty over total catches that arises from discarding can hamper efforts 
to accurately assess current stock levels. In an economic and social sense discarding is wasteful of the energy 
and cost used to catch the fish. It also represents a waste of wealth and resources, perturbing given the 
importance of fish as a source of food to the world’s population and future food security scenarios highlighted in 
Chapter 1. 
While we are unlikely ever to completely eliminate the interactions between fishing gear and the environment, 
many interactions can be minimised by either reducing the potential for interaction, particularly through avoiding 
fishing in areas or at times of year when interactions are greatest, or by the development of specific gear 
configurations that minimise the impact, including changing gear types entirely (e.g. replacing trawls with 
longlines).  
Many of these measures are already being successfully employed in fisheries around the globe, and the following 
case studies present some of them. The case studies highlight not just technical solutions, but more importantly 
the innovative methods taken to arrive at the solutions. 
Sea turtle caught on a pelagic longline  (Source: MRAG).
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The problem and driver: High discard mortality 
Australia’s Northern Prawn Fishery (NPF) is a typical tropical shrimp fishery in the sense that it faced the common 
issues with regards to by-catch and discards (Table 6). Tropical shrimp fisheries tend to have extremely high by-
catch and discards because the diversity of ecosystems generally increases with greater proximity to the equator 
(Cheung et al. 2005), with the result that there are very many more potential discard species in tropical shrimp 
fisheries than in temperate ones. However high levels of by-catch and discarding also occur in temperate shrimp 
and Norway lobster trawl fisheries.  
In the NPF, approximately 516 separate species have been recorded as by-catch, including six species of turtles 
(Griffiths et al. 2007). Strong pressure was 
applied by the public to address this as 
discards from fishing boats were beginning 
to wash up on to tourist beaches. Following 
this, the government and industry worked 
together and agreed to widely implement by
-catch reduction devices (BRDs) which 
would sit in the trawl net and reduce 
unwanted catch. While this strategy made 
the NPF the world’s first tropical shrimp 
fishery to introduce a by-catch action plan, 
it was commercial drivers that paved the 
way for a different innovation in the 1980s: 
the seawater hopper. 
The main driver for this particular innovation 
was industry demand. Sorting shrimp from 
catches with high levels of by-catch was time consuming work. The combination of time and the regular 300C
temperatures, meant that the quality of the shrimp decreased rapidly. As the quality of the shrimp decreased, so 
did its market value, hence there was a great incentive to reduce the sorting time to a minimum and/or reduce 
the temperature. Consequently the innovation was driven purely by the possibility of commercial gain, yet has 
also delivered significant environmental gains. Furthermore, this was an innovation purely driven by industry’s 
requirements and design. 
The innovation: Seawater hoppers 
Catch is emptied from the trawl net into a ‘hopper’ of seawater on the back of the fishing vessel. Due to their 
natural behaviour, the shrimp settle on the bottom of the hopper while much of the fish by-catch remains 
swimming in the upper levels of the hopper. This not only separates shrimps from by-catch automatically, but it 
also increases the quality of the product by keeping the shrimp alive and away from the hot, outside 
temperatures. 
Different versions of the hopper technology exist depending on the scale of the fishing vessel — larger scale 
vessels have a much more complicated system than small vessels. In the larger-scale version, once the shrimp 
sink to the bottom of the hopper, they travel on to a conveyor belt from the bottom of the hopper on to a 
workbench which allows for easy sorting and packing. Any by-catch to be discarded also travelling along the 
conveyor belt can be set aside and placed into a chute leading directly back in to the sea. Once all the shrimp has 
been sorted from the catch, the hopper is drained and the remaining by-catch is sent up the conveyor belt, in to 
the exit chute and back to the sea. The small-scale version is similar except that swimming by-catch is skimmed 
off the top of the hopper and placed in a chute back to the sea and then the shrimp are removed from the 
bottom of the hopper for packing. 
This hopper is not required by regulation and uptake in the NPF has been purely industry-driven. However, the 
Australia: Prawn 
seawater hopper 
Species Prawns (Multiple) 
Fishing Method Trawling 
Fishery Tonnage 7,185t (2008/09) 
© CSIRO (2007)  
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(Source: Venezuela: Davies et al. 2009; other countries: calculated from 
source data presented in Kelleher 2005). 
Country Fishery Period Landings Discards
Discard
rate(%)
US GulfofMexico 2000 116,408 480,183 80.5
Indonesia ArafuraSea 1998 53,786 239,594 81.7
Ecuador Industrial 1996 24,113 91,211 79.1
Venezuela Totalshrimp
trawlfleet
2000
2003
33,600 86,400 72.0
US SouthAtlantic 2000 14,646 73,230 83.3
Table 6: Landings and discards (tonnes) and discard rates 
for the 5 tropical shrimp fisheries with the highest discard 
rates
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Queensland Government is 
attempting apply the hopper in an 
ad j a cen t  f i s he r y  t h rough 
subsidised purchases. 
Costs and benefits  
The cost of the seawater hopper 
varies depending on the size of the 
setup. The small-scale hoppers 
which do not require any 
mechanisation can be installed for 
roughly AUD 1,000 (USD 1000). 
However, the larger scale versions 
with a much more complicated set 
up, can cost AUD 80,000 
(USD 80,200) – AUD 120,000 (USD 120,350). Importantly, because the initial intention of this innovation is for 
financial gain, this investment is made solely by the vessel owner as a business decision; subsidies were not 
required to implement this innovation. 
Subsidies have been offered by the Queensland government for the adjacent Queensland East Coast Trawl 
Fishery (QECTF) of up to AUD 30,000 (USD 30,080). Subsidies were required as uptake has been much less in 
this fishery due to safety regulations within that state. If the older vessels install hoppers, they will then require 
regular inspections which they are not currently subject to. Even with the offer of subsidies, only an additional 
four of the 470 possible vessels have implemented the hopper. 
The hopper successfully achieved its intended purpose by improving catch quality and reducing sorting time thus 
leading to higher income for fishers. The catch retained in the hopper has an opportunity to recuperate after the 
stress of initial capture which leads to 5–10% less damaged product. Furthermore, processing and packing time is 
30–50% faster (Ocean Watch Australia 2004). These aspects combined have had positive impacts on the 
reputation of Australian prawn products on domestic and international markets. 
Currently, there have not been any studies conducted specifically in the NPF on the survival rate of discarded fish 
from vessels with seawater hoppers. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that survival rates of discarded fish is 
30–95% depending on the length and depth of the trawl. Also, 
scientific research conducted in the nearby Torres Strait Prawn 
Fishery (TSPF) found that 4 hours after capture the survival 
rate of the discarded fish roughly doubled from 8% to 16% 
(see Figure 33) for vessels with seawater hoppers as opposed 
to those without (Dell et al. 2003).  
Given the combination of innovations implemented in to the 
NPF — the BRDs and the seawater hopper — it is difficult to 
attribute benefits specifically to the seawater hopper alone. 
Regardless, the NPF in its entirety should be recognised as a 
leading example of both management-led and industry-led 
innovations which have assisted in addressing the societal 
concerns of by-catch and discards. 
Uptake potential 
In practical terms, the uptake potential of this innovation in 
other tropical shrimp fisheries is high. Australian manufacturers have reportedly provided seawater hoppers to 
vessel owners in Mozambique, Spain and French Guyana (R. Tedman, FishQuip, pers. comm.). The regions in 
Table 6 where discard rates have been indicated as high are areas considered to be particularly suitable for 
further uptake. 
The method of implementation of the seawater hopper in the NPF is possible within any fishery which can benefit 
from the same commercial gains found in the NPF — greater income generated from a higher quality product. As 
shown in the QETCF though, managers must ensure that the implementation of such innovations does not 
interfere with fishing operations. Given that this was a purely industry driven initiative, the main barrier to 
implementation in other fisheries will be the initial financial investment. 
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Side view of a large hopper of the type used in the NPF. Prawns sink to the bottom to be 
collected by the conveyor belt as other species swim in hopper (Source: Ocean Watch 
Australia 2004). 
Figure 33: Survival at four hours post capture of trawl 
caught by-catch in the TSPF (Source: Dell et al. 2003). 
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The problem and driver: Cod stocks declining 
The Barents Sea cod (or North east Arctic cod) is fished by both Norwegian and Russian vessels and includes 
some by-catch, both undersize (juvenile) cod and non-target species. In the Norwegian management system, 
vessel owners do not have the right to sell a species unless they hold a licence, and sufficient quota, to sell the 
fish. This led to significant discarding of non-quota fish. Vessel owners not holding a licence to fish cod often had 
to discard the catch as they did not hold the rights to sell it. With minimum size limits introduced in 1970s, this 
meant that landing undersize cod was also illegal and had to be discarded. Catching juvenile cod has a number of 
consequences: catching fish before they breed damages sustainability of the stock (Hylen et al. 2008); and, cod 
of this size are not as valuable as larger cod, 
therefore economically, it would be more 
efficient to allow these fish to grow before 
capture. However, perhaps the most damaging 
effect of discarding is the loss of accurate 
information on the size and composition of the 
catch, which makes assessing and managing 
the stock extremely difficult. 
Discarding was exacerbated by the practice of 
high-grading. Vessels have a fixed hold capacity 
and quota. If they catch fish that are of low 
value (e.g. of smaller size) they may discard 
them in favour of catching larger of higher 
value. This maximises their revenue, but 
creates incentives for discarding.  
The key drivers to change in the Barents Sea 
fishery were multiple: industry, media, and the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs. As some discarding of 
fish occurred due to management requirements, industry would often argue that this seemed a waste given the 
cost involved to catch that fish, particularly when it was known that fish could fetch reasonable prices in markets. 
Norwegian media also joined in the debate and through the varying channels, alerted the public to the 
consequences of discarding (e.g. P. Gullestad and B. Shultz, pers comm.)  Due to this, it is believed that 
eventually a discard ban would have been put in place regardless. However, significant events leading up to the 
mid-1980s were the real trigger for the innovation. 
For seven years before 1986, cod catches had only been 50% of the level caught in the late 1970s (Hylen et al. 
2008). This was due to a combination of human interaction and also natural fluctuations. However, the Institute 
of Marine Research (IMR) was aware that due to natural environmental reasons, a particularly large and healthy 
population of cod was about to reach legal catching size — this is referred to as a strong year class. In the past, 
strong year classes had occurred, but due to discarding and high-grading this year class was not given the 
opportunity to sufficiently boost future cod populations, and the potential benefit was lost. The media then began 
pushing this issue, and the lack of stocks available for fishers, into national news. 
In light of this, the Minister for Fisheries at the time, Bjarne Mørk Eidem, thought that it would be a wasted 
opportunity to allow another strong year class to be decimated by poor fishing practices and wanted to control 
discards and high-grading. Management’s suggestion to this was that it would be too difficult to monitor. 
However, Eidem’s response was that it should at the very least be illegal despite the difficulty of enforcement. 
This strong political will was the real driver for the innovation that was introduced in 1986 for cod and haddock 
which has since developed to encompass many other species since. 
The innovation: Discard ban regime 
The Norwegian discard ban is part of a management regime which aims to guide fishers away from needing to 
ban discards to a situation where by-catch and discards are minimised entirely. It applies to all Norwegian 
Norway: 
Discard ban 
Species North East Arctic 
Cod
Fishing Method(s) Trawling, Gillnet, 
Longline 
Fishery Tonnage 607,000t (2010) 
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Figure 34: Total spawning stock biomass (SSB) and catches of cod since 
the discard ban in 1987 (Source: ICES, 2010). Note that landings are 
now below SSB. 
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fisheries not just cod. The combined package consists of banning discards, fishing area closures (similar to 
Scotland, see Box 3) and fishing gear restrictions such as the mandatory sorting grid. The discard ban was initially 
introduced for cod and haddock in 1987 and has subsequently been modified in stages to include all species with 
any commercial value. As an incentive to fishers to keep all catch, when fishers come to port to sell their catch, 
they are compensated for the catch which does not meet management regulations — such as undersized fish or 
over-quota fish. Without this compensation, there would be little incentive for fishers to keep this catch on board 
and illegal discarding might still occur. However, the payment they receive does not cover more than the cost of 
fishing i.e. they cannot make a profit from it. 
The sale of fish is monitored and conducted by Norway’s sales association which is a non-governmental body. In 
addition to monitoring catch at port, catch at sea is monitored by government coastguard inspectors. Even so, 
some high-grading and slippage (release of fish while still in the net) probably takes place, and is extremely 
difficult to monitor. Inspectors board fishing vessels to ensure discarding is not taking place, and in addition if 
they find that too high a percentage of the catch does not meet regulations, then the area in which the fish was 
caught is closed until it can be proven by research that the area is fit for fishing again (Hyen et al. 2008).  
Over-quota fishing by Russian vessels had also been a problem, and this was addressed by increasing 
communication between Russian and Norwegian authorities, and the implementation of port state measures to 
ensure that only legally-caught fish could be landed. This helped address the problem of illegal fishing and the 
extra pressure that this was having on the cod stocks. 
Costs and benefits of banning discards 
The monitoring from the coastguard, which is a pivotal aspect to the 
regime, is extremely intensive with approximately 2,200 boat inspections 
per year. The resulting cost to the Norwegian government is approximately 
£ 86 million (USD 137.8 million). Estimates suggest that only 70% of this 
cost is attributable to fisheries (£ 60 million; USD 96.1 million). 
The combination of measures has acted effectively to discourage the 
targeting of by-catch at the same time as encouraging its retention and 
landing. This has improved the recording of catch composition and allowed 
comprehensive stock assessments. The discard ban, combined with other  
initiatives and events such as strong recruitment and the elimination (in 
2009) of the very large levels of unreported catch from the fishery 
(Diamond and Beukers-Stewart 2009), has resulted in an increase in stocks 
from 121,243t in 1987 to 1,145,460t in 2010 (844% increase) (see Figure 
34).
With the increasing size of the cod stock comes a more stable economic 
outlook for the fishery. The value of total catch increased by 57% from 
1989, when catches were at minimum as a result of fishing levels above 
SSB (see Figure 34) to 2009. The value of catch the catch was 
approximately £352 million (USD 546 million) in 2009 and is expected to 
increase with the TAC increase set by ICES in 2010. 
The entire offshore fishery has now become MSC-certified which allows fishers to provide well-recognised 
sustainable products and receive premium prices for their catch. As in many other case studies examined positive 
changes in fisheries are being rewarded in the market-place by such certification.  
Uptake potential 
In theory, a discard ban could be implemented in any region. The regime as a whole is a good concept and has 
proven to be successful. The main barrier to uptake will be the cost that is involved to conduct the necessary 
inspections. Without these inspections, it would be more difficult to identify where the area closures should occur 
which are vital to the success of the program. In areas where this cost would be difficult to cover, it is possible to 
put in place tax regimes for the industry or consumers to recover these costs. The justification for such taxes 
would be the large economic gains being made by fishers. 
The Norwegian innovation for dealing with discards has proven successful, but it must be appreciated that 
without very good monitoring (involving inspectors, observers, and industry cooperation and self-regulation) 
placing an economic value on by-catch may not deliver similar benefits. Even within Norway, this incentive 
scheme has been removed from the pelagic sector as it was considered too lucrative. 
BY-CATCH & DISCARDS
Cod Stockfish at the Bergen fish market. 
Stockfish has been supplied to Southern 
Europe for 1000 years by small northern 
Norwegian communities. (Photo source: 
MRAG). 
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SmartGear is an international competition which aims to solve problems of direct impact of fisheries on the 
ecosystem. The competition creates incentives for fishers and other stakeholders to come together and arrive at 
technical solutions to particular problems.  
Drivers: increasing uptake of successful innovation 
At a research workshop in 2004, it was realised that while many environmentally positive developments are being 
made in fishing method technology, not enough was effort was placed on drawing these technologies into the 
global arena or rewarding them for the initiative shown to tackle the issue of by-catch. With that, in 2005 WWF 
held its first SmartGear Competition (SGC). 
The Innovation: The SmartGear Competition 
The SGC brings together the fishing industry, research institutes, universities, and government, to inspire and 
reward practical, innovative fishing gear designs that reduce by-catch. The SGC aims to fuel innovation rather 
than simply reward existing solutions, and offers USD 50,000 in awards to attract innovative ideas that offer a 
potential — although not necessarily yet proven — solution to some of the most pressing by-catch problems in 
fisheries.
Each year the competition receives between 70 and 90 entries from around 30 countries (Mike Osmond; pers 
comm.), e.g. Box 4. Despite so many entries and only a limited number designs receiving awards, competition 
judges and organisers provide feedback to each entrant and suggestions for further development. In many cases, 
entrants have taken this feedback and re-entered the competition in later years.  
Within the with total prize pool, there are two runner-up prizes of USD 10,000 and a USD 30,000 first prize. 
Winners of the first prize cash amount, are required to invest a minimum of USD 10,000 in to further 
development of the design and implementation of the method in to actual fisheries. WWF also assist with this 
development use their international network to promote implementation of the winning design in to fisheries. 
International: 
WWF SmartGear 
Competition 
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The “Traffic Cone” is one of the runner up designs in the 2007 
competition which is a simple yet cost-effective concept designed 
to reduce seabird mortalities in trawl fisheries. Diego González-
Zevallos, designer of the Traffic Cone, focused his idea 
specifically on the Argentine hake (Merluccius hubbsi) fishery 
which operates in the San Jorge Gulf, Patagonia (see map). 
These mortalities occur when seabirds attempt dive for fish from 
the front of the trawl net during hauling. The seabirds then 
collide with the trawl’s towing cables and either drown instantly 
or die at a later time due to injuries. Seabird mortality rates are 
lower in trawling operations than they are with other methods 
such as longlines yet populations are known to be extremely 
sensitive to changes in their natural process (Furness and 
Monaghan 1987).  
The Traffic Cone acts as a device to scare seabirds. It wraps 
around the towing cables (also known as warp cables) and sits 
constantly at the water’s level (see left). This discourages 
seabirds from diving for fish at the riskiest point; where the warp 
cable is in a range of just above to just below the water surface. 
During hake fishery season between January and February 2006, 
the Traffic Cone was tested onboard a commercial hake trawler 
operating in the San Jorge Gulf, Argentina. Cones were set in 12 
of 22 alternate fishing operations over the course of eight days; 
in which the numbers of fatal and non-fatal contacts were 
recorded. In hauls employing Traffic Cones, no seabirds were 
killed and the number of warp cable contacts was reduced by 
89%; in hauls without the device, 11 fatalities were recorded. 
The Traffic Cone is a mitigation device that may help fishermen 
comply with international conservation agreements, such as the 
Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels. 
However, it does represent an additional work burden to the 
fisher, albeit a simple device to install and use. As an indication 
of the uptake of the Traffic Cone amongst hake fishers, of the 11 
man trawler crew who field tested the cone, nine thought the 
device did not affect fishing practices and eight expressed 
willingness to adopt it voluntarily. 
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Since the start, the SGC has not directed any focus toward particular by-catch concerns — for example, whether 
or not the design should be for trawlers, or should try to reduce by-catch of a particular species. However, in 
2011 a new category will be introduced which focuses specifically on reducing by-catch within global tuna 
fisheries (Mike Osmond; pers. comm.).  
The competition is funded by multiple donor agencies such as National Oceans and Atmospheric Administration   
and Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans. There are also multiple private corporations supporting the 
competition. The level of developmental support for the winning design is dependent on the level of donations 
acquired.
Costs and benefits 
One of the largest benefits from this initiative is the large incentive for non-governmental development of 
environmentally-friendly fishing methods. In terms of winners and runners up alone, the competition has 
identified four winning designs, eight runner-up designs and two regional-specific winners (Table 7). This is aside 
from the several hundred competition-driven designs. Furthermore, because categories of methods don’t exist, 
these gear designs cover all methods of fishing and address an assortment of negative interactions that occur. 
Winners often find they can turn their solutions into businesses. 
Uptake potential 
The key to this innovation is to harness the knowledge of fishers to arrive at solutions to by-catch problems which 
benefit both them (because most by-catch is unwanted) and other stakeholders. This approach should be 
transferable, with suitable modifications to other situations. For instance, the Birdlife Albatross Task Force has 
modified the approach to work with fishers directly to solve problems of albatross by-catch in southern 
hemisphere fisheries; although a reward is not given for innovative development, the fisher’s own experiences  
are harnessed to mutual benefit. Clearly, and additionally, the actual gear innovations themselves are 
transferable, in the same way as the development and wider applicability of the seawater hopper (see page 72). 
BY-CATCH & DISCARDS
Table 7: Award winning gear designs from 2005–2009  
Year Place Design Purpose
2009 FirstPrize Underwaterbaitedhooks Reducebirdmortalityonhooks
 Runnerup Batwingotterboard Reduceseabedimpactinbottomtrawls
 Runnerup Hovercran Reduceseabedimpactinshrimptrawl
 RegionalPrize TheSelector ReducegoldfishbycatchinLakeVictoria
2007 FirstPrize TheEliminator Reducescodbycatchintrawls
 Runnerup Trafficcone Reducesbirdmortalityintrawls
 Runnerup NestedCylinder Reducesredsnapperbycatchinshrimp
trawl
 RegionalPrize Passiveporpoisedeterrent Reducebycatchofmarinemammals
2006 FirstPrize Sharkdeterringmagnets Reducesharkbycatchonhooks
 Runnerup Carefree’scunningcontraption Reducebirdmortalityintrawls
 Runnerup Flexigrid Reducescodbycatchintrawls,increase
safetytofishers
2005 FirstPrize Deepsettinglonglinetechnique Reducebycatchofseaturtles
 Runnerup Netchemicaldeterrent Reducebycatchofmarinemammalsin
gillnetfishing
 Runnerup Shrimptrawlmodification ReducebycatchinIndianOceanshrimp
fisheries
(Source: http://www.smartgear.org/about_smargear/  [Accessed August 23, 2010]).
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Reducing by-catch and discards  
Generating an incentive 
Fisheries by their nature will always impact on the environment, but that impact can and should be mitigated to 
the greatest extent possible, and its impact monitored. The examples in this section, and also some in Chapter 5, 
show that significant gains can be made by introducing mitigation measures so long as: 
 the knowledge of fishers drives innovation to generate solutions to gear-related impacts; 
 the incentive structure is such that fishers see an economic (such as new markets), as well as an 
environmental, benefit from developing and implementing mitigation; 
 fishers do not perceive disadvantages to their main business, such as reductions in catches and sales of 
their major target species. 
Discarding poses significant problems for fisheries because in addition to killing non-target fish, it is usually 
extremely difficult to monitor the actual level of by-catch which increases uncertainty over the state of the stock 
and the impact that the fishery is having on the ecosystem. This uncertainty addressed by the Norwegian discard 
ban where all catch is now accounted for. This increased certainty about stock status has led, in part at least, to a 
recovery of the stock and an increased TAC for the entire fishery (including Russia) to 703,000 tonnes. The new 
management measures have also allowed the offshore fishery to become MSC certified. 
The NPF case study shows that technical solutions to the discard problem exist even for tropical shrimp fisheries. 
This case study highlighted the wide uptake of seawater hoppers despite the requirement for fishers’ individual 
investment due to the fact that this system enhanced the quality of product and thus the price per kg at market. 
From an ecological perspective, survival rates of discarded fish approximately doubled from 8% to 17%. With the 
seawater hopper and other by-catch mitigation measures, such as turtle excluder devices, the NPF has been 
included in the list of the highest class of sustainable fisheries measures within the Australian legislative system.  
A common feature of the development of these solutions was the involvement of multiple stakeholders in the 
processes and generation of suitable economic incentives. In the NPF case, a purely industry driven design 
resulted in increases in both economic and ecological performance. In the Norwegian example, NGOs and 
industry bodies such as the sales associations were included in the catch monitoring process. Furthermore, 
management recognised that there are costs involved for fishers in landing the previously discarded catch, and 
conservative compensation is given to the fishers by the sales associations.  
These benefits are now starting to be realised by the fishers and, particularly in Norway, feedback from industry 
suggests that they understand how important these management measures were and how beneficial healthy fish 
populations can be to securing long-term incomes. These positive results should be highlighted when looking to 
apply innovations more widely. 
Uptake potential elsewhere 
The NPF and Norwegian discard case studies focussed on the mitigation of fish by-catch and discarding, but the 
impact of by-catch on birds, mammals and turtles is equally important. As the SmartGear case study showed, 
technical solutions now exist for most fishery interaction types: 
 by-catch and discard of fish in most fisheries, through the use of selective gear (such as the cod large-
mesh separator trawl and the shrimp seawater hopper); 
 by-catch of birds in trawl and longline fisheries, through the use of fast sink rates for longlines and 
methods of scaring birds away from active gear e.g. hooks, trawl warps and nets; 
 by-catch of turtles in longline fisheries, through the use of different hook and bait types;  
 by-catch of turtles in trawl fisheries, through the use of turtle exclusion devices; 
 by-catch of birds in gillnet fisheries is currently difficult to mitigate except with area or season closures; 
 marine mammals in trawl fisheries, through the use of escape hatches in trawls; 
 in all fisheries, by avoiding areas, depths and seasons in which the distribution of affected species overlaps 
with the fishery, including the use of marine protected areas and prohibitions of bottom trawling on 
sensitive habitat. 
Clearly fisheries experiencing these problems can look elsewhere for technical solutions that, with some 
adaptation to local conditions, can be readily implemented. Although few of the technical solutions are 100% 
effective, there are only a few by-catch problems that currently have no technical solution, and for these fisheries 
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the avoidance of interactions 
(through the use of area, season 
or depth closures) is always an 
option.  
However, the wider lesson to be 
drawn is in the engagement 
process. The introduction of the 
WWF SmarGear competition 
shows what can be done to create 
incentives for fishers to develop 
mitigation methods, and the other 
solutions (Norway, NPF) were also 
developed with industry and other 
stakeholder participation. In this 
regard, the lesson is somewhat 
similar to that expressed 
elsewhere in this report, 
particularly in respect of 
governance  and capac i ty 
problems: that engagement of stakeholders is a key aspect of developing a successful solution to fisheries 
problems.
SmartGear is clearly meeting its objective to recognise and reward the initiatives of fishing gear designs and to 
fuel innovation of further developments. For the first time in the upcoming around, the competition will also open 
a new segment specifically for by-catch mitigation designs in tuna fisheries. The SmarGear competition may be 
relatively small at this point, but the process of encouraging industry to design innovative concepts will be key to 
ensuring wide uptake of by-catch mitigation designs. 
These developments are not happening in isolation. A SmartGear design with high uptake (Faroese, Icelandic and 
Norwegian fisheries) was the Flexigrid, which is a further adaptation of the same grids used in both the NPF and 
Barents Sea which is lighter and more flexible. This means is it safer for fishers to handle and will reduce the 
damage caused to by-catch coming into contact with it and target species passing through the grid. Thus once it 
has been shown that gear modifications can lead to significant economic and environmental benefits without 
creating problems for a fishery (such as increased costs, operating time or compromising safety) they are likely to 
be taken up and modified for use in many different fisheries.  
When it comes to introducing a discard ban regime to other areas, the cost of doing so through the same method 
as done by Norway, with high levels of inspection, is often seen as prohibitive. The only way to generate high 
compliance with a discard ban is through regular inspections or the use of on-board observing systems, which are 
also expensive. New technological solutions are being developed, based around electronic (camera) monitoring 
systems, but while these are cheap to install they still require expensive human operators (MRAG 2006).  
However, observers can be very cost-effective on large vessels with high incomes, and provide the certainty of 
monitoring required for accurate stock assessment. At £220 (USD 352) per observer day (a high estimate based 
on European observer programmes) (MRAG 2006), 254,545 observer days would be available for the same price 
as the cost of the Norwegian coastguard for fisheries (£ 60 million; USD 96.1 million). Across the industrial fleet 
of 400 fishing for cod in the Barent Sea, this would equate to 636 days per vessel per year. Furthermore, this cost 
could then be 100% attributable to the fishing industry. 
Figure 35 allows for the possibility to consider areas for applying the experiences from these case studies. The 
map highlights all the FAO areas and their respective estimated percentage of discards to catch. Areas of higher 
percentages indicate where current selectivity measures are inadequate to mitigate high levels of by-catch. 
Furthermore, the volumes indicated in each area highlight regions where levels of protein are wasted and in areas 
where volumes are high, this could also impact stock assessments based on landed catch; as was the case in 
Norway prior to the discard ban. 
BY-CATCH & DISCARDS
Figure 35: Percentage of discard rates by FAO statistical areas. The actual volume of 
estimated discards are also included. High percentages indicate poor catch selectivity 
and large volumes indicate wastes of protein (Source: Kelleher, 2005).* Note data are 
skewed in Area 81, therefore ranking is not possible. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
As the introduction highlighted, world fisheries are in a critical state. Some 28% of stocks are identified as 
overexploited, depleted, or recovering; most of the world’s fishing fleets are overcapacity; approximately 10 
million tonnes of fish are discarded; 11–26 million tonnes (worth USD 10–23 billion) are lost to IUU fishing; and, 
underperformance due to inefficient operations, overexploited stocks and perverse incentives result in an 
estimated loss of USD 50 billion in economic rent each year.  
This report has presented case studies that address the key challenges — overcapacity, perverse subsidies, poor 
governance, lack of data and by-catch and discards – and has emphasised the complex, dynamic and inter-linked 
nature of these challenges. Poor management is often a result of poor governance and non-engagement of key 
stakeholders. This in turn can a) lead to the use of inappropriate management tools, that can have impacts on 
the environment and also b) generate perverse incentives for unsustainable practices leading to the inefficient 
economic operation, overcapacity and non-compliance with rules. There can also be substantial feedback between 
(a) and (b). The case studies show that there are practical ways of meeting these challenges (these are 
summarised in Table 35). 
Addressing overcapacity 
Overcapacity has been identified as one of the most significant challenges facing global fisheries. The case studies 
highlight that the problem of overcapacity is often one of control and that drivers of overcapacity may have their 
origins outside of the fishery. Examples include the incentives created by markets (herring roe) or changing 
environmental conditions (Senegal). It is important that these wider governance issues are considered when 
seeking to address overcapacity. Two main solutions are identified in the report: 
Rights-based approaches are proving to be highly effective as a means to address overcapacity and eliminate 
the ‘race to fish’ in fisheries whose objective is to create an economically efficient fishery and where there are 
capable enforcement systems. This race for fish can lead to problems of ‘high-grading’ and over quota catches. 
Rights-based approaches, particularly those allowing the transfers and trade in rights and quota, can play an 
important role in aligning fishing capacity with fishing opportunities and create economically efficient fleets (e.g. 
Icelandic ITQs). Because these systems generally encourage consolidation in the industry, safeguards may need 
to be put in place to protect some fishery sectors (as in the Pacific halibut fishery).  
Local management measures, often based on traditional practices, have also proven effective in addressing 
overcapacity. These approaches are effective where local people have the authority to make and enforce 
management measures. Management tends to have less emphasis on enforcing catch limits and instead seeks to 
maintain and enhance resource productivity. While these approaches have often been found in small-scale 
fisheries (where rights-based approaches may be expensive in relation to the scale of the fishery), the methods 
that are used, including restrictions on gears and spatial and temporal closures, have wider applicability. 
Addressing perverse subsidies  
Subsidies contribute significantly to the creation of perverse economic incentives, although inappropriate 
management may also generate them. The WTO process represents the best opportunity to tackle harmful 
fisheries subsidies on a global level and lead to real sustainability gains. Influencing public opinion to shape 
political views in advance of the negotiation rounds as opposed to trying to do so during negotiations is the most 
likely means to realise these gains. Unilateral removal of subsidies at a national level may affect international 
competitiveness of domestic industry in the short term, and while possible is likely to encounter significant 
industry resistance.  
Harnessing ethical purchasing choices through market-based mechanisms, including eco-labelling, and 
putting pressure on retailers can be very effective in generating positive economic incentives for sustainable 
fishing. Our case studies have highlighted a range of emerging financial mechanisms and incentives, with entry 
points at all levels, from individual fisheries to national and international initiatives (e.g. MSC and ISSF). 
Addressing poor governance 
Governance is about the politics of natural resource management. Many of the issues of management are, at heart, 
issues of governance. The case studies have demonstrated that even where good management occurs, it can be 
threatened or undermined by poor governance, or be impacted by decisions taken outside the fishery (e.g. Senegal, 
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Fiji, Cornish mackerel). In addressing governance challenges through more inclusive and interlinked decision-making 
processes we are seeking governance arrangements (both formal and informal) that make good management 
possible.  
Because governance is a complex challenge, individual solutions will differ depending on the nature and the 
history of the particular fishery. A common conclusion from our case studies is that bringing stakeholders 
together to address governance challenges is a vital step in making sustainable management possible.  
The case studies also repeatedly reinforced the contested nature of decision-making and the way in which 
different groups sought to legitimise their claims and advance their interests. As the examples of Lake Taal, Fiji 
and Senegal showed, even where there have been powerful vested interests, stakeholders have been able to work 
together and negotiate fisheries objectives and develop mechanisms to achieve these. Within these processes of 
deliberation and debate, local fishers and those dependent on the fisheries represent critical 
stakeholders. The case studies also highlighted that these processes represents a longer-term commitment and 
that there may be situations where there will be winners and losers when reaching consensus on issues is not 
always possible. 
Addressing key gaps in data and control 
Critical data about the operation of fisheries, the target 
species and the ecosystem are often insufficient to allow for 
evidence-based decision-making. The case studies showed 
that acquiring such data can immediately suggest solutions to 
key problems. The placement of scientific observers on
vessels is an obvious step to address this, and is adopted by 
many of the world’s most successful management systems, 
including CCAMLR. 
A key area of uncertainty in many fisheries is discarding, 
which should be monitored closely or eliminated, for example 
the discard ban in Norway. Addressing issues of governance 
and responsibility can contribute to improving data quality. 
The conservation credits scheme, and examples of local 
management and control, provide examples where 
collaborative approaches have been able to foster both 
greater compliance with regulations and more reliable data.  
Implementation of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management in combination with the Precautionary 
Approach allows for the development of suitable approaches in both data-rich and data-poor situations. The 
CCAMLR approach to krill fishery management is one example that utilises concepts from EBFM and the 
Precautionary Approach, explicitly acknowledging the key role that krill plays in the Antarctic food chain. These 
concepts are not new, but they have yet to be consistently applied (Pitcher et al. 2009). Indeed many traditional 
management systems include ecosystem considerations and, as in both the Fiji and Chile case studies, local 
knowledge underpinned the selection of suitable areas for closure. Elsewhere, explicit guidelines are being 
developed by the MSC and Lenfest working groups to ensure that fisheries targeting critical low trophic-level species 
in similar ecosystems such as sardines and anchovies do not adversely impact other species. 
Addressing by-catch and discards
Application of the EBFM, and relevant international agreements such as UNCLOS and UNFSA, require that both 
direct and indirect impacts of fishing should be considered. Chapter 6 demonstrated that solutions to address 
direct impacts are often obvious when the nature of the problem is understood. Although the solutions may not be 
simple, they are best developed in cooperation with fishers who will then be more willing to implement them 
— such as in the case of the Norwegian discard scheme. These schemes are most successful if they work to the 
mutual advantage of fishers and the environment, creating positive financial incentives for their effective 
implementation. The WWF SmartGear competition has been very successful at creating positive incentives, and 
the concept could translate well to other environmental problems. 
CONCLUSIONS
Multi-stakeholder management councils such as 
these can greatly assist in decision-making 
processes. (Photo source: C. Cawthorne). 
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This final section outlines some of the key areas we believe that the case studies have highlighted as a means to 
bring about transformations in fisheries systems. These are presented as recommended actions that can 
contribute to more sustainable and well managed fisheries. 
Harnessing wider support through markets and the value chain 
Fish is  the most widely-traded global agricultural commodity, so it is not surprising that our first recommendation 
is that one of the most effective ways to control overcapacity and to encourage better environmental 
performance is to harness the global market to generate change in fishery management. The value 
chain can represent an important entry point through which stagnant management processes can be held to 
account.  
Actors that are external to the fishery with wide market power can potentially tackle a wide range of problems. 
Many retailers and processors need to secure supplies of fish and therefore have an interest in ensuring fisheries 
are well-managed fisheries and that fishing and aquaculture operations are low impact. Consolidation within the 
sector means that individual processors and retailers are often gaining increasing power to influence the 
operations of fish producers, management bodies and essentially act as informal regulators. 
Food health and hygiene regulations 
represent a formal or legislative entry point 
for change. Requirements for products to 
demonstrate sustainable sourcing could be 
incorporated into such regulations. Other 
options include retailer and processor 
sustainability commitments and certification 
schemes. Many retailers and processors are 
developing and applying ‘best practice’ and 
several already have sustainability criteria 
against which they make themselves 
accountable. Furthermore, retailers and 
processors are working with suppliers to 
reduce the impact and improve the 
sustainability  of their supply chains. 
Certification schemes can have an important 
role in support of these efforts as they 
provide more formal assurance of 
sustainability and are recognised by 
consumers. Examples include the MSC, ASC and other traceability and certification schemes as illustrated in the 
case studies on South African hake, ISSF, Ben Tre clam and salmon farming.  
A key entry point is raising awareness among consumers of how they can contribute to increasing sustainability 
through their purchasing choices. This can help build the political pressure necessary for changes in regulations 
and increase the commitment amongst retailers to source sustainable and certified fish. NGOs and the media 
have an important role to play increasing consumer awareness about the state of fisheries, highlighting more 
ethical purchasing choices and placing pressure on producers. Given the global nature of modern retail 
operations, ensuring retailers and processors hold the same standard across their global branches and operations 
is another key role for consumers, NGOs and media.  
Support subsidy reform and create economic incentives for change 
Our second recommendation is that the economic inefficiencies in the global system must be addressed 
by removing subsidies. Developing innovative financial mechanisms and the inclusion of private financing can 
provide positive economic incentives for more sustainable practices. Even fairly small sums have proven to be 
effective (e.g. supporting technology prizes like SmartGear or contributions to the costs of certification in Ben 
Tre). At the larger scale, endowment funds can be used to finance conservation and management plans. Private 
finance mechanisms can also be used to mitigate short-term costs, for example providing loans to fishers on the 
Recommendations: Addressing the challenges 
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pressure on retailers and political players (Photo: MRAG, 2010) 
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condition that they limit fishing and allow stocks to rebuild. However, as with state subsidies, the role, 
mechanisms and outcomes of all types of private sector financing need to be clear and accountable. A key 
challenge is to identify and mobilise sources of funds, including public-private partnerships, to support these 
innovative schemes. 
Promote rights-based approaches to solve overcapacity 
Rights-based approaches have a high profile in fisheries debates. Many fisheries that are managed for economic 
returns have implemented rights-based systems giving use rights and responsibilities to fishers. When combined 
with tradability and transferability, these systems can provide the opportunity for fishers to maximise their 
efficiency and profitability, and through this to adjust fishing capacity to better match catching opportunities.  
Our third recommendation is that fisheries managed with the objective of maximising economic returns 
should become rights-based, and preferably with tradable rights and quota (ITQ). If the fishery is  
controlled effectively, such systems can generate significant increases in profitability, and at the same time 
reduce capacity to an economic optimum. With increased profitability, governments can capture resource rents 
that can be used to pay for research and management costs. The smaller fleets that result from consolidation 
(capacity reduction) of ITQ fisheries generally mean that control is improved. 
However, ITQs do not automatically improve ecological sustainability. Equity and social issues will also need to be 
explicitly considered as consolidation of large fleets removes smaller players. Because ITQs are an economic 
measure, their implementation may be inappropriate where the main objective of the fishery is not economic — 
for instance, where important objectives are to ensure access to fisheries resources, maximise food production or 
employment. Thus we qualify our recommendation to fisheries managed with economic objectives in mind 
(wealth creation).  
Promoting comprehensive data acquisition to fill information gaps 
Our fourth recommendation is increased investment in data collection, including promoting the use of 
scientific observers and other methods of comprehensive data acquisition including information from fishers 
and a greater role for local knowledge. This will improve knowledge of stock status, improve information flow 
from fisheries and contribute to implementation of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management. 
It is difficult to overstate the benefits that arise from independent scientific observation of a fishery. In addition to 
improving the quality of information on catches, discards and impacts of the fishery on the ecosystem, human 
observation can allow the rapid identification and solution to problems that a management authority did not know 
existed. We would recommend the use of 
observers on board all large vessels, 
where space and cost are not significant 
issues. Systems should aim to observe 
20% of hauls or days fished. Costs of 
observers should be met by industry levy, 
and will generally be lower than 
inspection costs, particularly in ITQ 
fisheries. The high performing CCAMLR, 
USA, New Zealand, South Africa and 
Australian fisheries have extensive 
observer programmes.
Discard bans (such as in Norway) and 
moves from landings quotas to catch 
quotas can also increase the information 
available about fishing, catches and 
interactions with the environment. Where 
the costs of observers are an issue we 
would recommend investment to explore 
CONCLUSIONS
Biological sampling of catch at-sea. Tasks such as these carried out by 
scientific observers is key to filling information gaps and having a greater 
understanding of ecosystem interactions (Photo: MRAG, 2010) 
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the use of automated data collection systems (e.g. Norway and the North Pacific longline fisheries). 
Small vessels and smaller fisheries cannot usually support observers, but here the most effective way of acquiring 
information may be collaboration with fishers, including supporting fishers to contribute to research and even 
undertake their own research. Fishers have extensive knowledge of the fishery and may be able to identify, or 
contribute to identifying, both pressing problems and innovative solutions. In Fiji, Scotland, Senegal  fisher 
knowledge has played an important role in improving data quality and fishers and scientists have appreciated and 
benefited from working together. Encourage collaboration between fishers and management authorities 
on research and data collection.
Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management 
Our fifth recommendation is the widespread application of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management.
Consideration of the ecosystem within a fisheries management context does not always require significant levels 
of investment and the concept of EBFM can be applied to virtually any fishery. However, for more complex 
multispecies fisheries, understanding the dynamics of the ecosystem and developing appropriate management 
measures can prove challenging in practice.  
Where there is uncertainty about the interactions, more precautionary approaches may be more suitable. For 
static habitats (such as coral reefs, spawning grounds of fish, sensitive habitat types) MPAs can make an 
important contribution. It is important that the development and implementation of MPAs is conducted in 
collaboration with industry and local stakeholders and that the MPA are located where they are likely to be most 
effective (e.g. Garaway and Esteban, 2003). For mobile animals, such as juvenile fish, protection is best done 
through interactive closures (such as in Scotland and Norway). Setting management targets and limits in a 
manner that accounts for interactions and interdependencies, for example in the CCAMLR krill fishery, can 
minimise the likely impacts on the wider ecosystem. Management systems should also take note of the recent 
advances in the development of guidelines for fisheries targeting low trophic level species. Raising awareness of 
the importance of considering the interactions between fished stocks and the wider environment and advocating 
the wider application of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management and risk-based approaches represents an 
important first step. 
Promote collaboration in policy making to solve governance problems 
The case studies have shown 
that there is one prerequisite for 
the design of successful 
solutions that is common to 
almost all the challenges, and 
that is to address governance 
issues. Thus, our sixth 
recommendation addresses this 
aspect of  improving 
fisheries governance. Good 
governance can support good 
management and create the 
conditions within which more 
sustainable outcomes are 
achievable. Poor governance 
c a n  u n d e r m i n e  g o o d 
management. The case studies 
have repeatedly shown that 
t he r e  a r e  bene f i t s  i n 
collaborative and inclusive 
approaches to management, 
bringing together different 
stakeholders with different 
knowledge, perspectives to 
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source: S.F.Walmsley). 
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address management challenges (e.g. South Africa hake, Fiji, Mozambique, Scottish aquaculture, ISSF, 
SmartGear). It is important that these processes are transparent and accountable, with assumptions and 
competing objectives for the fishery held up to scrutiny and open to debate.  
We recognise that developing these types of collaborative approaches may not be straightforward. Many fisheries 
are characterised by a history of competing claims. Conflict and confrontation are often a part of the process and 
power relations and vested interests can present significant obstacles to transformation (e.g. Lake Taal). 
Nevertheless, collaborative processes that respect the knowledge, perspectives and positions of different parties 
can help highlight the strengths of stakeholder groups and identify management arrangements that develop their 
potential roles in contributing to sustainability. Working together to achieve sustainability becomes a means to 
further develop trust and respect. 
The most important international governance initiatives currently in existence are the UNFSA and Port States 
Agreement. Key action which will bring about significant benefits is to facilitate and assist the ratification of 
these two instruments by all states.
Support innovation as a processes 
Our final, seventh, recommendation 
is to support processes rather 
than single solutions. The case 
studies have repeatedly highlighted 
that  f isher ies  are dynamic: 
fluctuations in fish populations, 
environmental condit ions and 
changes over time in societal needs 
and aspirations and economic 
conditions, while unpredictable, are 
to be expected. However, they also 
highlight that, against this backdrop, 
fisheries stakeholders are constantly 
innovating  and developing new 
solutions to emergent challenges. For 
example, fuel price increases have 
stimulated many developments in 
fishing technology, particularly with 
low-impact/drag fishing gears.  
As initiatives such as the Marine 
Stewardship Council, Aquaculture 
Stewardship Council, ISSF and 
Aquaculture dialogues have shown, it is possible to initiate processes that develop standards that contribute to 
increased environmental sustainability. Similarly, the WWF SmartGear competition represents an initiative that 
supports industry (and other actors) to develop innovative solutions to by-catch and environmental impacts, such 
as the incorporation of seal escape panels in nets. With suitable investment (e.g. from NGOs, governments and 
the  private sector), these types of process have a potentially wider applicability and can be used to address other 
challenges, for example innovations to improve sustainability of aquaculture operations. 
For these measures to be effective and widely applied, without fear that they will compromise the efficiency of 
fishing operations (and therefore cost the industry money), they must be developed in cooperation with industry. 
Where possible economically advantageous methods, or methods that do not economically disadvantage fishers, 
should be sought  as these will be more acceptable and their implementation is likely to be much more effective 
than imposed solutions. As with many of the management challenges, ultimately the process of arriving at new 
solutions is as important as the solutions themselves. 
CONCLUSIONS
Working with fishers to identify resource-use patterns and prioritise management 
activities and processes. (Photo source: R. Arthur). 
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Table 35: List of case studies, entry points for change, key change agents within the fishery system and 
lessons learned.  
While many of the issues and innovations may have occurred at the management and industry levels, results below highlight that other 
components of the fishery system can act as effective and efficient change agents.
Case study Driver Key entry points Lessons learned 
Alaska: Transferable 
quotas for Pacific 
Halibut, Canada 
Inefficiency
and a race for 
fish
Government
agencies, fishers 
Transferable rights can be an effective method to reduce 
capacity and increase fleet profitability. 
Iceland: Transferable 
quotas
Stock decline 
due to 
overcapacity
Government
agencies
When implementing a transferable rights system, the 
effects on small-scale fleets and communities need to be 
considered.
Canada: Quota pooling 
for herring roe 
Dangerous
short seasons 
Government
agencies
Where capacity cannot leave the fishery, quota pooling 
may be used to reduce management tasks and increase 
profitability.
Vietnam: Ben Tre clam Overharvestin
g driving stock 
declines
NGOs,
government
agencies, fishers 
Certification can increase product prices. However, in 
small-scale fisheries the cost of MSC certification and 
fishery objectives may represent an obstacle to 
certification. 
ISSF: Market-demand 
innovation 
Overcapacity
leading to IUU 
fishing
NGOs, retailers, 
processing
industry, RMFO 
Industry can be responsive to consumer awareness of 
sustainability issues and NGO pressure. NGOs can be 
effective in assisting industry to respond and address 
these concerns. 
Chile: Territorial use 
rights
Economic 
hardship
Government
agency, fishers 
Local knowledge can be key input to successful 
management measures. Need for limiting expectation of 
stock assessment; other approaches exist than purely 
scientific based. 
Tackling subsidies 
through the WTO 
Subsidies
contribute to 
overharvesting 
Governments,
NGOs and public 
International agreement on subsidy restrictions could 
have a positive impact on global fisheries sustainability, if 
restrictions are effective and enforced. 
New Zealand: Removal 
of subsidies
Declining fish 
stocks
Government
agencies, NGOs, 
public, fishers 
Subsidy removal at national level is possible, but may be 
difficult in many cases. Profitable fisheries can enable 
management costs to be recovered. 
Kiribati: Phoenix Island 
Protected Area 
Lack of 
financial
incentives for 
conservation
NGO, government 
agencies
Private investors are prepared to finance conservation 
measures when benefits are sufficiently high. 
Banking on Cod - 
Private Investment 
Creating long-
term
sustainability
NGOs, fishers Private investors could be prepared to finance 
conservation measures when benefits are sufficiently high. 
UK: Cornish mackerel Lack of reward 
for sustainable 
practices
Fishers,
consumers 
Certified fisheries are still subject to externalities which 
may affect their sustainability, and subsequently their 
certification status. 
The Philippines: 
Aquaculture governance 
in Lake Taal 
Addressing
environmental
degradation
Government
agencies, NGOs, 
public
Sustainability may require holding government agencies to 
account; creating pressure for them to address their 
responsibilities. 
South Africa: 
Certification in the hake 
fishery
Maintaining
sustainable
management 
Fishers, NGO, 
government
agencies
Fishers may adopt sustainability measures as a means to 
achieve other objectives and this can represent an 
opportunity.
Mozambique: Co-
management  
Overexploitati
on and conflict 
Government
agency, fishers 
Local people can make valuable contributions to 
management but should not be seen by managers as a 
means to transfer responsibilities and costs. 
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Case study Driver Key entry points Lessons learned 
Antarctic: Ecosystem-
based and precautionary 
management 
Decreasing
seabirds and 
increasing krill 
catches
RMFO Observer programs offer data sources which allow for 
comprehensive ecosystem-based management. 
Fiji: Local knowledge 
and traditional 
management practices 
Developing
community-
based
ecosystem
management 
Fishers, public, 
NGOs
Local knowledge and authority can underpin successful 
management and researchers and other stakeholders 
can have roles in supporting local management. 
Senegal: IUU fishing in 
small-scale fisheries 
IUU fishing Fishers, NGOs, 
government
Factors external to the fishery can contribute to 
increasing capacity and illegal fishing and solutions may 
lie outside the fishery. 
Scotland: Conservation 
Credits Scheme 
Need for 
responsive
conservation
measures
Government
agencies, NGOs, 
fishers
Real-time closures based on active fisher involvement 
can be an effective method, responsive to the dynamic 
nature of fisheries.  
Scottish salmon 
aquaculture
Increasing
environmental
impacts
Fish farmers, 
government
agencies, NGOs 
Development of the industry highlighted a range of 
emerging issues that could be addressed by working 
collaboratively to innovate and identify solutions. 
Australia: Prawn 
seawater hopper 
High discard 
mortality
Fishers Industry driven innovations can work with rather than 
replace current fishing practices. 
Norway: Discard ban Cod stocks 
declining
Government
agencies, fishers 
Discard bans allow for 100% of catch to be recorded, 
thus aiding accurate stock assessment. 
International: WWF 
SmartGear Competition 
Increasing
uptake of 
successful
innovation 
Fishers, NGO,   Private investment can be used to encourage innovation 
to meet sustainable fishing challenges. 
Fishers in India repairing their nets. (Photo source: S.F.Walmsley). 
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GLOSSARY 
Artisanal fisheries 
Traditional fisheries, typically small-scale, involving 
households and communities rather than 
commercial companies. Fishers generally use basic 
technology and work inshore by foot, or near to the 
coast from small vessels. 
Benthic
Refers to the bottom of water bodies, such as the 
sea floor. 
Biodiversity
The variability among living organisms from all 
sources including, among others, terrestrial, marine, 
and other  aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes 
diversity within species and ecosystems. 
Biomass
In a fisheries context: the total weight of a stock of 
living organisms (e.g. fish, plankton) or of some 
defined fraction of it (e.g. spawning females), in an 
area, at a particular time. 
By-catch
Fish and other animals besides the primary target 
species that are caught incidental to the capture of 
the primary target species. By-catch may be 
retained or discarded. 
Catch per unit effort (CPUE) 
Catch per unit of fishing effort. The total catch 
divided by the total amount of effort used to 
capture the fish.  
Closed season 
A period during which fishing for a particular 
species, often within a specified area, is prohibited. 
Collapsed fish stock 
Prolonged lack of annual recruitment of juvenile fish 
due to excessive fishing pressure that leads to the 
reduction of stock abundance to levels at which 
production is negligible compared to historical 
levels.
Co-management 
A process of management in which government 
shares power with resource users, with each given 
specific rights and responsibilities relating to 
information and decision-making. 
Demersal species 
Fish that inhabit the bottom of a water body during 
their adult life. Often referred to as ground fish. 
Depleted stock 
A fish stock where a high proportion of one or all age 
classes of individuals are harvested because of 
excessive fishing pressure that leads to a reduction in 
the spawning stock, limiting the natural reproduction or 
annual recruitment levels. 
Discards
Fish and other animals that are disposed of, usually at 
sea, after being caught. 
Distant water fishing nation (DWFN) 
A national which has a fishing fleet operating far 
outside of it’s Exclusive Economic Zone. 
Effort control 
A system of fishery management that focuses on 
limiting the quantity of fishing gear or the duration of 
its deployment rather than on limiting the quantity of 
catch that can be taken. 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
A zone of water up to 200 nautical miles from the 
boundary of a coastal State within which the coastal 
State has the right to explore and exploit, and the 
responsibility to conserve and manage, the living and 
non-living resources. 
Exploited stock 
Any stock of fish that is subject to commercial fishing 
activity. 
Moroccan fishing harbour. (Photo source: A. Wales). 
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Fish stock 
Scientifically, a population of a species of fish that 
is isolated from other stocks of the same species 
and does not interbreed with them and can, 
therefore, be managed independently of other 
stocks.  
Fishing effort 
The level of fishing gear of a certain type used on 
the fishing grounds over a given unit of time: e.g. 
hours trawled per day, number of hooks set per 
day, or the total number of boats engaged in a 
fishery and/or the number of days they were 
fishing.
Ghost fishing 
The continued capture of animals by fishing gear 
that has been lost or abandoned at sea.  
Harvest Control Rule 
A set of defined rules used to determine 
exploitation rates through controlling factors, e.g. 
catch or effort limits. 
High grading 
The discarding of smaller or lower quality fish of 
the target species to make room in the fish hold 
for larger, more valuable fish caught later in the 
day.
High seas 
High seas is a legal term used to describe the 
areas of water outside of a any national EEZ. 
Highly migratory species
Species or stocks that carry out extensive 
migrations throughout the oceans, usually crossing 
territorial boundaries such as EEZs and between EEZs and 
the high seas. This term is usually used to describe tuna 
and  tuna-like species such as marlins, and swordfish. 
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU 
fishing)
Fishing practices and activities that: contravene applicable 
laws and regulations, or the standards set out within 
international agreements; are not reported, or are 
misreported to a relevant authority; or for which there are 
no applicable conservation or management measures. 
Individual transferable quota (ITQ) 
A type of quota management system that typically entails 
the allocation of a part of the Total Allowable Catch to 
individual fishermen or vessel owners. The quota, once 
distributed, can be sold to others. 
Maximum sustainable yield (MSY) 
The largest average catch or yield that can continuously 
be taken from a stock under existing environmental 
conditions, without significantly affecting the reproduction 
capacity of the stock. 
No-take zone 
A form of marine protected area that is permanently 
protected from all forms of resource exploitation and 
direct destructive activities. Also referred to as a “marine 
reserve” or a “marine sanctuary.” 
Open access 
The right to catch fish is free and open to all. Fishing is 
essentially unrestricted. 
Output controls 
The management measures that limit the catch fishers 
can take. Options include the Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC), and individual quotas (IQ). 
Quota
Amount of catch allocated to a fishing license. 
Recruitment
A measure of the number of fish that enter a class—such 
as the spawning class or fishing-size class—during some 
time period. 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) 
The annual permitted catch for a species or species 
group. Usually a regional council or similar administrative 
body sets the TAC based on the range of the allowable 
biological catch.
French artisanal fishing vessel . (Photo source: I. Parkes). 

